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Abstract 
 
Development aid is an important feature of the international system, and the European 
Union (EU) and its Member States together form the world’s largest development aid donor.  
This research investigates the extent to which the distribution of EU development aid is 
based on need.  Development aid allocations are subject to political considerations and 
biases, and this can lead to significant imbalances between comparable recipient countries.  
The potential exists for the EU to disburse aid using an aid equity approach; multilateral 
donors are generally less subject to traditional aid-biases, and the EU is seen as potentially 
playing a normative role in international affairs.  Thus it is worth considering how the EU’s 
development aid distribution compares to the relative needs of recipient countries, and 
additionally how well it compares to the development aid distributions of key Member 
States. 
This research relates to many theoretical debates, such as the nature of the EU as an 
international actor, and the factors that guide, or should guide, development aid 
distributions.  It examines the EU alongside key Member States, rather than alone or 
alongside other more typically multilateral donors.  Also, compares the EU’s development 
aid distribution against need as indicated by the Human Development Index (HDI), rather 
than against need as measured economically, or against factors of institutional 
performance.  A study such as this has a high degree of social relevance and importance, as 
the issue of global disparities is perhaps the most significant facing our world.  Development 
aid is seen as an important means of helping to improve the quality of life of people in 
developing countries, and the EU and its Member States constitute the leading 
development aid donor. 
The research adopts a quantitative approach, and uses official development aid 
disbursement figures from the OECD.  It creates and introduces an aid allocation model 
based on the HDI.  It then compares the proportions of development aid recommended by 
the model for each recipient against the proportions they actually received during the 2001-
2013 period.  The main finding of the analysis is that the EU’s development aid distribution 
has two clear biases; a geographic bias towards the Enlargement area and Neighbourhood, 
and a population size bias against large countries.  However, once these biases have been 
accounted for, the development aid distribution of the EU is shown to be closely associated 
with relative levels of need as expressed by the model. 
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Section 1.1 – Introduction 
 
The world today is characterised by both concentrated wealth and high levels of 
development, and persistent poverty and inequality.  These unbalanced levels of 
development constitute a major issue facing humanity in the 21st century.  The discipline of 
development studies seeks to improve the quality of life of people throughout the world 
and thus issues pertaining to it have a high degree of social and global relevance.  
Development aid constitutes a financial transfer between wealthy countries and developing 
countries; it is an important feature of the development process and the international 
landscape.  It is widely seen as a means of helping to alleviate poverty and bring about 
development; however its distribution between recipient countries is affected to some 
extent by factors other than need. 
The European Union (EU) as whole is the world’s largest economy and largest development 
aid donor; it thus has the greatest capacity to positively influence events related to global 
development.  Furthermore, it is a unique and interesting actor in the international system, 
and is influenced to some extent by the concept of normative power.  The EU’s approach to 
development specifically is affected by both theories and ideas about development, and its 
own nature and unique features.  This research examines the EU’s approach to 
development aid, and in particular the role that need plays in determining its overall 
development aid distribution. 
In investigating the research topic, the thesis explores many specific issues related to it, and 
they are laid out as follows.  Chapter 1 contains the necessary academic aspects of the 
thesis.  After the introduction, Section 1.2 explicates the research questions that guide the 
structure and subject of the thesis.  The remainder of the chapter overviews the research 
design and methodological aspects of the thesis, sets some delimitations and defines some 
key terms and concepts relevant to the research. 
Due to the large gap between the development studies and European studies disciplines, 
this research examines the EU as a development aid donor from both perspectives.  Chapter 
2 investigates the research topic from a development studies perspective, progressing 
sequentially from the widest to the narrowest aspects.  It begins by overviewing the most 
important theories and ideas about development, before introducing the human 
development approach adopted in this thesis and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs); it then comments on contemporary issues in development and development 
theory.  After an examination of the influential issue of aid effectiveness, Section 2.7 
outlines the most important factors that guide development aid distributions.  The chapter 
ends by explicating an emerging issue in development studies and a secondary focus for this 
thesis, the chronically underfunded countries problem. 
Chapter 3 investigates the research topic from a European studies perspective.  It begins by 
overviewing the complex nature and makeup of the EU, and approaches to understanding it.  
It then outlines the normative power Europe (NPE) theoretical approach to understanding 
the EU as an international actor adopted in this thesis, and examines attempts to link it with 
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EU development policy in particular.  The remainder of the chapter outlines the overall 
approach of the EU to development, and the issue of development aid in particular. 
Chapter 4 has a focus on the model for development aid allocation, based on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which is created and introduced in this research.  It examines 
approaches to measuring need and identifies the HDI as the most appropriate for use.  The 
remainder of the chapter explains the process of creating the model, and displays the actual 
development aid disbursement figures it is later compared against. 
Chapter 5 contains analysis comparing those development aid distributions proposed by the 
HDI-based aid allocation model against actual development aid distributions during the 
MDG era.  It begins by outlying two clear biases in the distribution of EU development aid 
funding, then statistically tests the extent to which development aid funding from the EU 
and three of its key Member States is associated with relative levels of recipient need.  The 
chapter ends by examining the issue of chronically underfunded countries as it relates to the 
EU’s development aid distribution.  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
 
 
Section 1.2 – Research Topic 
 
This research investigates the EU as a development aid donor.  As such, it is situated at the 
nexus between European studies and development studies.  Both of these disciplines can 
influence the matter at hand in a practical sense, however there is not a strong connection 
between them in academia; this research is an attempt to bridge that gap.  It aims to 
influence broader theoretical debates within development studies, particularly around the 
aid effectiveness and aid allocations, and also within European studies, particularly around 
the nature of the EU as an international actor.  In doing so, it aims to help forge a stronger 
connection between the disciplines, and generate findings that can have a wider 
applicability within each of them. 
The particular focus of this research is on what role need plays in guiding EU development 
aid funding allocations.  That is, it specifically sets out to consider the extent to which EU 
development aid is being directed to those recipient countries that need it most.  Therefore, 
the first research question asks: to what extent does the distribution of development aid 
from EU Institutions reflect the relative human development needs of recipient countries?  
This research question can be considered as the main guiding research question that most 
heavily influences the direction and structure of the research.  To answer it involves 
investigating issues around development aid, the EU, and the concept of need. 
As stated above, the EU’s approach to development is influenced by theories and debates 
within both European studies and development studies.  This research is rooted in both 
disciplines, and with the latter in mind the second research question asks: to what extent 
has the EU’s approach to development aid been influenced by development studies and 
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development theory?  To answer this question it is necessary to investigate the specific 
nature of the EU’s approach to development and development aid.  It is also necessary to 
gain an insight and understanding into historic and contemporary debates within the field of 
development studies generally, and into issues around development aid in particular. 
A secondary focus for this research is on a notably problematic issue related to 
development aid provision; that of chronically underfunded countries.  The third research 
question examines this issue, and asks: to what extent does the EU’s overall development 
aid distribution exhibit signs of allowing some recipient countries to go chronically 
underfunded?  Investigating this issue involves understanding the problem and how it arises 
generally, and considering how it relates to the EU’s development aid funding more 
specifically.  It is also worth considering which recipient countries in particular may have 
gone chronically underfunded. 
Again, the EU’s approach to development is influenced by issues within both European 
studies and development studies.  The fourth research question, with the former now firmly 
in mind, asks: to what extent has the EU’s approach to development aid been influenced by 
the nature of the EU itself?  Answering this question involves not only understanding the 
EU’s approach to development, but also investigating the EU itself in greater depth.  This 
involves gaining an understanding of the European integration project, the unique make-up 
and nature of the EU, and how it interacts with the rest of the world.  Relatedly, this 
research uses the concept of normative power to analyse and appraise the EU, and 
therefore the fifth research question asks: to what extent does the EU’s approach to 
development aid indicate that it constitutes a normative power in international relations?  
Answering this question involves investigating the concept of normative power, and 
applying it to the issues raised elsewhere. 
An additional secondary focus for this research is on the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States.  While the Member States are the building blocks of the union, the EU can 
traditionally gain greater influence within a policy area if it can show that its contributions 
provide added value and enhance overall effectiveness.  Thus, it is worth considering how 
the EU performs compared to its Member States in the realm of development.  The sixth 
and final research question examines this issue and asks, in two parts: to what extent does 
the distribution of development aid from EU Member States reflect the relative human 
development needs of recipient countries?; and how does this compare with the EU’s 
development aid distribution?  This two-part question allows for comparisons between key 
Member States and the EU itself to be made.  These comparisons can indicate the extent to 
which the EU’s actions reflect, complement, enhance, or influence in some other way, those 
of its Member States. 
Finally, while this research engages with theory, has explanatory aspects, and is mostly 
evaluative in nature, its aim is to influence policy, and thus can be considered as policy-
oriented research.  The intention is that, in totality, it provides a sufficiently robust analysis 
of the EU’s approach to development aid funding that informed practical policy advice on 
the subject can be offered based on its findings. 
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Section 1.3 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
The research model for this thesis is informed by the main guiding research question, which 
asks to what extent the distribution of development aid from the EU reflects the relative 
human development needs of recipients.  In this research model, need is the independent 
variable.  Need is difficult to define and measure, and Section 4.1 examines this and other 
issues around need further.  The dependent variable in the research model is the 
development aid distribution (of the EU in the main, and secondarily of the key Member 
States).  So in sum, the aim is to examine how need affects the development aid 
distribution(s). 
While only one independent variable has been identified, in order to have a clear core focus 
for the research, it is acknowledged that other intervening variables will influence 
development aid distributions.  Along with need, development aid distributions can be 
affected by factors such as recipient institutional performance, a colonial or special 
relationship bias, a geographic bias, or the well-known small country bias.  These and other 
political factors are examined further in Section 2.7, and collectively the politics of aid 
constitutes the main intervening variable in the research model.  While not the main focus, 
the research inevitably touches on these issues and aims to shed some degree of light on 
them. 
The main research hypothesis is that development aid, from both EU Institutions and 
Member States, is largely driven by need.  That is, that need is an important variable in 
determining development aid distributions.  This hypothesis is a reflection of the generally 
accepted rationale for development aid.  The secondary hypothesis is that EU development 
aid is distributed more strongly on a needs basis than that of its Member States, and thus 
enhances the overall importance of need as a factor.  This reflects the general belief that 
multilateral donors are less influenced by traditional aid biases than states; although due to 
its nature, the EU is not a typical multilateral, it is not unreasonable that this would still 
apply.  Furthermore, the EU is considered to be a possible normative power in international 
affairs, and as such could be expected to have a more need-based development aid 
distribution.  The concept of normative power is quite influential in European studies, and 
has been influenced heavily by the writings of Manners; it is explored further in Section 3.3, 
and serves as a theoretical lens through which the EU as a development aid donor is 
examined.  The third and final hypothesis concerns the second and fourth research 
questions, and is that the EU’s approach to development aid is influenced more strongly by 
its own nature than by development theory.  This reflects the aforementioned gap between 
the two disciplines, and that previous studies of the EU as a development aid donor have 
generally situated themselves within the European studies tradition. 
In order to best examine the extent to which EU development aid reflects the human 
development needs of recipients, it is necessary to adopt a quantitative approach.  Thus, the 
research makes use of official statistics from datasets made available online by 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
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and Development (OECD), which allows for an analysis of where development aid funding is 
actually being directed to.  It is also necessary to consider the wider issues that affect the 
EU’s approach to development, so the research also makes use of other resources, including 
academic sources such as books and journal articles, and documents, reports and 
information pages published online by the EU and other organisations.  Overall, the research 
can be considered as secondary empirical research. 
The quantitative approach has become widely used in the social sciences, and plays an 
important role in development studies.  As the discipline aims to improve people’s lives, it is 
important to try and measure that improvement, in order to verify it.  Although quantitative 
measures are sometimes used at the micro level, more pertinently here they are widely 
used at the macro level.  There is much debate around how best to monitor development 
progress and which indicators best measure development.  Every year, the UN publishes the 
HDI, which is an attempt to quantify development at the macro level.  The HDI can be 
considered as part of the human development approach to development studies, a school 
strongly influenced by the writings of Sen; this theoretical approach is further explored in 
Section 2.2, and (alongside normative power) serves as an additional lens through which the 
research examines the EU as a development aid donor. 
The main advantage of the quantitative approach is its wide scope that allows 
generalisations to be made, and broad conclusions relevant at national and global levels to 
be reached; for this reason, it is widely used when formulating policy.1  The main 
disadvantage of the quantitative approach can also be found in this broadness; it can only 
capture what is easily measurable, cannot show diversity within the units that are being 
measured, and on the whole does not reflect the richness of human life and diversity of 
experiences.2  The possibility of mistakes in the data, or errors in the collection of the data, 
must also be acknowledged.  This is mitigated somewhat in this research by the use of 
widely-respected UN and OECD data.  Overall, despite these concerns, a quantitative 
approach is the most appropriate way to answer the main guiding research question for this 
thesis. 
In order to test the relationship between need and development aid, the specific method 
used is Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient Analysis.  This is a measure of linear correlation 
widely used in the social sciences.  It can indicate the existence of an association or 
correlation between the variables; however, it must be noted that such an association does 
not necessarily equate with a causal relationship.  Also, in order to test some potential 
biases and identify potentially chronically underfunded countries, the research proposes 
and creates an HDI-based aid allocation model.  The performance of both the EU and the 
key Member States is then compared against the model.  Whilst this approach is somewhat 
experimental, it is similar to that used in two key studies that have been published on the 
                                                          
1 Carvalho, S. and H. White (1997). Combining the Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Poverty 
Measurement and Analysis. Washington D.C., The World Bank. pp. 10-13. 
2 Ibid. pp. 10-13. 
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matter.3,4  Although the research is quantitative in nature, it is not overly statistical, and its 
theoretical grounding in both development studies and European studies is of primary 
importance.  Statistical data is used so it can be interpreted appropriately in ways that elicit 
suitable practical policy advice. 
This research takes a comprehensive approach to analysing the EU as a development aid 
donor; rather than focussing on a particular recipient, selection of recipients, or region, it 
considers disbursements to all recipients of EU development aid.  In this way, the EU itself is 
the case that is being studied, and it is a pertinent case due to its unique and prominent role 
in international affairs and overall status as the world’s leading donor.  For the Member 
State comparisons, the Member States selected are France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom (UK).  The EU now has 28 Member States, and while each has its own development 
programme, it is unfeasible in a research project of this size to analyse all of them.  France, 
Germany and the UK are the Member States with the largest development aid budgets in 
absolute terms, and dispense volumes comparable to that of the EU Institutions; 
additionally, they are widely seen as the strongest and most influential states within the EU.  
As the focus of this research is on the EU as a development aid donor, the main use of the 
key Member States is for comparative purposes, and the underlying factors that influence 
their own specific approaches to development are not emphasised. 
Finally, regarding the philosophy of science, this research could be seen as traditionally 
positivist, due to its empirical quantitative approach.  However, it also engages extensively 
with theory, and aims to remould and improve reality rather than just describe it; in this 
way it could be seen as belonging to the post-positivist critical theory school.  Essentially, it 
does not take a strong position on issues relating to the philosophy of science, as most 
methods of building and refining human knowledge have some degree of validity, which 
rests mainly on their relevance to the subject matter.  The methods and overall approach 
used in this research are selected primarily due to their practical usefulness in answering the 
research questions. 
 
 
Section 1.4 – Delimitations 
 
While the research topic and approach is as defined in the previous sections, it remains 
necessary to clearly define and clarify some of its parameters. 
To begin with, the time-period for which data is included, is 2001-2013.  In the latter part of 
2000, the MGDs were signed.  These goals, which will be explored further in Section 2.3, 
                                                          
3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012). Identification and Monitoring of 
Potentially Under-aided Countries. Development Assistance Committee. Paris, OECD.  
 
4 Utz, R. (2010). Will Countries with Insufficient Aid Please Stand Up? Concessional Finance and Global 
Partnerships Vice Presidency. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
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were a significant global endeavour and become hugely influential within the realm of 
development.  Their signing represented a paradigm shift such that the subsequent period 
can be considered as the MDG era.  The aim of this thesis is to, as best possible, take a 
macro historical snapshot of that MDG era, in order to allow for conclusions about the 
period as a whole to be reached.  The year 2000 is generally used as a baseline year in the 
collection and display of MDG data, rather than as part of the period itself, so is thus 
excluded; for the purposes of this research, 2001 is seen as the beginning of the MDG era.  
2013 is the final year included in the study, as although the MDG era continues two years 
beyond it, at the time of writing it is the most recent year with available HDI and 
development aid data.  Additionally, in the year 2000, the EU signed the Cotonou 
Agreement with a number of developing countries; this represented a paradigm shift of its 
own, with regards to the EU’s approach to development.  The Cotonou Agreement will be 
explored further in Section 3.5, and its historically close proximity in start-date with the 
beginning of the MDG era gives further rationale for the time-period used in the research.  
As the explicit focus of the research is on the MDG period as a whole, it will not examine 
changes or trends that may have occurred within the period.  This approach reinforces the 
wider holistic perspective taken in the research.  The MDGs were replaced in late 2015 by 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which means the MDG era is coming to a close.  
As the world transitions away from the MDG era, now is an appropriate time to look back on 
the period, and reflect on what learnings can be taken from it moving forward. 
Secondly, the research has an exclusive focus on development aid, rather than including 
other types of financial flows.  It is important to acknowledge that development aid is not 
the only means of financing that is used for the purposes of development; others can 
include the likes of remittances, private donations or private aid, other capital or investment 
flows, and domestic taxation or resource mobilisation.  While issues around financing for 
development are touched upon in the research, these other types of financial flows are not 
included in the analysis; they are each distinct enough from development aid in varying 
ways, and their distributions are likely to be driven by rationales other than need.  Also, 
there is the issue of humanitarian aid, a specific type of aid that is given in the immediate 
aftermath of disasters and financed through its own mechanisms, which is sometimes 
analysed alongside development aid.  It is deemed outside of scope for this research, as its 
distribution is likely and understandably to be driven by a different logic based on the spatial 
occurrence of disasters. 
Additionally, it is important to note that this research examines development aid 
disbursements, rather than development aid commitments.  That is, it examines the 
distribution of how EU development aid funding has actually been allocated to recipient 
states.  Also, it uses net disbursements rather than gross disbursements, as in the MDGs, 
and again, considers disbursements to all countries that receive EU development aid.  A 
disbursement represents an actual financial transfer, and thus an analysis of disbursements 
most accurately shows where the EU’s development aid priorities lie. 
Finally, when examining the EU’s development aid priorities, this research considers 
priorities in terms of recipient states, rather than sub-state units, or sectors.  Although 
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states vary in size and other characteristics (and although the European integration project 
is bringing this assumption into question), they are widely considered the building blocks of 
the international system.  As such, it is common across international organisations to 
aggregate data at the level of the state, and states are commonly used as the unit of 
analysis in studies of this type.  While development aid distributions may be skewed within 
states, this is difficult to ascertain when studying a large number of states, and unfeasible to 
examine in this research.  Relatedly, a focus on priorities in terms of recipient states is 
adopted in preference to a focus on sectoral priorities.  Development aid can have a specific 
sectoral focus on the likes of good governance, infrastructure, absolute poverty reduction, 
education, conflict prevention, or something else.  These sectoral issues permeate 
throughout the development discourse and thus are inevitably touched on in the thesis, 
however, as they have lesser relevance to the research questions, they are not the main 
focus for analysis. 
 
 
Section 1.5 – Key Terms and Concepts 
 
The research makes use of a number of terms and concepts, and some of the most 
important are clarified here. 
Development aid is a feature of the international relations landscape being analysed in this 
research.  It is a financial transaction between a development aid donor and a development 
aid recipient, made with the explicit purpose of helping the recipient in the development 
process in some way shape or form.  This research uses the term development aid, or 
sometimes the short form of aid, however it can also be known as development assistance, 
overseas development assistance, or ODA. 
Developing countries refers to those countries in the international system that are generally 
recipients of development aid and seen to be less developed or less wealthy.  The term 
developing countries is preferred to the likes of undeveloped countries, underdeveloped 
countries or less developed countries in this research.  It is also generally preferred to 
categorisations such as low income countries, as development encompasses more than just 
incomes.  Categorising the countries of the world in terms of their levels of development is 
problematic, and it is acknowledged that the term developing countries is slightly 
misleading, as all countries could be said to be developing in some way.  However, it is 
necessary for the practical purposes of the research to have a particular term consistently 
used, and developing countries is widely used in this way in the field of development 
studies. 
The development aid distribution refers to the proportions of overall development aid 
packets that particular recipient countries receive, rather than the absolute amount they 
receive.  As this research examines development aid distributions, it takes that stance that a 
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more equitable distribution is feasible regardless of the overall absolute size of the 
development aid packet. 
The European Union (EU) is the international actor being examined in this research, and is 
referred to throughout the thesis.  Section 3.1 overviews the nature and history of the EU.  
It is the current institutional form of the European integration project, and was established 
as such in 1993.  For simplicity, pre-existing formal structures of the European integration 
project are generally referred to as EU also. 
Normative power Europe (NPE) is a theoretical lens being adopted in this research, and it is 
overviewed in Section 3.3.  It is a particular conception of international relations, but is not 
widely referred to in that field; rather it is usually applied in particular to the EU by many 
within European studies. 
Need is the key independent variable in this research, and the focus is on how to practically 
operationalise the concept, rather than on the philosophical underpinnings of the concept 
itself.  Section 4.1 examines different approaches to measuring or quantifying need.  
Poverty is a concept referred to often in development studies, and in this research it 
considered closely related to need, as both influence the overall development status of a 
country. 
The 0.7% target is an important concept in studies of development aid.  It refers to the 
proportion of their gross national income that wealthy countries have repeatedly 
committed to giving as development aid. 
The MDG era is the survey period for this research.  The Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) were signed in 2000 and were the driving force in international development until 
2015.  When used in relation to the practical purposes of this research, the term MDG era 
refers more accurately to the 2001-2013 period from which data was included; the term 
MDG period is generally used synonymously with MDG era. 
Finally, chronically underfunded countries refers to those development aid recipients that 
receive a smaller proportion of development aid than their level of need indicates they 
should, over an extended period of time.  To be clear, it refers specifically to those countries 
that are relatively under-aided, rather than absolutely under-aided, as based on an absolute 
scale most developing countries could reasonably be considered under-aided.  The use of 
the term chronically is justified by the long survey period used in the research.  The term 
donor orphans is more commonly used to refer to these countries, but it is generally not 
used in this research as it problematically infantilises developing countries; the more 
descriptive term of chronically underfunded countries is preferred in this research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
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Section 2.1 – Development Studies and Development Theory 
 
Development studies is a multi-disciplinary field concerned with issues pertaining to the 
quality of life of people in the developing world.  Theoretically, it seeks to understand how 
states change and evolve in ways that improve the wellbeing of their populations.  In an 
applied sense, it seeks to investigate and propose how actors can influence the process of 
those changes.  It is accompanied by a large and dense body of development theory, of 
which the most influential parts are overviewed in this chapter.  As a discipline, 
development studies has a specific and explicit normative point of departure, the goal of 
improving lives, that sets it apart from other academic disciplines.  Because this goal serves 
as a guide and motivator, it is particularly concerned with the practical relevance of 
research.5 
While development studies has seen much growth in the last 25 years, its emergence as a 
discipline is usually dated to the post-World War II era of decolonisation.  At this time, 
wealth and high levels of development were seen to characterise some parts of the world, 
while others were seen to exist in a contrasting state of poverty.  A desire to spread that 
wealth and development to those poorer parts of the world, and improve their economic 
prospects, motivated early developmentalists.  In 1949, then-United States President 
Truman spoke about better using the world’s resources to relieve the suffering of people 
around the world; he saw greater economic production as the key to prosperity and peace, 
and scientific and technical knowledge as the means of achieving that greater production.6  
Truman’s speech is widely seen as a historical demarcation point, after which development 
itself became a subject of overt practical and academic concern. 
This conception of development, where the focus was on diffusing science and technology 
to increase productivity, became known as modernisation theory, and it effectively occupied 
the default theoretical position in development studies.  It contended that the path taken by 
the wealthier countries provided a model that the developing countries could follow.  In 
order to replicate the progress of the more advanced countries, it held that developing 
countries needed to undergo a shift in mentality from traditional to modern values, and 
traditional beliefs were often seen as a barrier to progress and economic growth.  It also 
advocated for increased trade, market-friendly policies, and the development of a dynamic 
private sector, led and directed by a strong state.  In addition to its strong normative or 
ethical element, development was imbued with a strong political element from its outset.  
The United States and the capitalist countries offered the developing countries a vision of 
                                                          
5 Sumner, A. (2006). "What Is Development Studies?" Development in Practice 16(6): 644-650. 
 
6 Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum. "Truman's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949."   
Retrieved 16 November, 2015, from 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm. 
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development through modernisation and economic growth, in part as a means of 
countering and reducing the influence of the Soviet Union and the communist countries.7,8 
The modernisation approach was most memorably systematised by Rostow, who detailed 
the stages of economic development a developing country needed to pass through, in order 
to catch up with the advanced industrialised countries.  In Rostow’s model, the initial stage 
was traditional society, and in the second stage the country would develop the 
preconditions for take-off; this would be followed by the take-off itself, a drive to maturity, 
and finally a stage described as the age of high mass consumption.9  Development was 
therefore conceived of by modernisation theory as a linear process of economic growth, 
with a focus on increasing incomes by increasing the overall production level of the state. 
Modernisation theory did not go unchallenged, especially in the developing world itself, 
where states sought to determine the most appropriate development strategies to adopt.  
Of particular concern was deciding the degree to which they should engage in international 
trade or focus on building their own industries.  Over time, the main school that formed as a 
critique or counterpoint to modernisation theory was dependency theory.  It observed many 
realities of the post-World War II and post-colonial experience for developing countries, 
considered their engagement with modernisation to be a failure, and sought to explain why.  
Dependency theory argued that the world was made up of a developed core and an 
underdeveloped periphery; this global system was structurally unfair and generated 
unequal exchanges between core and periphery.  From this perspective, economic growth in 
the wealthy core countries was occurring through exploitation of the periphery, and thus 
developing countries were poor, and remained so, precisely because of their peripheral 
place in the system.10,11 
Dependency theory is often associated with the writings of Frank, who analysed Latin 
America in particular.  He believed that the poor status of developing countries was not akin 
to a start point, as proposed by the stages of growth model, but rather more akin to an end 
point, due to the legacy and ongoing effects of the colonial era.  Furthermore, he argued 
that the stages of growth model was an inaccurate conception of the reality for developing 
countries; while the wealthy countries of the time had once been undeveloped, their 
economic progression had taken place in a different historical context and did not provide a 
viable model to replicate.  For Frank and other dependency theorists, developing countries 
instead existed at the periphery of a system deliberately constructed for their exploitation; 
                                                          
7 Willis, K. (2011). Theories and Practices of Development. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge. pp. 44-47. 
 
8 Harriss, J. (2014). Development Theories. International Development: Ideas, Experiences, and Prospects. B. 
Currie-Alder, R. Kanbur, D. M. Malone and R. Medhora. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 35-49. 
 
9 Willis, K. (2011). Theories and Practices of Development. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge. p. 46. 
10 Conway, D. and N. Heynen (2014). Dependency Theories: From ECLA to Andre Gunder Frank and beyond. 
The Companion to Development Studies. V. Desai and R. B. Potter. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge: 111-115. 
 
11 Harriss, J. (2014). Development Theories. International Development: Ideas, Experiences, and Prospects. B. 
Currie-Alder, R. Kanbur, D. M. Malone and R. Medhora. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 35-49. 
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their development prospects within this system were seen as low, and it would be advisable 
for them to disengage and remove themselves from it as best possible.12 
Dependency theory strongly influenced and helped spawn political theories such as world 
systems theory, which would itself have some influence on perspectives of development.  
While dependency and its related approaches challenged the dominant paradigm of 
modernisation, the solution of disengaging from the system proved impractical.  Ultimately, 
neither modernisation nor dependency became universally accepted, or seen as successful 
in bringing about development, and the discipline was for some time at a theoretical 
impasse between them.  Neither was seen as providing a satisfactory account of differences 
in the development experience between different countries, nor a full understanding of the 
complex challenges that developing countries faced.13 
The impasse in development studies would eventually be broken by the arrival of neoliberal 
development.  This approach had its roots in the neoliberal economics and politics that had 
become influential in the United States and a number of other wealthy countries.  The 
neoliberal economic approach involved a rise in the influence of private and corporate 
interests, and a reduction in the power of the state.  Neoliberal development can be 
considered as the application of this approach to development studies; it served as 
something of a spiritual successor to modernisation, and a counterpoint to dependency.  It 
believed that globalisation and free markets could bring about positive change to 
developing countries, and thus advocated they increase international trade and integrate 
further into the global economy, in order to achieve development progress and economic 
growth.14,15 
Neoliberal development contended that previous efforts at achieving development had 
been unsuccessful due to poor choices made by states.  Thus, it advocated for the removal 
of the state as the leading actor in determining development strategies.  Instead, it argued 
that development be led by international institutions, while the state played a diminished 
role of enacting the prescribed policies.  This attitude towards the role of the state 
represents the main differentiation point between neoliberal development and 
modernisation theory.  The international institutions that were to lead the development 
process were the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the precursor to 
the World Trade Organisation, and collectively they constituted the Washington Consensus.  
They would prescribe specific policies designed to increase the economic competitiveness of 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
 
13 Schuurman, F. J. (2014). The impasse in development studies. The Companion to Development Studies. V. 
Desai and R. B. Potter. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge: 21-25. 
 
14 Willis, K. (2011). Theories and Practices of Development. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge. pp. 41-54. 
 
15 Cammack, P. (2002). Neoliberalism, the World Bank, and the New Politics of Devleopment. Development 
Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives. U. Kothari and M. Minogue. Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave. 
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developing countries, through the likes of trade liberalisation, reduced public spending and 
the privatisation of state assets.16 
From the late 1980s onwards, acute financial crises in the developing world began to take 
place.  The Washington Consensus responded to these crises by creating Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) for developing countries.  These would be based on the 
policies associated with neoliberal development, and developing countries were required to 
accept these policy programmes as a condition of accessing the required loans or debt 
relief.  In this way, the principles of neoliberal development were effectively imposed on 
much of the developing world.17 
Another response to the modernisation-dependency impasse was to question the whole 
idea of development itself.  Over time, this would lead to the rough coalescence of the post-
development school, which includes those approaches that ultimately reject the notion of 
development; this line of thought was related to the post-positivist and post-structural 
trends seen in the latter part of the twentieth century in the social sciences more generally.  
While the development industry had grown over time, for post-developmentalists it had 
patently failed to positively transform the developing world, an outcome they saw as a 
result of its own intrinsic features.  For instance, incapable of uncoupling itself from 
modernisation and neoliberalism, development was seen as inherently ethnocentric, 
restrained by donor dictates and overly technocratic.  Furthermore, while development was 
cast as a failure, the nature of what it sought to impose on the developing world meant its 
potential success was also seen as undesirable.  So, for post-developmentalists, 
development was a failure not due to poor execution, but rather due to its own problematic 
nature.18,19 
Post-development is often associated with the writings of Escobar, who saw development as 
a means through which Western countries exercised control over the developing world.  He 
took inspiration from those who studied the cultural legacies of colonialism and applied 
their post-colonial perspective to development.  For Escobar, development was a means 
through which Western countries could assert their moral and cultural superiority over the 
developing world, impose their view of progress on it, manage it, and remould it in their 
own image; development was also seen as prejudicially asserting modern lifestyles as 
inherently superior to traditional ones.  Overall, Escobar believed development to be a 
disempowering successor of colonialism and a form of cultural imperialism.  The post-
development solution was to encourage local communities to re-engage with their own 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Conway, D. (2014). Neoliberalism: Globalization's neoconservative enforcer of austerity. The Companion to 
Development Studies. V. Desai and R. B. Potter. Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge: 106-111. 
 
18 Rist, G. (1997). The History of Development: from Western Origins to Global Faith. London, Zed Books. 
 
19 Sidaway, J. D. (2014). Post-development. The Companion to Development Studies. V. Desai and R. B. Potter. 
Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge: 147-152. 
Page 23 of 127 
 
traditions and identities, and to remove themselves from the Western-led development 
framework that prevented them from developing in the ways that they themselves saw fit.20 
As with dependency theory, post-development solutions generally proved impractical, 
particularly so given the massive growth of the development industry.  Furthermore, the 
approach has been seen as minimising those genuine gains for many people in the 
developing world that have been brought about by development, and of romanticising 
traditional ways of life, which can themselves be problematic in their own ways.  
Nonetheless, post-development has been able to take up a seemingly permanent position in 
the academic discourse, as something of a constant critical companion to development. 
 
 
Section 2.2 – The Human Development Approach 
 
During the final 15 years of the 20th century, neoliberal development occupied a dominant 
position in the development discourse, but it did not go uncriticised or unchallenged.  The 
neoliberal development approach came to be seen as overly scientific, dogmatic, and 
removed from real-world concerns and experiences; the SAPs that it favoured were 
particularly controversial and were widely seen as responsible for bringing harm and 
negative effects to the people of the developing world.21  An alternate perspective that 
gained some traction was the basic needs approach to alleviating poverty; this drew 
attention to the unequal nature of economic growth, and argued that instead of focussing 
on economics, development should work directly on ending poverty and providing the basic 
necessities of life to all people.22  This perspective helped give rise to the human 
development approach, which would challenge the dominance of neoliberal development, 
and eventually surpass it.  While post-development was seen as a rejection of development, 
human development can be seen both as an attempt to humanise development, and as an 
attempt to broaden and expand what development is considered to be. 
The leading human development theorist is Sen, and his writings are seen as embodying the 
human development position.  His early work focussed on famines, and he argued that they 
were not the result of a lack of food, but rather of a lack of access to food, caused by 
political failures; the solution to ending famines thus lay not in greater food production, but 
in rectifying these political failures.  Sen believed that all humans were entitled to live good 
lives in the manner of their choice, and that certain basic freedoms must be in place in order 
for them to do so.  In his 1999 seminal text, Development as Freedom, he argued that 
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21 Conway, D. (2014). Neoliberalism: Globalization's neoconservative enforcer of austerity. The Companion to 
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expansion of freedoms was integral to development itself, as it constituted both the means 
and the ends of development.23  This viewpoint, often called the capabilities approach, saw 
poverty as a denial of human freedoms and capabilities, and development as an extension 
of freedoms and capabilities to all people.  Thus, Sen reframed the purpose of development 
as being human capacity development, rather than economic development.24 
Sen identified five specific types of freedom that constituted development; political 
freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective 
security.25  These freedoms were intrinsically interconnected with each other, and his 
concern was with the capability of humans to actually live them out in real life, as nominal 
freedoms of some kind could not always be exercised if freedom was restricted in other 
ways.  If these freedoms were genuinely in place, then individuals would be free to use 
them as they wished when making their life choices.  In a practical sense, the human 
development approach provided a new way of appraising success in development, based on 
the expansion of human freedoms and capabilities, rather than on the expansion of incomes 
or economic production.  The role of development actors was thus not to provide universal 
blueprints or answers, but rather to work to enhance freedoms that gave local people the 
capability to make their own choices.  Per the human development approach, development 
could be seen as the removal of those structures that prevented humans from exercising 
their own agency.  The intention was that people in developing countries could transition 
from being seen as passive recipients of development programmes, to active and 
empowered agents free to determine their own destinies.26 
An important aim of the human development approach was to expand what was classified 
as development progress beyond numerical economic measures.  Its focus on freedom 
constituted a deliberate attempt to fundamentally question modernisation theory and 
neoliberal development, and move the development discourse beyond them.  This is clear in 
Sen’s seminal text, which he opens by stating that “focusing on human freedoms contrasts 
with narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of 
gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or 
with technological advance, or with social modernization”.27  However, while the human 
development approach is critical of an excessive focus on economics, it does not 
fundamentally reject it in the way post-development does.  It generally considers free 
markets and economic growth not as an ends for development, but nonetheless as an 
important means; markets are seen as necessary but not sufficient or prime-determinant in 
the process of enhancing human freedoms.  Thus, overall, the human development 
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approach is best considered as a composite approach that sees both economic and social 
factors as important to development.28 
Given this broader view of what constitutes development, the human development 
approach espouses the importance of using non-economic indicators, alongside more 
traditional economic indicators, as measures of development.  This approach has become 
highly influential in the international arena, particularly in the United Nations (UN), and 
composite indexes are now widely used in the place of purely economic indexes, when 
attempting to quantify development.  A prominent example of this is the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which was created in-part by Sen, and is compiled and published 
by the UN.  This index uses life expectancy at birth, actual and expected years of schooling, 
and gross national income as its input factors; these factors represent health, education and 
living standards respectively, and are combined into a single score that gives an indication of 
the development level of a state.29 
The concept of freedom as both the means and ends of development became highly 
influential in development studies.  The human development approach, with its focus on 
developing and expanding human capabilities, offered a practical medium way between 
neoliberal development and some of the spirit of those critical approaches seen as 
unworkable.  During the 2001-2013 period examined by this thesis, human development 
can be seen as the dominant paradigm in development studies, and thus the appropriate 
theoretical lens to adopt.  In particular, as will be discussed further in Section 4.1, the HDI 
offers an appropriate and useful means of measuring or quantifying the respective 
development levels of development aid recipients. 
 
 
Section 2.3 – The Millennium Development Goals 
 
In September 2000, the UN adopted the Millennium Declaration, from which the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were derived.30  The MDGs would become hugely 
influential in the realm of development, and were the first comprehensive and globally 
collaborative effort to identify and quantify development priorities.  Their aim was to 
facilitate and inspire global development, by providing humanity with targets that all  
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Goal 1   Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty 
Goal 2   Achieve Universal Primary Education 
Goal 3   Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women 
Goal 4   Reduce Child Mortality 
Goal 5   Improve Maternal Health 
Goal 6   Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases 
Goal 7   Ensure Environmental Sustainability 
Goal 8   Develop a Global Partnership for Development 
Figure 1: The Millennium Development Goals31 
 
countries could work towards.  The goals were time-bound and the target date for their 
achievement was set at 2015; with 2000 being used as a baseline or zero year, the 2001-
2015 period can appropriately be labelled as the MDG era.  In totality, the MDGs consisted 
of a collection of the eight overarching macro goals listed in Figure 1, 18 constituent targets, 
and 48 specific indicators; the headline goal was to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, 
and overall they reflected a broad understanding of what constituted development.32 
While the MDGs represented the culmination of a political process led by the UN and 
influenced by various actors, they were clearly inspired by the human development 
approach to development studies.  The MDGs are infused with the ambition of enhancing 
human freedoms and capabilities, and expand out specific components of this ambition to 
track on a macro scale.  Furthermore, the change in thinking from the neoliberal 
development approach to the human development approach, which advocated that 
development be understood more broadly, created the possibility for a comprehensive set 
of global development goals like the MDGs to be imagined and enacted.  So, while the 
MDGs represent an achievement in international collaboration, they also represent the 
landmark achievement of the human development approach, and reflect what factors were 
believed to constitute human development at the time of their signing.  During the MDG 
era, the goals drove and directed most work in development, and came to encapsulate 
development itself.  At a community level, development practitioners worked to empower 
local people to develop capabilities to effect the changes outlined in the first seven MDGs.  
While at a state level, developing countries worked towards the achievement of the goals, 
and donor countries often reformulated their approach to development to more closely 
reflect them. 
Though much work in development relates to the first seven MDGs, given the significant 
role that donors can play in shaping development outcomes, it is important to consider 
issues related to the global partnership for development referred to in MDG 8.  The first 
indicator for MDG 8 refers to tracking the total proportion of their gross national income 
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that wealthy countries give as development aid.33  While reference to a specific target 
proportion is absent from the MDGs themselves, in international development the widely-
accepted target proportion for development aid from wealthy countries is 0.7% of gross 
national income; this wide understanding is a result of this particular target being called for 
and committed to many times in many different settings over the years.34,35  For its part, the 
European Union (EU) has endorsed and subscribed to the MDGs, and its approach to 
development is influenced by them.36  Furthermore, it has specifically adopted the 0.7% 
target as a goal for its Member States to work towards.37  Section 3.7 examines this further, 
and in particular, how much development aid EU Member States gave during the MDG era, 
and how this compared to the 0.7% commitment.  By including MDG 8 in the MDG 
framework, the international community confirmed the important role that development 
aid itself is seen as playing in the overall development process. 
The UN considers the MDGs to have been successful in inspiring a global movement working 
towards the achievement of human development objectives.  It believes they have 
generated remarkable gains, noting the halving of the number of people living in extreme 
poverty, and the progress made towards the other ambitious goals; however, it does 
acknowledge the persistence of global poverty and inequality, and the uneven nature of 
development progress during the MDG era.38  This mostly-positive view of the MDGs is not 
shared by all, and in addition to criticisms around the specifics of the goals, some have 
questioned whether development progress that occurred during the MDG era can be 
directly attributed to the goals themselves.39,40 
With the MDG era coming to an end, as intended, in 2015, the international community has 
agreed on a new set of goals for international development that will replace the MDGs.  
These will be known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and, like the MDGs, their 
signing represents the culmination of a contested political process conducted through the 
UN.  The new goals represent the convergence of the human development agenda with the 
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sustainability agenda, and reflect a new paradigm of thinking in development studies that 
may well predominate in the forthcoming years.41  Nevertheless, for the purposes of and 
during the study period for this research, it was MDGs, the global partnership for 
development, and the 0.7% target that were of upmost importance.  As the world moves 
into the SDG era, now is a pertinent time to look back on the MDG era and consider what 
lessons can be taken from it. 
 
 
Section 2.4 – Contemporary Issues in Development 
 
In contemporary times, the world remains characterised by both the presence of high levels 
of development, and the persistence of global poverty and inequality.  Within development 
studies, particular issues of interest have included the ongoing evolution of development 
theory and an increased focus on development aid itself. 
Theories about development exist under constant contestation, and their importance lies in 
the impacts they can have on development practice.  Development began with 
modernisation theory, and its concern with economic growth, as a foundation, but with the 
passage of time a wider understanding of development has emerged, and it is no longer 
seen exclusively as a linear or cumulative process.  However, donors can vary widely in the 
aspects of development they choose to focus on, and the development theories they are 
more strongly influenced by.  The UN and many other donors have been influenced heavily 
by the human development approach and the MDGs, with their social focus on 
empowerment and expanding capabilities.  Meanwhile, despite the dominance of human 
development, other influential actors have retained a neoliberal development approach; the 
institutions of the Washington Consensus and the United States are known for their ongoing 
promoting of market-friendly policies, economic growth, and the reforming of governance 
in developing countries.  Chapter 3 of this thesis examines the EU and its approach to 
development, and considers how that approach may have been influenced by theories 
about development, as well the nature of the EU itself. 
The continuing undercurrent of post-development thought sees the seemingly permanent 
presence of poverty and increasing inequality as a failure of development.  It sees 
development as a practice still dominated by modernisation theory and its rebooted guise 
of neoliberal development, and responsible for implementing a flawed planning approach, 
exhibiting dangerous short-termism, and causing environmental destruction.  For post-
developmentalists, the development industry itself is what remains problematic, and 
reforming or humanising past practices is not sufficient to redeem it.  While post-
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development is still largely seen as sitting outside development, some of its critiques have 
had a reforming influence on development practices, and will likely continue to do so.42 
In recent years, concerns over climate change, biodiversity degradation, excessive 
exploitation of the finite resources of the earth, and a need to better preserve the earth for 
future generations, have become more prominent.  This concern for environmental and 
ecological sustainability infers that there are limits to the desirable levels of consumption 
and development.  The sustainability agenda has thus been applied to development studies, 
and this has formed the sustainable development approach.  While based on concerns for 
environmental sustainability, when applied to development it has become understood more 
widely to include the likes of economic, social and political sustainability.43  This approach 
has gained much credence in international development, and with the MDG era coming to 
an end, the UN has replaced the MDGs with the SDGs; the new goals are notably more 
comprehensive, and reflect a combination of human development and sustainable 
development concerns.44 
The institutionalisation, through the UN, of the sustainable development approach indicates 
that it has taken up the dominant theoretical position in development studies.  However, 
this position is unlikely to remain stable or uncontested, as history suggests that ideas and 
theories about development can remain influential long after their initial emergence.  It 
would seem highly probable that the neoliberal development approach, for instance, will 
remain influential for the foreseeable future, possibly in an adapted form.  At the same 
time, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the gradual trend towards broader, more 
universal and holistic understandings of development will continue to generate new 
approaches into the future.  However, some have noted that different approaches to 
development can work in different contexts, and suggested that universal theories or 
approaches, due to their nature, cannot capture the complexity of humanity or the 
development process.45  These ideas all offer possible glimpses into what development 
theory could look like in the future. 
Returning to the MDG era, the period has seen an explosion of interest in development 
studies, and a marked diversification in the specific aspects of it that have become areas of 
analysis.  These include the likes of globalisation, employment and development, rural 
development, urbanisation and development, the environment and development, gender 
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and development, global health, education, and conflict prevention and resolution.46  
Attention has also been drawn to a number of challenges to the traditional development 
model that have materialised during the period.  Big philanthropy, as typified by Gates, is 
having an increasing influence on development; this approach bypasses traditional donors, 
and gives funding to recipients directly from wealthy private individuals.47  The mega-
proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in development continues 
to take much practical development work out of the hands of recipient states themselves; 
this trend began when the neoliberal development approach sought to reduce the influence 
of recipient state actions on development outcomes, and has accelerated through the 
human development approach-influenced MDG era.  Finally, the Cotonou Agreement, which 
has a particular focus on regionalism, and which will be discussed further in Section 3.5, is 
an institutional framework through which the EU seeks to influence international 
development in its own way. 
 
 
Section 2.5 – Ideas about Development Aid 
 
One aspect of development studies that has generated much interest and debate during the 
MDG era, and is particularly pertinent to this research, is development aid itself.  Many 
specific issues relating directly to development aid have emerged during the period.  
Foremost of these is an institutional push to monitor and ensure the effectiveness of aid; 
viewpoints on this issue, which is examined the following section, can depend largely on the 
parameters set for what is considered effective.  The practice of tying or adding conditions 
to development aid has been controversial; it is often used by those donors who believe 
changes in recipient state behaviours and policies are necessary for the aid to be effective.  
Chang has been a prominent critic of the practice, noting that the policies usually attached 
do not match those used previously and successfully by the now-wealthy countries when at 
a comparative stage of development, and arguing that it contributes to a kicking away of the 
development ladder.48 
The MDG period has seen a proliferation and fragmentation of development actors and 
development aid donors in particular, including the rise of new emerging donors that were 
previously development aid recipients.  This has created greater complexity in the 
development system and increased the potential for overlap between donor activities.  
There has also been a greater focus on the political factors that can influence development 
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aid allocations, and this issue is examined in Section 2.7.  The lack of coordination between, 
and competing priorities of, independent donors can result in development aid packages 
becoming unbalanced between recipient countries and their relative needs; this can lead to 
some countries becoming chronically underfunded, an issue examined in Section 2.8 and of 
particular concern for this research.  The global financial crisis and its austerity response also 
occurred during the MDG period; this saw cutbacks to funding in many areas within wealthy 
countries, and presented a challenge to the maintenance of development aid funding levels.  
Finally, one consequence of the uneven levels of development progress within states is that 
a majority of poor people are now located in middle income countries.  This has generated 
discussion around whether development aid should be directed to the poorest countries, or 
the countries with the highest number of poor people; this issue is examined in Section 4.1. 
As part of the increased focus on development aid in contemporary times, many books have 
been published on the subject, each usually offering an explanation for how and why 
development aid can succeed or fail, and advocating a development aid reform agenda.  
These works can potentially have an influence on development aid practices, and the views 
of the four most prominent thinkers in this area are summarised below. 
Sachs seeks to provide a vision for ending global poverty, by explaining how poor countries 
can become wealthy, and believes that development aid can play an important role in this 
process.  He argues that many people in developing countries are stuck in a poverty trap, as 
the normal process of capital accumulation cannot occur because households need to spend 
all their money on basic needs; development aid can play a role in kick-starting economies 
to lift households above subsistence and out of the poverty trap.  For Sachs, contemporary 
levels of development aid are not sufficient to meet poverty reduction targets, and need to 
be massively increased.  He believes that concerns about recipient country institutional 
performance should not override this need, as recipient countries generally perform at an 
expected level when properly taking into account their overall level of development. He 
argues that it simply costs more to help those countries that are poorer and most in need of 
assistance, and increased volumes of aid should be specifically directed to those poorest 
countries.49 
Easterly characterises the world as suffering from two tragedies; the first is global poverty 
and the second is the failure of development aid to solve it.  He is heavily critical of the 
development aid bureaucracy, particularly donors but also recipient state governments, as 
responsible for this failure, and argues that fundamental reform of how aid is delivered is 
required.  While Easterly at times uses the language of post-development, his prescriptions 
are market-based, as he believes that only the dynamism of individuals and firms in free 
markets can bring about true development.  He considers it necessary to further reduce the 
role of the state in development, and advocates for the introduction of a market-type 
mechanism to development aid provision in order to make it more efficient; under this 
                                                          
49 Sachs, J. D. (2005). The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York, Penguin Books. 
Page 32 of 127 
 
system funding would be given directly to individuals in developing countries, and aid 
agencies would need to compete for their patronage.50 
Moyo has a particular focus on Africa, and believes that development aid has been a 
complete failure in bringing about development to the continent; furthermore, it has made 
things worse by, for instance, increasing levels of corruption.  She believes that economic 
growth cannot be generated by an aid-based development model, and therefore almost all 
development aid should be stopped.  She argues that without development aid funding, 
African countries would be forced to seek foreign investment and other forms of financing, 
and rapidly adopt the neoliberal market reforms she sees as necessary to bring about 
development; this would end their dependence on aid and bring about genuine 
prosperity.51 
Collier writes from a position of concern for those developing countries, home to around a 
billion people, which have had stagnant economies for a number of decades, and are falling 
behind the rest of the developing world.  He notes a number of challenges they often face, 
such as insecurity, the natural resource trap, being land-locked, and deep corruption.  For 
Collier, these countries are in need of greater long-term assistance from the international 
community, which should include debt relief, protected market access, and military 
intervention within them when necessary; importantly, development aid should be 
specifically and strategically used to generate economic growth in these countries.  Collier is 
known for his support of the use of aid conditionality as a means of generating required 
reforms in these countries, and argues that past failures of conditionality are due to 
recipient governments not following through with their promises to enact reforms.52 
There are some key underlying similarities and differences between the approaches of these 
four prominent thinkers.  While all advocate for some degree of reform from both donors 
and recipients, Collier is distinct in that he sees recipient behaviour as the key locale for 
reform, while Sachs, Easterly and Moyo see donor behaviour as such.  In terms of volume, 
Sachs advocates for much more development aid and Moyo advocates for much less; for 
Easterly and Collier, issues around volume are not the main focus, though the former does 
argue for less aid.  It is important to note that all are economists, and understand 
development mainly in terms of economic growth; all have been involved with the World 
Bank to various degrees and Sachs has been involved heavily with the UN.  Theoretically, 
Easterly is best identified as belonging to the neoliberal development school, and Moyo 
represents a stronger variant of neoliberalism.  Collier is the most difficult to categorise 
theoretically, and overall fits most well with a traditional modernisationist conception of 
development.  Sachs has clearly been influenced by the MDGs, and while holding some 
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modernisationist tendencies, is best understood as sitting within the human development 
approach.  The degree of systemic reform they advocate for also differs; the approaches of 
Sachs and Collier can be accommodated by adapting the current system, while Easterly and 
Moyo argue for a substantial systemic overhaul.  For this and other reasons, Sachs and 
Collier seem to have had the most influence on development aid practices in the real world.  
For Sachs, the allocation of development aid should be based on the level of need, and 
while Collier argues that development aid should be directed towards to the poorest 
countries, he also contends that its allocation should be based on or used to influence their 
performance; these justifiers, of need and performance, are known to influence donor 
decisions around development aid allocations.  This research, which examines the extent to 
which EU development aid is based on the relative human development needs of recipients, 
fits most closely with the views on development aid put forward by Sachs. 
 
 
Section 2.6 – Aid Effectiveness 
 
Development aid has become an oft-analysed feature of the development landscape and 
the international relations landscape more generally.  This increased focus on development 
aid itself has been accompanied by concerns about ensuring that it is effective.  These 
concerns for aid effectiveness are usually framed as being for the extent to which 
development aid actually works, or as a way of ascertaining how development aid can most 
appropriately contribute to the overall development process.  Most of those interested in 
aid effectiveness, whether generally supportive or critical of development aid, tend to start 
from a position that it is not completely effective or ineffective, but rather is effective to 
some degree, or at least capable of being so, and can be reformed and made to work better. 
There has been an organised collaborative push, managed by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and including both donors and recipients, to make 
aid better and more effective.  This process generated the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, which called for development aid to be scaled up, for development activities 
to be recipient-led, and for donors to end duplication and coordinate more closely 
together.53  Further declarations on the subject have since followed, and have called for 
increased monitoring of development aid, and a shift in the way the issue is framed, from 
aid effectiveness to development effectiveness.  While most of these actions called for have 
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generally not occurred, the process has nonetheless increased attention on the issue of aid 
effectiveness.54 
Aid effectiveness can often focus on either the direct or the deeper effects that 
development aid has had.  At the direct level, it considers to what extent particular aid 
projects were successful in fulfilling their specific objectives, and it is standard practice in 
development to evaluate aid projects in this way upon their completion.  Riddell argues that 
most aid does succeed in meeting its own immediate project objectives, and has some 
degree of positive impact in the way it was intended to; however, he warns that its potential 
can be somewhat constrained by the dominant project-based approach to development.55 
At the deeper level, aid effectiveness considers the extent to which uses of development aid 
made an overall contribution to long-lasting positive difference in the lives of recipient 
populations; though more difficult to determine, it is possible that development projects 
can be unsuccessful in this regard despite achieving their direct objectives.  Nonetheless, 
Riddell argues that development aid probably does have deeper positive effects, though 
these are often small, and below the high expectations for it.  He believes that development 
aid generally has small positive impacts on economic growth, but is more cautious about its 
impacts on poverty reduction, due to an overall lack of data, and the many factors that goal 
is influenced by.  For Riddell, a concerning trend is that development aid is increasingly 
being given for short term purposes that are easier to evaluate and seen as generating 
greater direct returns, rather than for more long term, complex or deeper problems.  He 
argues that while short-term aid can bring genuine improvements, excessive short-termism 
is problematic and development aid should instead be used for more long-term and 
transformational purposes.56 
While there is value in the comprehensive quantitative approaches taken by the likes of 
Riddell, others understand aid effectiveness in a more macro systemic way.  This type of 
approach considers how development aid as a resource can best contribute to development 
overall.  Its main concerns are not whether development aid fulfils its direct objectives, or 
even brings about deeper positive changes, but rather what its objectives and the changes it 
seeks to help bring about should be in the first place.  Differing approaches to systemic aid 
effectiveness are influenced by theories and philosophies about development.  Those who 
understand development as economic growth will view the purpose of development aid as 
to influence economic growth, and evaluate its effectiveness by the extent to which it has 
done so.  Similarly, those who understand development as the attainment of the MDGs, or 
in human development terms, will characterise the purpose of, and judge the effectiveness 
of, development aid in those terms also.  The views of the prominent thinkers overviewed in 
                                                          
54 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action."   
Retrieved 16 November, 2015, from 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm. 
 
55 Riddell, R. C. (2014). Discussion Paper 33. Does foreign aid really work? An updated assessment. 
Development Policy Centre. Canberra, Australian National University. 
 
56 Ibid. 
Page 35 of 127 
 
the previous section, for instance, outline visions for the role of development aid and how it 
can work most effectively at a macro systemic level.  An example for how this plays out in 
practice is offered by the issue of aid volumes; some, such as Sachs and the drafters of the 
Paris Declaration, consider aid effectiveness as intrinsically linked with aid volumes, and 
throughout the MDG period there were calls for greater volumes of aid to be made available 
in order to achieve those goals. 
When considering the most appropriate role for development aid in the development 
process, it is necessary to properly contextualise the degree to which it can influence 
outcomes.  Development aid is one type of financial flow from wealthy countries to 
developing countries, however a number of other types of financial flows are also seen as 
contributing to the overall financing of development.  These can include other official public 
sources of funding, such as financing for climate change mitigation initiatives, or military aid 
given for security purposes.  Charitable private donations to NGOs that work internationally 
contribute in some way to development, as does the work of big philanthropic foundations.  
Remittances, which are direct international transfers from household to household, by 
friends or family living in wealthier countries, also play a role.  Finally, foreign direct 
investment and other forms of private capital flows, including some corporate responsibility 
initiatives, can be used for development purposes.  These sources of funding each have their 
own unique features and varying direct objectives, but, along with other types of financial 
flows not listed here, are seen as contributing in some way to the development process.57,58 
While it is important to understand development aid as one part of financing for 
development, it is also important to understand financing for development as just one of 
many factors that influence the overall development process.  The policy approaches 
adopted by wealthy countries in a number of different areas, beyond their approaches to 
development aid or development financing, can have an impact on people in the developing 
world.  Most notable among these include; their trade policies, their migration policies, their 
approach to international security, their approach towards international technology 
transfer, and their environmental policies.59  Furthermore, despite attempts to reduce the 
role of the state in development, recipient state governments have primary policy-making 
rights and responsibilities in their own jurisdictions, and the approaches they adopt in 
almost all policy areas will have some impact on development outcomes in their country.  
Regarding financing in particular, there has been a greater push to improve domestic 
taxation systems in the developing world, and better mobilise domestic financial resources 
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overall for the purposes of development.60  While all of these factors can influence 
development in some way, they too are affected by and operate within a vast and complex 
human system characterised by many varying and evolving social, political and other factors.  
So, while development aid undoubtedly has the potential to affect outcomes in the real 
world, it is important not to overstate its potential impacts, or subscribe to unrealistic 
expectations for it.  Development aid is but one factor, within a vast catalogue of factors 
with varying degrees of controllability, with the potential to impact on the development 
process; furthermore, these many other factors can often work to constrain or enhance the 
potential impacts that development aid can have. 
The main focus of this research is not on aid effectiveness in a traditional sense, but rather 
on aid distribution, which relates to more systemic macro approaches to understanding how 
development aid can be effective.  It does not seek to measure the success of particular aid 
projects, or the overall direct or deeper effects of specific EU development aid activities.  
However, it does not object to the sensible and reasonable idea that development aid be 
evaluated by the extent to which it achieved its direct objectives, and helped bring long-
lasting positive changes to the lives of its recipients.  Nonetheless, it sees considerations of 
what those objectives and changes aimed for should be, and of the most appropriate overall 
role for the use of development aid as a financial resource, to be of greater importance. 
Ideas about systemic approaches to the best use of development aid are heavily based on 
theoretical or philosophical perspectives.  This research is concerned with need, and holds 
the perspective that aid equity is the most important aspect to consider when determining 
uses for development aid.  This approach is underpinned by two intrinsic aspects of 
development studies as a discipline; its overt normative ambition of improving lives, and its 
underlying universalism, which sees development progress as something that all people in 
all places should be reasonably able to aspire to and access.  A focus on aid equity not only 
aligns development aid more closely with the intrinsic nature of development studies, but 
solves a particular problem with the aid effectiveness approach.  Generally speaking, in the 
real world, the less developed a recipient country is, the less capable it is of using 
development aid effectively; so, at the macro level, a focus on aid effectiveness, as a means 
of analysing performance, creates a disincentive for donors to give development aid to the 
poorest countries, as they are known to use it less effectively.61,62  A solution for this is to 
frame the overarching purpose of development aid as to help those countries most in need, 
rather than to generate the best returns or to be as effective as possible.  A focus on a more 
equitable distribution for development aid overall can improve outcomes for those most in 
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need, and does not preclude the possibility of aid effectiveness concerns remaining 
paramount at the direct and deeper levels, within an overall framework of aid equity. 
However, academic conversations around development aid at present are generally framed 
around aid effectiveness.  Aid equity is a term and a concept that is yet to be introduced 
into the development discourse, despite an apparent need for it, and despite its 
underpinnings in theoretical and philosophical perspectives rooted in the discipline itself; 
this task is beyond the scope of this thesis, but represents a possible area for future work.  
Aid effectiveness concerns are important, but they should not override aid equity concerns; 
an excessive focus on aid effectiveness can serve to detract from aid equity.  Development 
aid in particular, amongst the many factors that influence development, and the different 
financial flows that constitute the overall financing of it, stands out uniquely as a resource 
where an equity purpose could reasonably be instituted.  So in sum, at a macro systemic 
level, the best use of development aid is as a financial resource to equitably distribute 
between recipient states based on their levels of need. 
In addition to reflecting idealist concerns for universal justice and fairness, a shift in 
perspective to focussing on aid equity could actually prove to be the most effective use of 
development aid over the extreme long term.   Over time, it could help prevent the poorest 
countries from falling too far behind the rest of the world in developmental terms, and 
potentially destabilising their neighbours and the wider international system.  Theoretically, 
if the global distribution of development aid was completely equitable, and aid effectiveness 
concerns were applied at the direct and deeper levels, this would be an excellent way of 
using the resource of development aid to help bring about long-term development for all 
the people of the world. 
 
 
Section 2.7 – Factors Guiding Aid Allocations 
 
In a practical sense, there are three main influences that are seen as determining how 
donors choose to allocate their development aid funding between recipients; these can be 
summarised as need, institutional performance, and political factors. 
Need is generally seen as an important justification for the provision of development aid, 
and an important factor in guiding how it is allocated.  It is widely believed that if donors are 
genuinely motivated by altruistic and humanistic concerns, their allocation of development 
aid will be determined by relative needs of recipients, and result in the least developed 
countries receiving the most aid.63  However, the issues of institutional performance and 
political factors can serve to detract from development aid being allocated purely on a 
needs basis, and there is some conjecture over the degree to which each of the three 
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factors practically influences development aid allocations overall.  For instance, Berthelemy 
argues that aid allocations are influenced significantly by need, the institutional factor of 
governance, and political factors such as commercial and geopolitical concerns.64  
Meanwhile, Hoeffler and Outram argue that recipient needs are the most important of the 
three main factors in determining aid allocations, donor self-interest encompassed by 
political factors is often overstated but nonetheless secondary, and institutional factors such 
as democracy and human rights have little importance.65 
In development studies overall, and in studies about development aid allocations in 
particular, the issue of institutional performance is coming under increasing consideration.  
The institutional performance factor includes concerns about the likes of democracy, good 
governance, human rights, and policies seen as promoting economic growth and 
development.  The idea underpinning this approach is that development aid may only be 
effective in the right policy environments, and therefore if donors want their aid to be 
effective, they must allocate it to recipients that exhibit good governance and good 
institutional performance generally.66  The concern over institutional performance stems 
from studies by development economists examining the relationship between development 
aid and economic growth; these studies reflect understandings of development where 
progress is measured by economic growth, the purpose of aid is to influence growth, and its 
effectiveness should be evaluated by the extent to which it has done so. 
The most important of these studies was by Burnside and Dollar, who are associated with 
the Collier school of thought; their extensive quantitative study concluded that 
development aid had a positive impact on economic growth when good policies were in 
place, but little impact when poor policies were in place, and therefore it was the policies 
that determined whether the aid was effective or not.  Thus, they argued that development 
aid should be allocated to recipients on the basis of their policy performance, or attached 
with the conditionality that recipients adopt the appropriate policies.67  These conclusions 
have not been supported by all development economists; Easterly and his colleagues, for 
instance, have raised doubts that development aid can positively impact on economic 
growth in any policy environment.68  Meanwhile, Rajan and Subramanian have argued that 
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development aid inflows have a negative impact on the competitiveness of a country and 
therefore do not positively impact on its economic growth overall.69 
It is important to note that not all studies examining institutional performance are 
concerned with economic growth; Carey, for instance, has analysed whether human rights 
concerns in particular play a role in development aid allocations, and argued that largely 
they have not.70  Overall, studies considering the extent to which various aspects of good 
governance or institutional performance have influenced development aid allocations can 
be said to have produced mixed results.71  Finally, while good institutional performers are 
more likely to make better use of development aid funding, as mentioned in the previous 
section, allocating development aid on this basis effectively directs funding away from the 
poorest countries with the highest levels of need, as their institutional performance tends to 
be worse.  This issue could potentially prevent donors from considering factors of 
institutional performance too heavily when allocating their development aid funding. 
Development aid is inherently political.  Donors make political decisions about how much 
development aid to give, which recipient countries and specific actors or organisations 
working within them to give it to, and which activities it should be used for; the process and 
execution of this work is also embedded with many political components.  Aid volumes are 
heavily influenced by political considerations; they are generally well below the 0.7% target, 
and these low volumes constrain the potential effects that development aid could have.  
Additionally, development aid operates within a complex wider context, and is just one of 
many factors that can influence development overall.  While acknowledging the importance 
of the issue of aid volumes, the main focus for this research is on aid distributions, and a 
development aid distribution based on aid equity is possible regardless of overall aid 
volumes.  However, it is noted that an increase in volumes offers the theoretical possibility 
for donors to simultaneously maintain prior funding levels to favoured recipients, and 
create a more equitable distribution overall.  The inherently political nature of development 
aid allows for contestation over approaches to allocating it, and thus the possibility of 
introducing an aid equity approach is somewhat reliant on making the political case for it to 
policy-makers. 
Development aid allocations themselves are traditionally influenced by many political 
factors, and this serves to intervene against a purely needs-based distribution of 
development aid.  The political factors grouping comprises of those motivators related to 
donor self-interest, and includes the likes of commercial or trade-promotion interests, a 
historic or special relationship interest towards their former colonies, and geographical 
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proximity or geopolitical interests.72  The role these factors play in development aid 
provision stems from the traditional conception of development aid as an instrument of 
foreign policy, and thus inevitably influenced by the foreign policy outlook of the donor 
state.  During the Cold War era, political factors were largely seen as the main determinant 
of development aid allocations, rather than need or institutional performance; wealthy 
countries openly used aid as a means of supporting their perceived economic, geopolitical 
and security interests, while humanistic concerns were not seen as significantly influencing 
their behaviour.73 
Political factors can shift debate about development aid allocations away from the issue of 
need, but they are often seen as important by particular domestic interests within donor 
countries, and in donor country electorates more generally.  Kleibl, for instance, argues that 
domestic politics plays an influential role in determining how donors balance their 
development aid priorities between commercial considerations and recipient needs.74  
Overall, political factors are still seen as playing an important role in contemporary times.  
Alesina and Dollar, for instance, argue that development aid is dictated much more by 
political and strategic considerations than by recipient needs or policy performance.75  
Meanwhile, McGillivray notes the widespread view that political criteria have been de-
emphasised in favour of developmental criteria since the end of the Cold War, but argues 
that this shift is less significant than commonly thought.76  Finally, others such as Woods, 
and Gavas, have noted that since the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, security 
concerns in particular have had a resurgent influence on development aid priorities.77,78 
A particularly well-known, and not especially controversial, factor that influences 
development aid allocations is a population bias towards smaller countries.  While countries 
with larger populations generally receive more development aid in raw terms, smaller 
countries generally receive more development aid on a per capita basis.  This issue seems to 
arise for four main reasons; the importance in international relations of holding state status, 
the presence in the international system of a number of strong but nonetheless developing 
countries with very large populations, the notable developmental challenges faced by small 
states due to their size, and a targeting of the poorest countries overall rather than those 
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countries with the largest numbers of poor people.79  The aid allocation model used in this 
research, which is introduced in Section 4.3, and based on the HDI, considers recipient 
populations as a factor, as it is concerned with development aid per capita. 
The development aid allocations of typical bilateral donors are generally driven to varying 
degrees by each of the three main influences identified above; need, institutional 
performance, and political factors.  Multilateral donors lack domestic political concerns, and 
are less influenced by realist international relations concerns than bilateral donors; as such, 
their approach to development aid allocation is generally seen as being less affected by 
political factors, and of having greater concern for the factors of need and institutional 
performance.80  Neumeyer argues that multilateral donors still exhibit the small country 
bias, and in some cases special relationship biases, but do not have the geographic 
closeness bias, nor other biases associated with bilateral donors.81  Meanwhile, Berthelemy 
argues that need is the generally the main influence on the behaviour of multilateral 
donors, and that they are much less influenced than bilateral donors by other factors.82  
However, the EU is not a typical multilateral donor or a typical bilateral donor; as discussed 
in Section 3.2, it is a unique form in international relations that sits somewhere between the 
two, and cannot be fully understood using those traditional international relations concepts.  
Nonetheless, the main factors that generally influence donor behaviour in determining 
development aid allocations still affect the EU in some way, and Section 3.7 considers the 
extent to which the various factors are seen as influencing EU development aid distributions 
in practice. 
 
 
Section 2.8 – The Chronically Underfunded Countries Problem 
 
An emerging issue in development studies, and of importance to those concerned with 
development aid in particular, is that of chronically underfunded countries.  This issue arises 
due to the competing influences that affect how donors choose to distribute their 
development aid between recipients, and the independent manner in which they each 
operate; these factors result in significant imbalances in the levels of development aid 
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funding disbursed to different recipient countries, when compared with their respective 
levels of need. 
The most prominent explication of the problem is provided by the 2013 document, 
produced by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, titled Identification and 
Monitoring of Potentially Under-aided Countries.83  It notes that the greatly varying amounts 
of development aid received by different recipient countries cannot be explained by their 
respective levels of need or institutional performance.  Decisions around development aid 
allocations are highly contested and influenced by many arguments, but ultimately donors 
distribute their development aid funding based on their own objectives and priorities.84  As 
discussed in the previous section, these objectives and priorities are affected to varying 
degrees by the three main influences of need, institutional performance, and political 
factors.  So, most pertinently here, it is important to note that political factors play a 
significant role in determining how donors choose to distribute their development aid 
funding between recipients. 
The other main contributor to the chronically underfunded countries problem, is the nature 
of how development aid donors operate within the development industry and the complex 
international system.  There are a large number of donors and each makes its own 
independent decisions, using its own criteria, on how to distribute its development aid 
funding.  Generally, these decisions are not made in consultation with other independent 
donors, and do not take into account the allocation practices of other donors, nor the 
overall funding levels that recipients may be receiving.85  Overall, the way that development 
aid is disbursed can be appropriately described as un-coordinated, and the problem further 
is exacerbated by the ongoing proliferation and fragmentation of development actors. 
These factors, the politics of aid and the un-coordination of donors, combine to create 
inevitable imbalances in development aid distributions; some recipients receive 
proportionally less aid than they would receive based on a coordinated equitable 
distribution, while others receive more.  As this disjuncture repeats over a period of years, it 
results in significant inequities in development aid funding levels emerging between 
countries of comparable development needs.  Chronically underfunded countries are those 
countries that receive a notably smaller proportion of development aid, over an extended 
period of time, than that suggested by their level of need.86  While maintaining reasonable 
expectations for the extent to which development aid can impact on outcomes, reducing 
these funding inequities could help chronically underfunded countries alleviate or resolve 
some of the acute problems associated with their low levels of development and high levels 
of relative need.  Although the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has been 
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the leading voice on this issue, it has gained increased attention from others in recent years.  
Riddell, for instance, characterises it as an aid allocation mismatch between those countries 
who get development aid and those who need it.87  Meanwhile, the 2014 Reality of Aid 
Report characterises the problem as a systematic bias against those poorest countries most 
in need of development aid, and advocates that donors specifically direct increased volumes 
of aid to those countries most in need.88 
A necessary step towards reducing these development aid inequities, and resolving the 
chronically underfunded countries problem, is identifying which recipient countries are 
indeed chronically underfunded.  However, in part because this is an emerging research 
area, there is not an established definition of exactly what constitutes a chronically 
underfunded country, nor a single accepted means of determining which particular 
recipients can be classified as such.  Given the low volumes of development aid, which 
overall do not reach the 0.7% target, almost all developing countries probably have some 
claim to being underfunded in an absolute sense, however the aim when seeking to identify 
chronically underfunded countries is to identify those that are underfunded in a relative 
sense. 
Various approaches have been used in attempting to identify chronically underfunded 
countries; these usually create a model for the ideal distribution of development aid, and 
then compare actual aid disbursement figures against those suggested by the model.  Collier 
himself, along with Dollar, created the first prominent model of this type, which used 
factors of need and institutional performance to suggest the most efficient way that 
development aid could be used to alleviate absolute poverty.89  Utz of the World Bank 
conducted a study using four different models to try and identify chronically underfunded 
countries; an updated version of the Collier-Dollar model, an alternate model prioritising 
institutional performance but also considering need, an egalitarian model with aid 
distributed equally among all citizens of developing countries, and a model simulating the 
actual importance donors attach to need and institutional performance.90  The OECD 
document referenced above takes a similar approach and also uses four different models; a 
further updated version of the Collier-Dollar model, an alternate model balancing need and 
institutional performance, an egalitarian model, and a model combining weighted 
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population figures and need as indicated by per capita incomes.91  In terms of specific 
countries that may be chronically underfunded, the latter two studies each identified seven 
recipients as such, according to at least three of their four respective models; both studies 
identified Guinea, Niger, Togo and Nepal, the Utz study also identified Comoros, Congo and 
Ethiopia, and the OECD study also identified Burkina Faso, Madagascar and Bangladesh.92,93 
The limited number of studies in this area of emerging importance indicates that further 
attempts to identify chronically underfunded countries are required.  That task is attempted 
in this thesis, with three important differences in approach; a clear prioritisation of need 
through a basing of the model used on the HDI, an explicit focus on the EU as a donor, and 
the use of development aid disbursement figures from a much longer period of years.  The 
explicit focus on the EU means that of the two main factors that create the chronically 
underfunded countries problem, this research has a particular focus on the politics of aid 
aspect, rather than the un-coordination aspect.  A specific point of interest rests on whether 
the countries the model used in this research identifies as chronically underfunded match 
those identified as such in the previous two studies. 
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD argues that identification of 
chronically underfunded countries and improved coordination between donors can help 
resolve the issue.  As bilateral donors will likely remain constrained to some degree by the 
objectives and priorities of their own country, multilateral donors may be best placed to 
reduce and correct any imbalances observed.  Although it is not a typical multilateral, the EU 
could potentially take a leading role in resolving the issue of chronically underfunded 
countries.  Many development aid donors are also EU Member States, so the EU is an 
appropriate actor to lead and manage increased coordination between them, as is called for 
by the OECD.  Also, given the somewhat reduced influence of traditional political factors, 
and the somewhat unique influence of the concept of normative power, as discussed in 
Section 3.3, on the EU’s approach to international relations, it is perhaps the ideal donor to 
adopt an approach to development aid allocation that prioritises need as a factor, and 
deliberately targets chronically underfunded countries.  Such an approach would not only 
benefit those countries most in need of development aid, but could help in creating a clear 
and distinct role for the EU in international development, and potentially enhance its 
international standing. 
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Section 3.1 – Overview of the European Union 
 
The approach taken by the European Union (EU) towards development is influenced to 
some extent by the issues pertaining to development itself discussed in the previous 
chapter.  However, it is also influenced to some extent by the historical, political and 
institutional factors that shape the European integration project and the EU itself. 
After centuries of sporadic but increasingly brutal warfare on the European continent, 
culminating in the widespread destruction caused by World War II, elites in different 
European countries reasoned that closer integration between them could help bring shared 
material gains and prevent further conflicts from breaking out.  Thus, the European 
integration project emerged, which at its core was an attempt to bring greater peace and 
prosperity to Europe, and these two underlying concepts have remained important 
motivators in guiding the project over time.  It aimed to bring improvements to the human 
life experience in both a social sense, which included those factors associated with 
democratic forms of governance, and a material sense, with a focus on creating wealth 
through increased economic integration.  The economic aspect of European integration is 
probably the most renowned, as it includes the creation of a common European market and 
a common European currency, the euro, among its tangible achievements.  In jointly 
pursuing these ambitions, European states have successively given up, or pooled, increasing 
degrees of their sovereignty, and because of this the European integration project presents 
a challenge to traditional conceptions of international relations.  The integration process has 
been underpinned through the years by a number of treaties, the most important of which 
are the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) 
as the main formal mechanism of European cooperation, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, 
which formally established the European Union itself as such.94 
The number of specific states participating in the formal structures of the European 
integration project has increased over time.  The original six signatories of the Treaty of 
Rome were France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.  The 
number increased to eight in 1973, when the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and Denmark 
joined.  Following their transitions from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal were welcomed in the 1980s, as the older members sought to 
support the new democratic regimes in those countries, taking the overall total to 11.  In the 
1990s, the reunification of Germany saw the eastern part of Germany incorporated into the 
project, and Sweden, Finland and Austria joined, which increased the overall number of EU 
Member States to 15.  The collapse of communism was an important event in world history 
that had many far-reaching impacts; one of these was that the states of Eastern Europe, 
having been taken over by new democratic regimes, sought to join the process of European 
integration.  Meanwhile, the EU Member States desired still to support the entrenchment of 
democracy, and work to spread peace and prosperity further across Europe.  These desires 
culminated in the expansion of the EU by an additional ten states in 2004, which took the 
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total number of members to 25; the new Member States were Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta.  
Finally, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, increasing its membership to 27, and 
Croatia joined in 2013, increasing EU membership to its present level of 28 Member 
States.95 
The overall governance structure of Europe incorporates decision-making bodies with some 
degree of power at three separate tiers.  The states themselves are considered sovereign in 
international relations and as the building blocks of the EU, and they are still widely seen as 
playing an important or primary role in determining policy.  Some states, with Germany and 
Spain being prominent examples, also have strong regional government structures that play 
an important role, though this is not the case for most EU Member States.  Finally, the third 
tier is the EU itself and its constituent institutions.  The idea of subsidiarity plays a role in the 
governance of Europe; this idea contends that the lowest tier of government that can 
execute policy in a given area competently and effectively, should have primary 
responsibility for doing so.  Therefore, to gain greater responsibility in the area of 
development policy, for example, the EU would theoretically have to demonstrate that it is 
clearly more competent and effective as a development actor than the states themselves.96 
The institutional architecture of the EU is comprised of four key institutions.  The most 
prominent of these is the European Commission, which drafts and implements policy, and 
administers the EU budget; it is essentially the bureaucracy of the EU, and is divided into a 
number of directorates general, or departments.  The second key institution is The Council, 
which refers to a number of structures through which Member State representatives meet 
to decide on the direction and objectives the EU should adopt with regards to specific 
issues; the most important of these structures are the precisely-named European Council, 
which are meetings of Member State heads of government, and Council of the European 
Union, which are meetings of Member State ministers responsible for the specific areas 
under discussion.  The other key institutions are the European Parliament, which is directly 
elected and acts as the legislature, but is generally less powerful than the parliament of a 
typical state, and the European Court of Justice, which is the judicial arm.  With the 
exception of the last of these, which is located in Luxembourg, the key institutions of the EU 
are located in Brussels, which is increasingly being seen as something of a de facto capital of 
the EU.97 
Most EU policy actions are directed internally.  Prominent areas related to the economic 
aspect of integration include financial policy, issues related to the common euro currency, 
and issues related to the Common Market.  Prominent areas related to the social aspect of 
integration include the likes of environmental, gender, technology and transport policies.  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which subsidises agricultural activities within Europe, 
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and is widely seen as indirectly impacting negatively on the developmental prospects of 
developing countries, is an economic policy conducted with social benefits to EU citizens in 
mind.  While the CAP and other policies are mainly directed towards and driven by issues 
internal to the EU, they nonetheless affect to varying extents how the EU operates 
externally.   
The ability of the EU to influence events, compared with that of the Member States, differs 
between different policy areas, and rests to some extent on how effective an actor it has 
previously shown itself to be in the particular area.  In development, the states are widely 
seen as the main drivers of actions and outcomes.  Notably, it remains the case that the EU 
budget, including that proportion dedicated to development aid, is funded originally 
through taxation by the Member States, as the EU does not have powers of taxation.98  
Furthermore, most of the overall pool of European development aid funding is still 
disbursed through the states themselves, rather than through the EU institutions, which 
indicates that in the area of development the states have chosen to retain a strong degree 
of control.99 
 
 
Section 3.2 – Approaches to Understanding the EU 
 
The complex nature of the European integration project, and the structures of governance 
in Europe more generally, challenge traditional understandings of states and international 
relations, and have given rise to theoretical approaches attempting to conceptualise what is 
occurring.  An important issue of concern is whether the EU more closely resembles an 
intergovernmental organisation or a supranational organisation.  Theoretically, an 
intergovernmental organisation has weak authority as power sits with its constituent states, 
whereas a supranational organisation has stronger authority than its members and 
resembles a state itself.  As the European integration project has seen Member States 
increasingly give up or pool aspects of their sovereignty over time, the EU is generally seen 
as resembling something more than a typical intergovernmental organisation, yet still as 
something less than a state, and thus constituting a unique phenomenon in international 
relations.100 
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A number of theoretical approaches to understanding the EU have gained prominence.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism serves as something of a default position, and argues that due 
to the leading role they play in policy-making, the Member States themselves remain the 
key actors in the EU, in terms of determining outcomes.  Neo-functionalism serves as the 
default counterpoint, and argues that a range of actors, including the supranational 
institutions of the EU, can affect outcomes; it also argues that enhanced integration in 
specific policy areas inevitably has spill-over effects, which promote further integration in 
other areas.  Multi-level governance perspectives build on neo-functionalism, and propose a 
complex model with a wide range of actors, including states, supranational institutions, and 
others, none of which has the ability to solely determine outcomes; also, it posits that the 
integration process overall has seen the supranational institutions gain power and authority 
at the expense of the states.101,102 
The policy networks approach uses theories and ideas about public policy that typically 
apply to states, and applies them to the EU; this approach has had some influence at the 
micro level, and suggests that the conceptual nature of the EU matters little in a practical 
sense.  New institutionalism is an approach that focuses in particular on the EU institutions, 
and the ways they affect and are affected by the integration process; it characterises the EU 
institutions as active and evolving agents, with their own motivations and interests, and an 
ability to play an important role in determining outcomes.  Finally, constructivism offers a 
sociological perspective, which attempts to shift the academic discussion away from a focus 
on agents, and onto the behavioural norms that shape the context in which they operate; as 
applied to the European integration project, this includes an acknowledgement of the way 
that state structures have evolved and adapted to the integration process.  While these 
conceptual approaches focus generally on the internal dynamics of the EU, they can also 
play an important role in influencing, and understanding, how it interacts with the rest of 
the world.103,104 
At the disciplinary level, European studies encompasses three broad and related 
approaches.  The first analyses Europe or the EU, or specific aspects of or issues pertaining 
to them in some way, using perspectives from different fields of study, and can be 
understood as akin to an area studies approach.  The second, and most dominant, is rooted 
in political studies, and examines micro or macro aspects of the European integration 
project itself, or specific issues arising from it; this approach generally has an internal focus 
and investigates how the process has affected and changed Europe itself, and the most 
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prominent theoretical concepts related to it are summarised above.  Finally, the third broad 
approach, which is taken in this research, is to adopt an outward focus and investigate how 
the EU interacts with the rest of the world, how its actions affect the wider world, and what 
they reveal about the nature of the EU itself. 
Studies examining the EU as a global actor tend to focus on specific aspects of its external 
interaction, that correspond with the different practical ways in which the EU interacts with 
the wider world.  They do so acknowledging the context, prominently elucidated by Hill, that 
a significant gap exists between what is often expected of the EU in international affairs, 
and what it is practically capable of achieving.105  Many studies investigating the EU as an 
international actor focus on aspects of external defence and security.  There has been 
significantly less integration in the military sphere than in the economic and social arenas, 
and thus those who see international relations in realist terms generally characterise the EU 
itself as somewhat weak or constrained.  In recent years, the EU has begun sending 
integrated security missions outside its borders, and these constitute one part of the EU’s 
interaction with the developing world that sits outside its development policy.106  Another 
prominent way in which the EU interacts with the rest of the world is through its trade 
policy, and this impacts to some extent on its approach to development; trade policy is one 
area where the power sits strongly with the EU tier, as it can clearly leverage the combined 
strength of the Member State economies in trade negotiations more effectively than the 
states themselves could do independently.107  There is also an increasing focus on the 
machinations of the European External Action Service, which is a recent but prominent 
construction that affects and is affected by all the main EU institutions, and conducts the 
organised diplomatic activities of the EU.108 
Finally, development policy, with its particular focus on the developing world, constitutes an 
interesting and under-researched aspect of the EU’s external engagement.  This research 
investigates the EU as a development aid donor, and the role that need plays in determining 
its development aid allocations; it does so cognisant that the EU’s approach to development 
is influenced by other aspects of its external action and its approach to international 
relations more generally, as well as its own internal features and the evolution and 
characteristics of the integration project itself. 
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Section 3.3 – Normative Power Europe 
 
A prominent conceptual approach that attempts to explain and understand how the EU 
operates as an international actor is normative power Europe (NPE).  This thesis adopts the 
NPE theoretical lens when examining the EU as a development aid donor. 
NPE was most prominently articulated by Manners in his 2002 article Normative Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?109  The normative approach is a conception of 
international relations that contrasts with the dominant realist approach; realism holds that 
states are the key actors in the international system, and their ability to influence events is 
based on their relative strength, which is generally equated with their military strength.  
Normative power, by contrast, is the ability to shape the ideas and values that influence 
global outcomes, and offers an alternate means through which actors can exercise 
international power.  While the EU exists in a global environment where realism drives to a 
large degree the actions of the dominant powers, the EU is poorly suited to influencing 
events in this manner, as it lacks an integrated military and is not a typical state.  For 
Manners and others, understanding how the EU actually operates in this international 
system is as essential to understanding its nature as analyses of its internal dynamics.110,111 
NPE builds on earlier ideas of Europe as a civilian, or non-military, power in international 
affairs, and offers a conceptual framework for understanding how the EU could function as 
an international actor of global influence.  Through the spread of its ideas and values, the EU 
could potentially shape the international norms that help determine how other actors 
behave in the system.  Manners uses the EU’s opposition to the death penalty, and its 
subsequent abolishment in many countries, to demonstrate how normative power can be 
exercised in practice.  Finally, he argues that the EU is uniquely predisposed to adopt a 
normative approach; the EU represents an atypical and unique political form in the 
international system, and its unique characteristics allow and encourage it to act in a 
normative manner, rather than in more traditional ways.112 
Manners identified a number of specific EU norms, derived from its own history and 
behaviour over an extended period, which could guide its international interactions.  The 
foremost of these were the five core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, 
and human rights; they were accompanied by the four additional minor norms of social 
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solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance.113  The NPE 
approach can thus be seen as descending from the integral motivations of the European 
integration project to help bring about peace and social good internally, as an explication of 
the component parts associated with that mode of thinking, and as a means of transmitting 
it externally.  Notably, Manners identified sustainable development as an EU norm as early 
as 2002, before the term was ubiquitous in development studies, however its subsequent 
ascension to dominance in that field clearly owes more to developments in the discipline 
itself than to any influence by Manners or the EU.  It is also notable that with development 
being increasingly understood more broadly, as for instance in the human development 
approach, overviewed in Section 2.2, with its focus on expanding human freedoms and 
capabilities, that all of these norms arguably relate to the development process in some 
way. 
The idea of NPE is applied in a variety of different ways.  Many scholars analyse the process 
of how the EU diffuses its norms and values to the rest of the world.  Others consider the 
level of coherence, capacity, or international credibility the EU has, or has to require, to 
influence international politics in a normative manner.  Analyses of the EU as a normative 
power often investigate specific policy areas such as the environment or trade, or specific 
norms such as human rights or democracy.114  There is also discussion over the increased 
moves towards military integration in Europe, and the possibly negative effect this could 
have on the conception of the EU playing a normative role in international affairs; Manners 
himself has argued that this is not inevitably the case, however that in practice these moves 
are indeed weakening the claim the EU could make to being a normative actor.115  A 
particular point of contention rests on the origin of the values originally identified by 
Manners, and whether they can be genuinely seen as distinctively European or EU values, or 
are better characterised as universal human values.  Also, there is some conjecture over 
whether the norms and values are shared by all EU Member States; alternately, if the values 
can indeed be established as European in origin, there is concern that deliberate attempts 
to transmit them to the wider world constitute a form of cultural imperialism.  Regarding 
the origin of these norms and values, NPE scholars usually accept them as universal human 
values, but argue that the EU has internalised and processed them, and presently sits in an 
ideal position to transmit and diffuse them.116 
Overall, the concept of NPE has become highly influential in European studies, particularly 
when considering the external relations of the EU.  The proposed or argued normative basis 
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for EU action is often traced to EU treaties, documents, and official approaches to external 
interaction.117  The normative principles identified and associated with NPE imply that the 
approach has a strong ethical underpinning.  While a normative approach refers to shaping 
international conceptions of normal around an actor’s ideas and values irrespective of what 
they may be, the types of values identified indicate that in the case of the EU, a normative 
approach constitutes having an ethically positive influence internationally.  Nevertheless, 
NPE has achieved wide theoretical credibility, and has also influenced, at least to some 
extent, the approach pursued by the EU in international relations; thus, it provides a 
credible means of assessing the EU’s external actions, and an appropriate platform from 
which to advocate for potential changes in its approach. 
When considering the most appropriate role for the unique international actor that is the 
EU, it is important to consider the overall international context in which it operates.  There 
are two central factors that influence international relations in contemporary times; firstly, 
the dominant actors in the system are strong states that generally hold a realist attitude 
towards international affairs, and secondly, the international system is slowly transitioning 
from a unipolar system dominated by the United States to a multipolar system.  The 
National Intelligence Council of the United States acknowledges the second of these, and 
believes that by 2030 their dominance will be increasingly challenged by China, India, and 
possibly Russia; regarding the EU, they argue it will remain significant and retain economic 
strength, but nonetheless decline overall and lose global influence over time.118  This 
accurately reflects the widely-held realist view of the EU as a declining power in an 
increasingly multipolar world. 
To retain or increase its international influence in the medium and long term, the EU must 
look beyond traditional realist conceptions of power.  The complex governance structure of 
Europe and lack of military integration mean that it will likely always appear weak or in 
decline when viewed through a realist lens.  However, adopting a unique normative 
approach to international relations could allow the EU to remain relevant and influential in 
the international arena through different means.  In particular, a distinctive normative 
approach would create clear differentiation between the EU and the strongly realist United 
States, and development policy is a particular area of external relations where the 
approaches of the two are already seen as beginning to diverge in this manner.119,120  The 
degree of effectiveness with which the EU could pursue a more strongly normative 
approach to international relations probably does rest somewhat on its internal structure; it 
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could likely function better as a normative power, and have greater international influence, 
with further internal integration. 
 
 
Section 3.4 – Development Policy as a vehicle for NPE 
 
As stated in the previous section, many studies have investigated the concept of normative 
power, and the extent to which it influences, or could influence, the approach of the EU to 
external relations.  Separately, a number of studies have examined in a variety of ways the 
development policy and practices of the EU, although this is an under-researched area, due 
in part to the large gap between the development studies and European studies disciplines. 
Those that examine the EU as a development actor often utilise the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
as a starting point.  This treaty, which established the European Union as the institutional 
form of European integration, contains a reference to its development activities, which 
states: 
“Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: - the 
sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among them; - the smooth and gradual 
integration of the developing countries into the world economy; - the campaign 
against poverty in the developing countries.”121 
This piece of text, as well as earlier and subsequent references to development in EU 
institutional treaties and other important documentation, indicates that development policy 
is seen by the EU as a part of its overall operations; most interesting for the purposes of this 
research is the specific reference to fostering development in the most disadvantaged 
countries in particular.  Additionally, it is notable that researchers are attaching increasing 
importance to development policy when evaluating the overall performance of the EU as an 
international actor; the European Think Tanks Group, for instance, argues that the 
effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to reduce global poverty and inequality constitute an 
important component of how its overall effectiveness can be assessed.122 
While there have been many studies investigating EU normative power, and some 
examining EU development policy, there have only been few specifically evaluating EU 
development policy through an NPE lens; this is somewhat surprising, as it contrasts with 
the wide general usage of development policy as an example of EU normative power in 
action.  The passage from the Maastricht Treaty quoted above, which refers to the EU’s 
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ambition of fostering sustainable development and is seen as a clear link between the 
institutional form of the EU and development policy, is also invoked as a basis for 
triangularly linking the EU, development policy, and normative power.  In 2008 Manners 
expanded on his earlier works and offered a greater extrapolation of the identified EU 
norms; regarding the sustainable development norm, he saw this as applying foremost to 
the EU itself, however also as extending specifically to its external interactions, particularly 
with the developing countries.123  Meanwhile, the best examples of studies examining EU 
development policy from an NPE perspective are provided by Orbie and Versluys, Bonaglia 
and his colleagues, and Birchfield.124,125,126 
The three studies referenced above have a number of notable similarities and differences.  
All offer broad overviews of EU development policy, with attention given to its thematic 
focuses and, to differing extents, to interactions with particular recipient countries or 
groups thereof.  All note the upscaling of EU development aid that has occurred in recent 
times, and Birchfield in particular has a focus on this.  Orbie and Versluys, and the Bonaglia 
group, both note that the EU disburses only a small amount of its development aid to the 
poorest countries; the former study explains this as a result of strategic considerations and 
an increasing focus on security, and the latter notes a particular focus the EU has on Eastern 
Europe, and argues that Member States have outsourced the development of that region to 
the EU.127,128,129 
Regarding the extent to which the EU can be characterised as a normative power in 
international development, Birchfield has the most positive outlook; she argues that the 
EU’s approach to development has undergone significant reforms, been infused with the 
principle of partnership and aligned with sustainable development practices, and therefore 
benefits development overall and tentatively at least indicates the EU to be a normative 
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power in development.130  The Bonaglia group reaches more cautious conclusions; it argues 
that while its analysis of EU documentation clearly indicates a normative approach to 
development, with values and principles embedded in a show of solidarity with the 
developing world, in a practical sense the EU lacks the degree of coordination to match this 
normative ambition, and furthermore does not yet have the level of influence in global 
development that matches either its ambition or its relative spend.131  Orbie and Versluys 
have the least positive outlook of the three studies; they note that an increase in resources 
does not necessarily correspond with more normative practice, and argue that the EU 
generally struggles to set norms in development and historically has instead followed the 
norms set by others, but nonetheless conclude that the EU is slowly evolving towards 
becoming a more normative actor in development.132  Overall, those who have analysed the 
EU as a development actor through the normative lens can be said to have reached mixed 
conclusions regarding the extent to which it constitutes a normative power in development. 
The issues of unequitable development aid allocations and chronically underfunded 
countries, being somewhat new and emerging, are not directly covered in the NPE literature 
to date, though the studies overviewed above do note generally that much EU development 
aid does not go to the poorest countries.  Nonetheless, a concern for these issues is 
intuitively consistent with an NPE outlook, and they represent examples of how a normative 
approach to international relations could respond to new and emerging international issues.  
Adopting a clearly and distinctively normative outlook and approach to development policy 
is important and necessary for the EU, if it seeks to genuinely become a normative power in 
the field of international development, and by extension in international relations more 
generally. 
 
 
Section 3.5 – EU Development Frameworks 
 
As development aid is one component of the approach the EU takes to development, it is 
important to consider broadly the EU’s overall development approach, and in particular the 
institutional frameworks through which it interacts with the developing world. 
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Among its many clauses, the 1957 Treaty of Rome stated that the signing European states 
agreed to associate with what it called the non-European countries and territories with 
special relations, in order to advance their economic and social development.133  France 
played an important role in ensuring the inclusion of this clause, as it sought to use the 
emerging European integration project as a way of retaining its influence in the developing 
world.134  In part because of this, France and French officials have had a particularly 
influential role in designing and implementing EU development architecture and policy.135  
The institutional relationship between the EU and the developing world was originally 
governed by the Yaoundé Conventions, although they defined the developing world 
narrowly, and their membership was made up largely of former French colonies.136 
From 1975, the Yaoundé Conventions were replaced by the Lomé Conventions, which would 
oversee the relationship between the EU and the developing world for the last quarter of 
the 20th Century.  The UK, having joined the institutional structures of European integration 
in 1973, played an important role in the creation of the Lomé Conventions, as it sought to 
include many of its own former colonies in the institutional relationship with the developing 
world; it thus joined France in playing a leading role in determining and executing EU 
development policy.  The Lomé Conventions were designed to be more of a partnership 
when compared with previous colonial relationships, and focused on economic 
development as a means of reducing poverty, reflecting the outlook of modernisation 
theory, the dominant theoretical paradigm in development at the time.  Notably, they 
included trade preferences for the developing countries in agricultural and mineral 
productions.  It is important to note that the Lomé Conventions were not agreements 
between the EU and the developing world as a whole, but rather with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), made up generally of former colonies of UK 
and France.  Over time, the Lomé Conventions solidified the relationship between the EU 
and the ACP, as other parts of the developing world have not had a comparable institutional 
relationship with the EU.  Overall, the Lomé Conventions were not perceived as successful, 
as during the period the ACP countries did not experience notable developmental gains or 
reductions in poverty, and their overall share of trade with the EU declined; furthermore the 
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non-reciprocal trading preferences contained within Lomé were seen by some as cementing 
production patterns in the developing world and constraining economic growth.137,138,139 
The Lomé Conventions were replaced in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement, and this 
agreement currently governs the institutional relationship between the EU and the ACP.140  
Although the Cotonou Agreement did not enter into force until 2003, this change in the 
institutional relationship closely corresponds with the signing of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and further delineates the MDG era examined in this research 
from other time periods.  However, while the MDGs can be seen as a reflection of the 
human development approach to development, the Cotonou Agreement reflects more 
closely the neoliberal development approach.  Its intention is to bring about further 
integration of the developing countries into the world economy, and it has a strong focus on 
trade liberalisation and economic growth; a further focus is on developing country 
institutional performance and good governance.  Meanwhile, a concurrent initiative gave 
full access to the EU market for all products from ACP countries, although the important 
export products of banana, sugar and rice were to be phased in.  As the non-reciprocal trade 
aspects of the Lomé Conventions had come to be seen as a negative, the original intention 
was to remove them from the Cotonou Agreement completely.  However, it was agreed to 
exempt those countries with particularly low levels of development or high levels of 
vulnerability from this aspect, and they were allowed to retain their trade preferences from 
the Lomé Conventions; further, these were extended to all of the defined least developed 
countries, which included some non-ACP countries.  An important and unique aspect of the 
Cotonou Agreement was its intention to formulate regional Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and different regions, or groups of countries, within the 
ACP group.  This aspect proved particularly unpopular with the developing countries and 
was criticised from the outset; the negotiations for many of the proposed EPAs remain 
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incomplete as of 2015, and this aspect of the Cotonou Agreement cannot be considered a 
success.141,142,143 
 
 
Section 3.6 – EU Approach to Development 
 
While the Cotonou Agreement forms the basis of the EU’s relationship with the ACP 
countries, its overall approach to development has many other components.  The key actor 
within the institutional framework of the EU responsible for overseeing EU development 
policy is the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG 
Devco), a department of the European Commission.  DG Devco describes its ultimate aims 
as reducing poverty in the world, ensuring sustainable development, and promoting 
democracy, peace and security.  It also works to increase coordination between EU Member 
State donors and offers a locale where common agreement amongst them regarding 
development issues can be generated.  The work of DG Devco is influenced by many factors 
relating to both the EU and development, including the likes of advocating for greater policy 
coherence within the EU, and a push for greater aid effectiveness; during the MDG era, the 
MDGs were supported by DG Devco and thus influenced the EU’s approach to development 
to some extent.144,145,146 
The EU produces a number of official documents related to development that each 
contribute to its overall approach.  The Consensus on Development outlines the vision that 
underpins the EU’s work as a development actor, as jointly agreed to by the Member States; 
it provides guidance to DG Devco and effectively serves as a joint EU development policy.147  
The Development Code of Conduct outlines the principles that should guide how the EU 
itself and the Member State donors coordinate with each other and practically operate in 
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the field of development.148  The 2012 Council Conclusions on Development re-emphasised 
many points contained in the previous two documents, and helped influence the setting of 
those parts of the 2014-2020 EU budget related to development.149  DG Devco reports 
annually on its work, outlining how EU development policy is being implemented, and also 
proposes specific ideas of how the EU and the Member States can improve their 
performance as development aid donors.150,151  It also writes many country strategy papers 
assessing the micro level needs of particular recipients, which help determine how aid is 
practically used in those specific contexts.  Finally, the EU funds the production of the 
European Reports on Development, which are compiled by development research institutes 
located in the EU, and have specific sectoral or thematic focuses on issues relating to 
development.152,153,154 
These documents make some specific references relevant for the purposes of this research.  
The DG Devco mission statement states explicitly that it concentrates funding to those 
countries most in need, and adds that it has a particular focus on supporting development in 
Africa.155  The Consensus on Development states that need should constitute an important 
criterion in determining development aid allocations, alongside institutional performance; 
and also that particular attention should be given to fragile states and donor orphans, by 
which it means chronically underfunded countries.156  The Code of Conduct also 
acknowledges this issue, and states that the EU and its Member States should work to 
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redress the imbalance in resources allocated to different recipients.157  The issue of need is 
mentioned many times in EU documentation related to development, but is not specifically 
defined, other than a reference to incomes in the Consensus on Development, and the EU 
does not have an official needs index, though it is theoretically possibly that DG Devco 
makes use of an unpublicised needs index.  Overall, there is sufficient evidence in EU 
documentation to suggest the EU at least considers need when determining its 
development aid allocations, and has a rhetorical awareness of the chronically underfunded 
countries problem. 
Researchers examining the EU’s approach to development have raised a number of issues; 
the two most prominent seem to be the relationship between the EU tier and the Member 
States, and the overall theoretical outlook of the EU’s approach.  Dearden overviews a 
number of issues the EU faces in coordinating Member State action in the realm of 
development, and argues the inconsistency in approaches between different Member 
States is problematic.158  Meanwhile, Barder and his colleagues draw attention to those 
differing approaches, and the differing levels of commitment to development of the 
Member States; they also argue that overall the EU works energetically to tackle the 
symptoms of poverty, but not the underlying causes.159  Schneider and Tobin examine how 
the Member States influence the overall approach of the EU to development, and argue 
that different groups of Member States can align it with their own interests by forming 
interest coalitions.160  Regarding the overall theoretical outlook reflected in the EU’s 
approach to development, there seems to be a reasonable consensus that it generally 
adopts a neoliberal development approach; this stems somewhat from its historic use of aid 
conditionality.  Carbone argues that although the EU has been working to stop the practice 
of tying or conditioning aid, it has thus far failed with this ambition, as it has been unable to 
generate agreement on the issue amongst the Member States.161  Langan takes a stronger 
position, arguing that despite a rhetorical opposition to aid conditionality, the EU still uses it 
in practice through the way it administers budgetary support to developing countries.162  
The focus on institutional performance and good governance adopted by the EU is also seen 
as contributing to its overall neoliberal approach to development; Carbone examined this 
                                                          
157 Council of the European Union (2007). EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in 
Development Policy. External Relations Council. Brussels, Council of the European Union. 
 
158 Dearden, S. J. H. (2008). "Introduction: European Union Development Aid Policy - The Challenge of 
Implementation." Journal of International Development 20: 187-192. 
 
159 Barder, O., J. Clark, A. Lepissier, L. Reynolds and D. Roodman (2012). Working Paper 313. Europe Beyond 
Aid: Assessing Europe's Commitment to Development. Washington D.C., Center for Global Development. 
 
160 Schneider, C. J. and J. L. Tobin (2013). "Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European 
Union." International Studies Quarterly 57: 103-114. 
 
161 Carbone, M. (2014). "Much ado about nothing? The European Union and the global politics of untying aid." 
Contemporary Politics 20(1): 103-117. 
 
162 Langan, M. (2015). "Budget support and Africa-European Union relations: Free market reform and neo-
colonialism?" European Journal of International Relations 21(1): 101-121. 
Page 62 of 127 
 
issue in an earlier piece, as did Hout, who argued that the technocratic approach to 
governance reform taken by the EU reflects an ambition to mould developing countries into 
market societies.163,164 
The information overviewed in this section relates to the EU’s overall approach to 
development, which influences its approach to development aid in particular, the subject of 
concern in the upcoming section. 
 
 
Section 3.7 – EU Development Aid 
 
In its rhetoric, the EU describes itself explicitly as the world’s leading donor, as over half of 
the overall global total of development aid is provided by the EU and its Member States.165  
However, it is important to note that the majority of this development aid is administered 
and allocated by the Member States themselves.  Each of the Member States has its own 
development aid programme, with its own budget and its own priorities, and thus the 
Member States are donors in their own right; there is considerable variance in many ways, 
including aid volumes and proportions, between the Member States as development actors.  
Additionally, the EU tier is also a development aid donor, and its budget is funded by the 
Member States; the total development aid budget administered by the EU tier is 
comparable to that of the large Member States used for comparative purposes in this 
research. 
The EU and its Member States have repeatedly committed to increasing the proportions of 
their budgets that they dedicate to development aid; the 0.7% target is the long-standing 
target advocated for and agreed to within the United Nations (UN).  The EU also has its own 
intermediate development aid targets, designed to help scaffold the Member States 
towards the 0.7% target; these EU targets were set in two tiers, one for those 15 countries 
that joined the EU before 2002 and one for those countries that joined since, to account for 
their own broadly different developmental situations.  The 2010 target for the older EU 
Member States was 0.51%, and their 2015 target was 0.7%.  For the newer EU Member 
States, the 2010 target was 0.17%, and the 2015 target was 0.33%.166 
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Figure 2: EU Institutions Aid Volumes to All Recipients (USD millions)167 
 
 
There is notable variance in the proportions of development aid given by different EU 
Member States.  As of 2013, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and the UK are meeting the 
0.7% target; the first three of these countries had development aid levels of above 0.7% for 
the entire MDG period, while the UK is a recent addition to the group.  Norway, which has 
not joined the EU, is the only other development aid donor to reach that target.  The 
Netherlands was previously above the 0.7% target, but as of 2013 had dipped below it.  Of 
the three key EU Member States being used for comparative purposes in this research, the 
UK gives a notably higher proportion of development aid than France and Germany, 
however this is a recent phenomenon, and over the MDG period as a whole the three gave 
comparable amounts.  Among the newer EU Member States, as of 2013 none is close to 
reaching the interim 0.33% target set by the EU, though Slovenia gives the highest 
proportion among this group.  Overall, it is notable that those countries that do meet the 
0.7% target are among the wealthiest and most developed in the EU.168 
During the MDG era, it can be said that development aid slowly increased as a priority for 
the EU and its Member States, as there was an increase in development aid volumes during 
the period.  This is illustrated by Figure 2, which shows the raw volumes disbursed by the EU 
itself to all recipients in the years between 2001 and 2013.  Notwithstanding temporary 
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reductions in times of economic turbulence, the overall pattern shown by this graph is a 
slow upwards trend.  Finally, it is notable that helping people in developing countries is of 
importance to a majority of citizens in all EU Member States, as indicated by a 2015 
Eurobarometer survey.169  Should this remain the case, it is likely that development aid 
proportions will increase further in the future. 
The EU distributes its development aid to recipients through four geography-based 
development aid funding instruments; the disbursements for all four are administered for 
the most part by DG Devco.  The use of four separate instruments reflects how the EU 
categorises its interactions with different countries and regions in the wider world.  The 
most prominent of these is the European Development Fund (EDF); it disburses 
development aid to the ACP group of countries, which are signatories of the Cotonou 
Agreement.  The EDF sits outside the EU budget and is funded directly by the Member 
States, but is managed by DG Devco.170  The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
disburses development aid funding to those countries that are candidates, or have been 
deemed eligible to become candidates, to join the EU.  While sometimes considered to not 
be development aid in the traditional sense, funding from this instrument is consistently 
included as such in official statistics, so thus is included in this research.  The European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) disburses development aid to those countries covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy; these countries are located in Eastern Europe, North 
Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.  Finally, the Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI) disburses aid to the remaining developing countries not covered by the other three 
instruments; this essentially equates to Asia and Latin America.171  The IPA, ENI, and DCI 
funding instruments sit within the EU budget under the Global Europe heading and 
constitute the three largest and most significant lines in this section of the budget.172  This 
use of four development aid funding instruments based largely on geography is important 
because it plays a role in determining how of EU development aid funding is distributed 
between different recipient countries. 
As discussed in Section 2.7, those factors that influence development aid distributions 
generally can be grouped as need, institutional performance and political factors; some 
researchers have investigated aspects of how these broad influences specifically affect the 
EU’s overall development aid distribution, and generally have reached critical conclusions 
about the role played by political factors.  These studies have often focussed on a potential 
geographic bias towards the ACP countries, a further potential geographic bias towards 
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Eastern Europe, and the overall developmental level of leading EU development aid 
recipients.  Further studies have investigated the role that institutional performance plays in 
the EU’s development aid distribution.  While there is not yet a large number of studies on 
this topic, investigations of the development aid allocations of specific donors, including the 
EU, are becoming more commonplace within the development studies discipline over time. 
Arvin and his colleagues conducted a study of EU development aid in the 1986-1995 period 
and reached clear conclusions that the EU exhibits the small country bias and a bias towards 
the ACP countries with which it has a long-standing institutional relationship; they also 
argued that to some extent it favours wealthier developing countries, and that overall the 
EU’s development aid is highly politicised.173  Berthélemy concurred with these findings, 
arguing that while multilateral donors generally have more equitable development aid 
distributions, the EU is unique as a multilateral in that it exhibits a strong bias in favour of 
ACP countries, and that overall both need and institutional merits play a only a small role in 
determining its overall aid allocations.174 
Writing in 2000, Cox and Chapman examined the historic patterns of EU development aid in 
the pre-MDG era.  One of their main conclusions was that the proportion given to sub-
Saharan Africa has declined over time, from highs of over 70% in the 1970s to around 30% 
at their time of writing.  In contrast, they argued the proportion of aid to Central and 
Eastern Europe increased in rapidly in the 1990s and a bias towards this region has come to 
supersede the traditional ACP bias.175  Many others have also noted this shift in EU focus 
towards Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism.  A recent study from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) descriptively examined 
many aspects of the development aid allocations of the EU and other donors, and 
concluded, amongst other things, that as of 2012, EU development aid remains primarily 
focussed on Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.176 
The findings of the above studies indicate that generally need does not play an important 
role in determining EU development aid distributions, however some studies have looked at 
this aspect specifically.  Baulch argues that the EU concentrates its development aid to 
middle income countries, and that need as defined by the MDGs does not play a major role; 
he also argues that the EU compares unfavourably to its Member States in this regard.177  
Meanwhile, Karamalakov argues that political factors rather than need determine how the 
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EU allocates its development aid, and that much is given to advanced countries; he argues 
that a substantive redistribution is thus required.178 
Some researchers have focussed on the extent to which factors of institutional performance 
influence EU development aid distributions.  Zanger argues, amongst other things, that good 
governance factors did not play a consistent or prominent role in determining the EU’s 
development aid distribution in the pre-MDG era.179  Meanwhile, Carey argues that despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, ultimately human rights records of recipients consistently do not 
strongly influence EU development aid commitments.180  Finally, the extent to which 
security issues influence the EU’s performance as a donor is coming under increasing 
consideration when analysing its development aid distribution.181,182 
So, while overall these studies suggest that need does not play a prominent role in 
determining EU development aid distributions, none examines specifically its performance 
in the MDG era from a human development perspective.  Having examined the research 
topic from development studies and European studies perspectives, the remainder of this 
research analyses the development aid distribution of the EU and the extent to which it is 
influenced by need. 
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Section 4.1 – Approaches to Measuring Need 
 
The concept of need is important to development studies generally, and to this research 
project in particular.  However, what constitutes need in development is an issue of 
contestation; it is difficult to accurately measure and quantify need, and there is no single 
universally accepted way of measuring levels of development, developmental changes, or 
overall levels of need.  Nonetheless, for the purposes of this research, it is necessary to 
identify a measure that offers an appropriate indication of the relative levels of need of 
recipient states; this will allow for an investigation of the extent to which need influences 
the actual development aid distributions of the European Union (EU) and the selected 
Member States.  Therefore, this section considers different approaches to quantifying 
development and assessing the relative development statuses and levels of need of 
particular developing countries.  Importantly, differing approaches to and ideas about 
measuring need are related to and informed by general theories and understandings of 
development.  These approaches are usually based around measuring levels of 
development, or measuring levels of poverty; it is logically assumed that a lower level of 
development equates to a higher level of need, and that a higher level of poverty equates to 
a higher level of need. 
Given the wide range of approaches to measuring development levels, poverty and need, it 
is necessary to clarify the stance taken by this research towards a number of specific issues.  
Firstly, poverty can be understood as absolute poverty or relative poverty; absolute poverty 
approaches involve a comparison with defined benchmarks, whereas relative poverty 
approaches involve a comparison with the overall standards of the group.  Each approach 
can be applied globally, or, more usually, internally within states.183  The concern of this 
research is not with absolute poverty or levels of need within states or globally, but rather 
with relative differences between states.  Secondly, an issue related to need and poverty is 
that of inequality.  The relative differences between states constitute an important facet of 
global inequality, but further inequalities exist within states themselves, their constituent 
regions, or smaller units still.  Even assessing need at the most practical micro level, the 
household, cannot fully account for inequality, due to problems of unequal allocation of 
resources within households.  Relative internal inequality is a problem that affects all 
countries and is difficult to remove; while states may have varying capabilities of resolving 
internal inequalities, ultimately doing so must be considered the primary responsibility of 
the state itself.  Generally, inequality remains a problematic issue when attempting to 
quantify need, and measures of poverty or need cannot fully account for internal 
inequalities or differences.184 
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The third issue acknowledged is the conjecture over whether development aid should be 
directed to poor people or poor countries.185  This issue has arisen due to the presence of 
large numbers of poor people in developing countries that are not among the very poorest; 
this is a result of differing levels of population and internal inequality between states, and 
relates to differing understandings of poverty.  This research contends that while population 
levels should naturally be taken into account when determining development aid 
allocations, ultimately aid must be directed foremost to the poorest countries with the 
highest average levels of need; this is consistent with an aid equity outlook, and accounts 
for the generally lower capabilities the very poorest countries have of resolving issues 
related to their low levels of overall development and high levels of need.  Nonetheless, this 
issue remains an important and problematic one within the development studies discipline, 
and with regards to development aid allocations in particular.  Finally, while approaches to 
measuring need are related to theories and understandings of development, they are also 
related to deeper philosophical understandings of the concepts of need and poverty; 
although related, these deeper philosophical issues are not examined in this research.186 
Modernisation theory, overviewed in Section 2.1, was the default dominant theoretical 
paradigm in development studies, and has traditionally had a strong influence on 
approaches to measuring development.  Per the modernisation outlook, with its economic 
focus, the overall economic production level of the state is seen as the most appropriate 
measure of its level of development; increasing economic production is perceived as the 
purpose of development, and there is little practical differentiation between the concepts of 
economic growth and development.  Thus, higher levels of production, greater economic 
growth, and higher incomes, are seen as signifying higher development statuses.  Therefore, 
modernisation approaches advocate that development be measured in monetary terms; the 
measures utilised are usually the likes of the related Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
Gross National Product per capita and Gross National Income per capita.  These measures, 
albeit in slightly differing ways, calculate the total of productive economic activities seen as 
contributing to the overall wealth of the state; they then divide this number by the 
population of the state, in order to show the average wealth of citizens in the country, 
which is seen as equating to the average level of development.  Additionally, approaches 
based on economics can often have a particular focus on economic growth rates 
themselves.  Advantages of using income measures and other economic measures include 
that they are relatively easily quantifiable, and are seen as allowing for accurate 
international comparisons, while approaches based on social statistics are often seen as less 
easily quantifiable and less comparable across different states.  Support for economic and 
income-based measures of development remains strong amongst those with 
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understandings of development influenced by modernisation, and these approaches remain 
widely used, particularly by development economists.187,188 
Another approach to measuring levels of need that is based on income levels, and possibly 
the most well-known approach amongst the wider public, is the poverty line approach.  This 
begins by setting a benchmark for the minimum level of income required to have an 
acceptable living standard, and then calculates the number or proportion of people whose 
incomes do not reach that standard.  Those people living below the benchmark, or poverty 
line, are then said to be living in poverty, or sometimes absolute poverty.  This approach is 
often applied internally to states, and thus poverty lines can differ significantly between 
states, due to their differing economic and developmental situations; however, the poverty 
line approach is also applied internationally, and the World Bank in particular is known for 
its use of a global poverty line when measuring levels of need.  There is much debate around 
the appropriate levels at which to place poverty lines, both internally within states, and 
internationally, and ultimately their placement is a political decision that reflects the 
outlooks and capabilities of relevant actors; poverty line approaches must also account for 
the issue of inflation when considering changes over time.  While the benchmarks used in 
these approaches are generally set in an absolutist way, such as $2 per day, they are 
sometimes set at relative points, such as a certain percentage of the overall income average.  
Poverty line approaches have much support as a means of assessing levels of need, however 
the contested nature of where the benchmarks they use are set can be seen as decreasing 
their credence.  Furthermore, the binary way in which they characterise populations, with 
people being portrayed as simply in poverty or out of poverty, is seen as problematic, as it 
generally does not account for overall averages, or for how far above or below the poverty 
line individuals or populations may be.189,190 
While approaches related to modernisation theory remain widely in use, the evolution of 
development theory has led to a greater diversity in understandings of development and 
approaches to measuring it.  The human development approach, as detailed in Section 2.2, 
understands development broadly and in terms of human freedoms and capabilities, and 
thus as extending beyond just economic concerns.  As such, it considers economic or 
income-based measures of development as unsatisfactory, as economic changes do not 
necessarily equate to changes in overall quality of life, and that regardless those approaches 
do not fully reflect levels of development as understood by human developmentalists.  
Therefore, the human development approach also considers social indicators as suitable 
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measures of development status, and this theoretical school has developed a number of 
more encompassing ways of quantifying need and development; these often include the 
likes of education indicators and health indicators.  The shift in development theory towards 
broader understandings of development is important, because it influences not only 
approaches to quantifying development, but also the policy approaches adopted by 
developing countries; if development is understood as economic growth, states tend to 
focus their energy on achieving economic growth, whereas if development is understood as 
human development, they are more likely to emphasise the importance of social policy. 
Two of the most renowned approaches to quantifying development associated with the 
human development approach are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).  The MDGs are overviewed in Section 2.3 and 
comprise a collection of human development indicators subscribed to by all countries 
through the United Nations (UN).  Development progress towards the MDGs was monitored 
by the UN from the year following their signing, 2001, through to the present.  The MDGs 
have been hugely influential in global development, and in this research the study period 
has been defined to as best possible equate with the MDG period.  However, while 
acknowledging the importance and validity of the MDGs, the research cannot practically use 
them as a measure of development; by design, they are complex and cannot be 
encapsulated by a single number, instead being comprised of 48 separate indicators.191 
The MPI is a modern approach to quantifying development released in 2010 that is gaining 
much credence.  It is situated within the human development school and seeks to account 
for the multiple dimensions of poverty, including overlapping deprivations of capabilities.  
As such, it is highly detailed, considering differences between regional units and ethnic 
groupings within states, and has ten input factors related to education, health and standard 
of living, but does not include income as an input factor; the MPI can be considered as an 
expansion of the Human Development Index (HDI) detailed below.  The MPI approach 
reflects a continuation of the trend of understanding and measuring development in 
increasingly broad ways.192  This research cannot make use of the MPI as a measure of 
development; while it can be encapsulated in a single number, it is too recent an addition to 
the development landscape, and was not in existence for much of the survey period.  
Nonetheless, the MPI represents an interesting recent development in approaches to 
measuring need, and may prove to be highly influential in the post-MDG era. 
One of the earliest innovations of the human development approach was the HDI, which is a 
widely-known composite approach to measuring levels of development.  It combines three 
important aspects of development into a single index; health as measured by life 
expectancy, education as measured by actual and expected years of schooling, and standard 
of living as measured by income levels.  The three components are weighted equally and 
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combined into a single HDI rating score for each country, which ranges from 0 to 1; it is 
updated yearly and is overseen and administered by the UN.  The HDI is judged as the most 
appropriate measure of need for the purposes of this research.  However, it is not without 
drawbacks; it is important to note that the HDI is a summary and not a comprehensive 
measure of development, and that, as with many other approaches, it cannot account for 
internal inequalities within states.  Furthermore, the HDI is not technically a measure of 
need, but rather a measure of development status; the logical assumption adopted is that a 
lower HDI value equates to a higher level of need.193,194 
Overall, the HDI is reasonably broad, is independent of donor or recipient rhetoric, is 
internationally respected and long-standing, and is consistent with the human development 
approach adopted in this thesis; in an environment where how best to measure need is 
contested, the HDI offers the most appropriate approach for use in this research. 
 
 
Section 4.2 – MDG Era HDI Figures 
 
Assessing development aid allocations, as detailed in Section 2.8, usually involves creating a 
model for the ideal distribution of development aid, then comparing actual development aid 
distributions against those suggested by the model.  While the main focus of those models 
overviewed in Section 2.8 is on identifying potentially chronically underfunded countries, 
they are also useful for assessing the extent to which the factors that make them up 
influence overall development aid distributions; as this research focuses on both of these 
issues, this overall approach is an appropriate one to adopt.  The most prominent models of 
this kind to date consider institutional factors, a balance of need and institutional factors, 
egalitarian distributions, or need as measured by incomes.195,196,197  This research, with its 
focus on need, and outlook informed by the human development approach, creates a model 
that is distinct in that it is informed by an aid equity outlook and based on the HDI; this is a 
simple model constructed for illustrative purposes, and the intention is to develop and 
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expand the model in further research.  The remainder of this chapter overviews the process 
of compiling the factors necessary to create the model, and applying it to the relevant 
development aid distributions in order to examine the performance of the EU as a 
development aid donor. 
The first step necessary in creating the aid allocation model is to identify a figure that 
represents the overall level of development of recipient states.  As discussed, the HDI is the 
most appropriate means of measuring need for the purposes of this research, and thus 
forms the basis for the figures identified.  As also discussed, the research aims to include 
development aid disbursements from the 2001-2013 period, which corresponds as best 
possible with the era of the MDGs.  Therefore, it is necessary to identify an HDI figure that 
accurately represents the level of development of particular recipient states for the MDG 
period as a whole, rather than for any specific year.  It is important to note that while the 
HDI is published yearly, the HDI figures published in a particular report are not comparable 
with those published in previous years, due to subtle changes in factors that affect the 
calculation process.198,199,200  However, each report does contain a section looking back at 
historical trends using the latest configuration of the calculation.  With these points in mind, 
the research uses the HDI trends section of the 2014 HDI report, which was the most recent 
published at time of writing.201 
In order to create an MDG period HDI figure for each recipient country, a weighted average 
was constructed.  The HDI trends section of the 2014 HDI report offered HDI figures for 
selected years; the relevant years for the purposes of this research were 2000, 2005, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.  As the survey period was 2001-2013, the stance adopted was 
that each year in the survey period should count equally, and that its assigned HDI figure 
should be that for the most historically recent year assigned a figure in the 2014 HDI report.  
The effect of this was that in the construction of the MDG era HDI averages, the 2000 figure 
in the report had a 4/13 weighting, the 2005 figure in the report had a 3/13 weighting, the 
2008 figure in the report had a 2/13 weighting, and the 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 figures 
in the report each had 1/13 weightings.  This process allowed for the construction of the 
MDG era HDI figures for recipient countries that are utilised in the research; these figures 
are displayed in Figure 2 and they are ordered from the lowest to the highest. 
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It is important to note that some recipients were not given historic HDI figures for all 
pertinent years in the 2014 HDI report; this was particularly the case for the most distant 
2000 year reading.  As this issue applied to 13 countries, a significant number, it was 
determined to keep these countries in the study, and adapt the weightings that contributed 
to their MDG period HDI figure as necessary.  The stance taken was that in these cases the 
first reading available should be backdated to apply to all earlier years in the survey period, 
and thus be assigned a higher than usual weighting, while the remaining readings would 
retain their usual weighting.  Eleven countries were missing a 2000 reading, so their 2005 
reading was given a 7/13 weighting, with the subsequent readings weighted as normal; 
these countries were Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia-H.), Burkina Faso, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia), Georgia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Nigeria, Uzbekistan and the entity recorded as West Bank and Gaza 
Strip (hereafter Palestine).  Two countries were missing readings for 2000, 2005 and 2008, 
so their 2010 reading was given a 10/13 weighting, with the subsequent readings weighted 
as normal; these countries were Eritrea and Turkmenistan. 
The research began from a basis that all countries that received development aid from the 
EU or the selected Member States during the MDG period, or that the model indicates 
should have received development aid during the MDG period, were eligible for inclusion in 
the survey.  It then removed countries from this set only when it was justifiable to do so.  
The first of two justifiable reasons for removing countries was that some countries did not 
have any HDI figures in the 2014 HDI report to indicate their level of need.  The second 
reason was that some countries have very low populations, and Section 4.3 covers the issue 
of population.  Those countries that did receive development aid, but were removed as they 
lacked any indicative HDI figure were North Korea and Somalia. The removal of Somalia in 
particular is significant as that country faces many developmental challenges and is widely 
seen as the archetypal example of a failed state.  The situation in Somalia has likely 
rendered the collection of economic and social statistics highly difficult and probably 
explains the absence of HDI figures for Somalia for the entire MDG period.  Although 
Somalia does receive significant amounts of development aid, if it could be assigned an HDI 
figure, this would probably indicate the country to have a particularly high level of need, and 
the proportion of aid it receives to be insufficient.  The absence of HDI figures for North 
Korea is probably the result of political issues which make it difficult to ascertain the 
developmental level of that country. 
A particular issue of note is that four countries gained some form of independence during 
the MDG period, a complicated issue for this research; these entities are Timor-Leste, 
Montenegro, Kosovo, and South Sudan.  Timor-Leste, while officially independent in 2002, 
was effectively self-governed from 1999, and has HDI, population and aid disbursement 
figures for the whole survey period; it is thus treated as a typical country in the sample.  
Montenegro seceded from Serbia in 2006 and has since received development aid 
disbursements, however it has been removed from the survey due to its low population; it is 
impractical to adjust Serbia’s aid receipts from the 2001-2005 period to account for the 
presence of Montenegro, however it is reasonably assumed that only negligible amounts of 
the development aid given to Serbia in this period went to Montenegro.  Kosovo declared 
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independence from Serbia in 2008 and its international status is disputed; for the purposes 
of this research Kosovo is included with Serbia, and the research notes that unit as Serbia 
(incl. Kosovo).  This is not a political statement on the validity of Kosovo’s independence, but 
rather is made necessary by the fact that although the two entities received separate 
development aid packets from 2009 onwards, they are assigned a combined HDI figure by 
the UN, and there is no means of ascertaining separate HDI figures for the two.  Finally, 
South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 and received its own development aid packet in 
the final two years of the survey period.  For the purposes of this research, South Sudan is 
included with Sudan, as for the majority of the period it was part of Sudan and theoretically 
received aid from the same packet, and nonetheless does not yet have a separate HDI 
figure; the inclusion of South Sudan with Sudan is not a statement on the validity of its 
independence, but rather is done for the purposes of the research. 
It is necessary to note that for expediency, a number of countries in the study are referred 
to by their shortened forms.  In addition to those countries already noted earlier in this 
section, this applies to the following countries; the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
referred to as DR Congo, the Central African Republic is referred to as CAR, Papua New 
Guinea is referred to as PNG, the Dominican Republic is referred to as Dominican Rep., and 
Trinidad and Tobago is referred to as Trinidad and T. 
Finally, the inclusion of all countries that received development aid from the pertinent 
donors, or should have received development aid according to the model, during the 2001-
2013 period, meant a number of countries that might not generally be considered as 
developing countries were included in the sample; this included a number of EU countries.  
Portugal was a Member State of the EU for the whole period, but has a relatively low HDI for 
an EU Member State, and is included as the model indicates it should have received 
development aid.  Latvia joined the EU in 2004 and its HDI level also indicates that it should 
have received development aid during the period.  Slovenia also joined the EU in 2004, and 
actually did receive development aid from EU in the early part of the survey period, 
although its HDI is sufficiently high that the model indicates that it should not have.  
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, around halfway through the MDG period, and, 
although neither did, their HDI levels indicate they should have received development aid.  
Finally, Croatia is presently an EU Member State, having joined in 2013, the final year of the 
survey period, and is included in the study as it received development aid funding for most 
of the MDG era.  It is important to note that among the overall grouping of countries 
included in the survey, these countries have generally the lowest levels of need, and 
furthermore as EU Member States are eligible for different forms of funding through 
internal mechanisms. 
The above issues all played a role in determining the final composition of countries in the 
study, and Figure 3 summarises the MDG era HDI figures derived for all those countries that 
were ultimately included in the study.  Figure 4 displays the same information in map form, 
including the remaining EU Member States for comparative purposes.  It uses the 
classifications from the HDI itself; the red countries are those with low levels of human 
development, the orange countries are those with medium levels of human development, 
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the green countries are those with high levels of human development, and the blue 
countries are those with very high levels of human development. 
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Country 
MDG 
Era HDI 
Figure 
Niger 0.298 
DR Congo 0.300 
Chad 0.331 
Sierra Leone 0.332 
CAR 0.334 
Burundi 0.337 
Mozambique 0.342 
Burkina Faso 0.343 
Ethiopia 0.357 
Mali 0.361 
Liberia 0.363 
Guinea 0.374 
Eritrea 0.374 
Malawi 0.377 
Guinea-Bissau 0.392 
Afghanistan 0.404 
Rwanda 0.406 
Gambia 0.415 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.418 
Tanzania 0.429 
Sudan 0.429 
Benin 0.435 
Uganda 0.437 
Zimbabwe 0.438 
Togo 0.447 
Haiti 0.451 
Senegal 0.453 
PNG 0.453 
Angola 0.454 
Lesotho 0.455 
Mauritania 0.458 
Yemen 0.463 
Cameroon 0.466 
Myanmar 0.475 
Madagascar 0.475 
Nigeria 0.478 
Zambia 0.485 
Nepal 0.490 
Kenya 0.491 
Bangladesh 0.502 
Pakistan 0.502 
Swaziland 0.511 
Laos 0.518 
Ghana 0.526 
Cambodia 0.531 
Congo 0.532 
India 0.534 
Timor-Leste 0.537 
Tajikistan 0.571 
Morocco 0.572 
Namibia 0.585 
Nicaragua 0.585 
Guatemala 0.586 
Honduras 0.589 
Vietnam 0.601 
Kyrgyzstan 0.606 
Botswana 0.623 
Iraq 0.624 
South Africa 0.629 
Moldova 0.634 
El Salvador 0.637 
Uzbekistan 0.637 
Mongolia 0.639 
Philippines 0.639 
Bolivia 0.640 
Syria 0.641 
Indonesia 0.644 
Gabon 0.649 
Paraguay 0.650 
Egypt 0.652 
China 0.654 
Palestine 0.662 
Dominican Rep. 0.672 
Algeria 0.677 
Colombia 0.684 
Ecuador 0.686 
Thailand 0.687 
Albania 0.688 
Turkmenistan 0.689 
Tunisia 0.689 
Armenia 0.694 
Iran 0.695 
Azerbaijan 0.695 
Jamaica 0.697 
Turkey 0.700 
Peru 0.703 
Ukraine 0.707 
Macedonia 0.712 
Sri Lanka 0.713 
Brazil 0.713 
Bosnia-H. 0.722 
Georgia 0.722 
Kazakhstan 0.724 
Venezuela 0.725 
Mauritius 0.726 
Mexico 0.727 
Jordan 0.730 
Costa Rica 0.731 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
0.731 
Panama 0.736 
Trinidad and T. 0.739 
Oman 0.745 
Malaysia 0.747 
Bulgaria 0.749 
Belarus 0.749 
Lebanon 0.749 
Russia 0.751 
Romania 0.751 
Uruguay 0.762 
Libya 0.769 
Argentina 0.774 
Latvia 0.779 
Croatia 0.783 
Saudi Arabia 0.784 
Chile 0.788 
Cuba 0.789 
Portugal 0.798 
Slovenia 0.853 
Figure 3: MDG Era HDI Figures 
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Figure 4: MDG Period HDI Map 
 
Section 4.3 – The HDI-based Aid Allocation Model 
 
The calculation of MDG period HDI figures overviewed in the previous section was the first 
step in creating the HDI-based aid allocation model.  The other two steps in the process 
were the calculation of MDG period population figures for recipient countries, and the 
combining of the two input factors; these latter two steps are overviewed in this section. 
It is standard to take population figures into account, to at least some degree, when 
determining how development aid should be distributed between different recipients; it is 
intuitive, for instance, that if two countries with comparable average development statuses 
have differing populations, the more populated country has a higher overall level of need.  
Thus, the model used in this research considers recipient state populations when 
determining how development aid should be distributed.  Population figures were sourced 
from the UN, which annually produces population estimations and projections for each year 
in the entire 1950-2100 period.202  For the purposes of this research, the estimations offered 
for each particular year in the survey period (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013) were averaged, with equal weightings, to create an 
MDG era population figure for each country included in the study.  In this way, the 
population figures used in the research accurately reflect the average populations of 
recipient states during the survey period as a whole.  These MDG era population figures, 
listed in millions, rounded to two decimal places, and ordered in size from largest to 
smallest, are listed in Figure 5. 
                                                          
202 United Nations (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs - Population Division. New York, United Nations. 
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It is important to note that countries and entities with very low populations, that could 
potentially have been included in the sample, were removed.  These entities sometimes lack 
state status and official population and HDI figures, have different developmental needs 
driven mainly by their small size, and tend to receive very high amounts of development aid, 
when it is measured per capita.  These factors mean they are somewhat incomparable to 
the other countries and entities in the international system, and nonetheless including them 
in the study could have potentially skewed results wildly and detracted from its usefulness.  
Thus it was determined to remove very small countries and entities from the sample and 
the benchmark for inclusion in the study was set at an MDG period average population of 1 
million. 
The states and other entities removed for this reason can be grouped into Caribbean 
entities, Pacific entities, and other entities and for completeness they are listed as follows.  
The Caribbean states and entities removed due to their small size were Anguilla, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and 
the UK Virgin Islands.  The Pacific states and entities removed due to their small size were 
the Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, 
New Caledonia, Niue, the Northern Marianas Islands, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, 
Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna.  The other states and entities 
removed due to their small size were Bhutan, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Maldives, Mayotte, Montenegro, Saint Helena, Sao 
Tome and Principe, and the Seychelles.  Finally, Malta, which joined the EU in 2004 and 
received development aid in the early part of the survey period, was also removed due to its 
small size.  It is acknowledged that many of those entities excluded are signatories of the 
Cotonou Agreement, and thus there is value in investigating them, the development issues 
they face, and their relationship with the EU; nonetheless, their small size renders them 
unsuitable for use in this particular research project. 
The MDG era population figures for those countries ultimately included in the study are 
listed in Figure 5. 
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Country Pop. 
China 1319.77 
India 1178.13 
Indonesia 232.52 
Brazil 192.19 
Pakistan 160.36 
Nigeria 148.04 
Bangladesh 146.11 
Russia 143.77 
Mexico 113.52 
Philippines 88.79 
Vietnam 85.97 
Ethiopia 81.12 
Egypt 77.98 
Iran 71.83 
Turkey 69.76 
Thailand 65.95 
DR Congo 60.29 
Myanmar 50.65 
South Africa 49.62 
Ukraine 46.45 
Colombia 44.29 
Sudan 42.62 
Tanzania 41.93 
Argentina 39.98 
Kenya 37.46 
Algeria 34.51 
Morocco 31.15 
Uganda 30.21 
Iraq 28.71 
Peru 28.34 
Venezuela 27.65 
Uzbekistan 26.73 
Malaysia 26.72 
Saudi Arabia 26.08 
Nepal 26.03 
Afghanistan 25.72 
Ghana 22.61 
Mozambique 22.46 
Yemen 21.79 
Romania 20.93 
Sri Lanka 19.77 
Madagascar 19.45 
Angola 19.30 
Cameroon 19.16 
Cote d'Ivoire 19.02 
Syria 18.93 
Chile 16.46 
Kazakhstan 15.85 
Niger 14.71 
Burkina Faso 14.36 
Ecuador 14.23 
Mali 13.85 
Guatemala 13.81 
Cambodia 13.74 
Malawi 13.64 
Zimbabwe 13.48 
Zambia 12.86 
Senegal 12.00 
Cuba 11.27 
Chad 10.82 
Portugal 10.49 
Tunisia 10.34 
Guinea 10.28 
Belarus 9.61 
Rwanda 9.59 
Haiti 9.56 
Dominican Rep. 9.50 
Bolivia 9.44 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
9.14 
Azerbaijan 8.80 
Benin 8.72 
Burundi 8.59 
Bulgaria 7.58 
Tajikistan 7.14 
Honduras 7.12 
PNG 6.40 
El Salvador 5.98 
Laos 5.97 
Libya 5.96 
Paraguay 5.95 
Togo 5.92 
Jordan 5.88 
Nicaragua 5.52 
Sierra Leone 5.30 
Kyrgyzstan 5.29 
Turkmenistan 4.87 
Georgia 4.39 
Eritrea 4.37 
Costa Rica 4.36 
Croatia 4.35 
CAR 4.22 
Lebanon 4.15 
Moldova 4.13 
Bosnia-H. 3.83 
Palestine 3.80 
Congo 3.75 
Liberia 3.58 
Panama 3.44 
Uruguay 3.35 
Mauritania 3.33 
Albania 3.00 
Armenia 3.00 
Oman 2.78 
Jamaica 2.70 
Mongolia 2.61 
Latvia 2.17 
Namibia 2.11 
Macedonia 2.05 
Slovenia 2.02 
Lesotho 1.96 
Botswana 1.95 
Gambia 1.55 
Guinea-Bissau 1.54 
Gabon 1.45 
Trinidad and T. 1.31 
Mauritius 1.23 
Swaziland 1.15 
Timor-Leste 1.01 
Figure 5: MDG Era Population Figures (in millions)
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The final step in creating the model involved combining the MDG era HDI figures with the 
MDG era population figures.  The first part of this constituted an adjustment of the MDG era 
HDI figures.  The HDI is constructed on a scale from 0 to 1 and classifies countries as 
belonging to one of four groups; countries with an HDI reading of lower than 0.55 are 
considered to have low levels of human development, those with a reading of between 0.55 
and 0.7 to have medium levels of human development, those whose reading lies between 
0.7 and 0.8 to have high levels of human development, and finally those countries with a 
reading above 0.8 are considered to have very high levels of human development.  It was 
adjudged that countries with very high levels of human development should not be 
recipients of development aid, and that the further a state is from reaching the status of 
very high human development, the greater their level of need. 
The comparative distances of recipients from the 0.8 benchmark were combined with their 
populations to generate a recommended development aid allocation for each of them.  At 
this point the MDG era HDI figure for Slovenia was adjusted to 0.8 exactly, as it had received 
development aid so was included in the sample, yet had on average a very high level of 
human development; this adjustment ensured that particular anomaly did not impact on 
the overall calculations.  The recommended aid allocation for each recipient was then 
converted to a proportion, so therefore the final reading provided by the model shows the 
percentage of the overall development aid packet that each recipient could reasonably 
expect to receive based on its level of need.  Because the model recommends percentages it 
can be applied regardless of the overall absolute amount of development aid funding, and 
can also be adapted to different sample sets of recipients. 
The HDI-based aid allocation model introduced in this research can be mathematically 
notarised as: 
 [ ( 0.8 – H ) * P / T ] * 100 
In the above equation H represents the MDG era HDI figure, P represents the MDG era 
population figure and T represents the sum of the (0.8–H)*P working figures for all countries 
in the sample.  The percentages of the overall development aid packet that the model 
recommends be disbursed to each country in the sample are displayed in Figure 6; they are 
rounded to three decimal places and ordered from the largest to the smallest. 
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Country % Rec. 
India 27.323 
China 16.800 
Pakistan 4.166 
Nigeria 4.156 
Bangladesh 3.796 
Indonesia 3.163 
Ethiopia 3.133 
DR Congo 2.628 
Vietnam 1.492 
Brazil 1.458 
Myanmar 1.435 
Sudan 1.379 
Tanzania 1.356 
Philippines 1.246 
Kenya 1.009 
Egypt 1.006 
Uganda 0.956 
Mozambique 0.897 
Afghanistan 0.888 
South Africa 0.740 
Mexico 0.723 
Nepal 0.704 
Iran 0.658 
Thailand 0.650 
Niger 0.644 
Yemen 0.640 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.633 
Morocco 0.619 
Russia 0.614 
Turkey 0.608 
Angola 0.582 
Burkina Faso 0.572 
Cameroon 0.558 
Madagascar 0.551 
Ghana 0.540 
Mali 0.530 
Malawi 0.503 
Colombia 0.448 
Chad 0.443 
Iraq 0.441 
Zimbabwe 0.425 
Guinea 0.382 
Uzbekistan 0.380 
Ukraine 0.377 
Algeria 0.370 
Senegal 0.363 
Zambia 0.353 
Burundi 0.347 
Rwanda 0.329 
Cambodia 0.322 
Haiti 0.291 
Benin 0.278 
Syria 0.262 
Guatemala 0.258 
Peru 0.240 
Sierra Leone 0.216 
PNG 0.194 
Togo 0.182 
Venezuela 0.181 
CAR 0.172 
Eritrea 0.162 
Sri Lanka 0.150 
Laos 0.147 
Tajikistan 0.143 
Ecuador 0.141 
Liberia 0.136 
Bolivia 0.132 
Honduras 0.131 
Malaysia 0.123 
Dominican Rep. 0.106 
Kazakhstan 0.105 
Nicaragua 0.104 
Tunisia 0.100 
Mauritania 0.099 
Argentina 0.091 
Kyrgyzstan 0.089 
Romania 0.089 
Congo 0.088 
El Salvador 0.085 
Azerbaijan 0.081 
Paraguay 0.078 
Moldova 0.060 
Lesotho 0.059 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
0.055 
Guinea-Bissau 0.055 
Gambia 0.052 
Turkmenistan 0.047 
Palestine 0.046 
Belarus 0.043 
Namibia 0.039 
Mongolia 0.037 
Saudi Arabia 0.036 
Jordan 0.036 
Bulgaria 0.034 
Botswana 0.030 
Georgia 0.030 
Albania 0.029 
Swaziland 0.029 
Armenia 0.028 
Costa Rica 0.026 
Bosnia-H. 0.026 
Jamaica 0.024 
Timor-Leste 0.023 
Panama 0.019 
Gabon 0.019 
Lebanon 0.018 
Chile 0.017 
Libya 0.016 
Macedonia 0.016 
Oman 0.013 
Uruguay 0.011 
Cuba 0.011 
Mauritius 0.008 
Trinidad and T. 0.007 
Croatia 0.006 
Latvia 0.004 
Portugal 0.002 
Slovenia 0.000 
Figure 6: Percentage of Aid Recommended by HDI-based Allocation Model 
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Section 4.4 – Actual Development Aid Disbursements 
 
In order to compare the distribution proposed by the HDI-based aid allocation model 
against actual development aid distributions, it was necessary to establish how much aid 
recipient countries actually received during the survey period.  The data for development 
aid disbursements was sourced from an online database managed by the Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).203  Data from the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD is commonly 
used in development studies as it is generally seen as thorough, reliable and accessible.   
The database contained figures for net development aid disbursements from the EU and the 
three selected Member States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), to all 
recipients for each year included in the survey period. 
As stated earlier, every country that received development aid from the EU or the key 
Member States during the MDG era was originally eligible for inclusion in the study, before 
some countries were removed for justifiable reasons.  Similarly, all development aid 
disbursed was originally considered eligible for inclusion, however there were clear 
justifiable reasons to remove some of the disbursements, as not all development aid is 
disbursed to specific recipient states.  The five categories of recipients that had to be 
removed from the study were; multilateral recipients, the EU itself (its own development aid 
budget is sourced from the development aid budgets of the Member States), regional 
organisations, unspecified countries, and states unsuitable for the study.  These categories 
of recipient received part of the overall development aid budget of the donors examined, 
and while their respective proportions, summarised in Figure 7, had to be removed from the 
study, they nonetheless offer points of interest. 
Multilateral recipients are generally departments of international organisations such as the 
UN or the World Bank; the EU gives a notably smaller proportion of its development aid 
budget to multilateral recipients than the Member States, possibly because it is considered 
itself to be something of a multilateral actor.  It is also notable that the UK gives a 
significantly higher proportion of its aid to multilateral recipients than France and Germany.  
The EU development aid budget is funded by the Member States, who each give a 
significant proportion of their own budgets to the EU; nonetheless, it is notable that the 
Member States distribute the clear majority of their budgets themselves, rather than 
assigning this responsibility to the EU.  Also, France and Germany give a significantly higher 
proportion of their funding to the EU than does the UK, possibly reflecting a greater 
commitment to European integration.  Regarding regional organisations, the EU gives a 
higher proportion of its aid budget to this type of recipient than the Member States, 
possibly due to a desire to gradually reshape the international system in its own image, by 
strengthening regional organisations in other parts of the world. 
                                                          
203 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015). Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Query Wizard for International Development Statistics: These data are an excerpt from Aid 
Disbursements to Countries and Regions (Dac2a). Development Assistance Committee. Paris, OECD. 
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The unspecified countries category includes two lines in the database, unspecified 
developing countries, and unspecified ex-Yugoslav states.  It is somewhat concerning from a 
transparency perspective that some development aid goes to unspecified countries, 
however it is theoretically possible that there are legitimate reasons for this.  The 
proportion of its aid budget the EU gives to unspecified countries is comparable to those of 
the Member States, with the exception of the UK, which has a surprisingly high figure for 
this category.  As expected, the category including recipients unsuitable for the study is the 
least significant of those examined here; the recipient from this category that receives the 
largest amount of EU funding is Somalia.  France has the highest figure in this category, and 
this is explained by the very large amount of development aid funding it gave to Mayotte 
during the MDG period; Mayotte is a small French dependency removed from the survey 
due to its low population, that if included would have been ranked fourth among recipients 
of French development aid.  Finally, the total proportion of the categories of recipients 
removed from the study is around 25% for the EU, which means that about three quarters 
of the overall EU development aid budget is included in the study.  The figures for the key 
Member States are significantly lower, and this is explained mainly by the proportions of 
their development aid they give to multilateral recipients and the EU itself. 
 
 EU France Germany UK 
Multilateral Recipients 3.73 14.67 15.42 21.05 
EU Institutions 0 20.42 21.10 15.08 
Regional Organisations 9.20 5.89 6.87 2.86 
Unspecified Countries 9.51 8.17 10.37 16.66 
Recipients Unsuitable for Study 2.87 4.23 0.17 1.18 
Total Aid to Suitable States 74.7 46.62 46.07 43.16 
Figure 7: Categories of Development Aid Recipient (% of total aid budget) 
 
Following the removal of those development aid disbursements that did not go to specific 
recipient countries suitable for the study, the total amount and proportion of development 
aid disbursed to each specific recipient from each specific donor could be ascertained.  
Figure 8 shows the total amount of development aid given to each recipient by the EU 
during the MDG era, as defined by this research; the figures are given in millions (United 
States dollars at 2015 prices, as with all monetary figures used henceforth), rounded to the 
nearest one, and listed in order from largest to smallest.  The table does not include all 
those countries included in the survey, but rather all those recipients in the study that 
received a non-negligible amount of development aid from the EU, defined as more than 1 
million per year on average during the MDG period.  Listing the recipients in this manner 
highlights those countries that were the leading recipients of EU development aid during the 
MDG era, and they appear to be clustered around the EU itself.  It is also notable that the EU 
disburses development aid to a larger group of recipient countries overall than the key 
Member States. 
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The total amounts of development aid disbursed to each recipient by the three key Member 
States being used for comparative purposes, France, Germany and the UK, are also 
displayed in this section.  Figure 9 shows the data for France, Figure 10 shows the data for 
Germany, and Figure 11 shows the data for the UK.  Again, these figures are in millions, 
rounded to the nearest one, and listed in order from largest to smallest; also, recipients are 
only included in the table of a specific donor if they received a non-negligible amount of 
development aid from that particular donor.  The leading recipients of development aid vary 
significantly between the three Member State donors.  Only three countries appear in the 
top 10 recipients for all of them; these are DR Congo, Iraq and Nigeria.  The leading 
recipients of aid from the UK and Germany are split reasonably evenly between Africa and 
Asia, while the leading recipients of aid from France are clustered in Africa.  Although the 
colonial or special relationship bias is not being tested in this research, it is interesting to 
note France and the UK have a number of their respective former colonies among their 
leading recipients.  Also, Germany distributes its development aid among the largest group 
of recipients overall, while the UK distributes its development aid among the smallest group, 
and in particular gives little aid to Latin American countries.  Finally, the aid disbursement 
figures for the Member States are different in a number of ways to that of the EU itself. 
The figures displayed in these tables show the actual amount of development aid recipient 
countries received during the MDG era from each of the relevant donors, and thus allow for 
comparisons with the model to be made in the following chapter. 
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Country Total 
Turkey 11770.61 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
6843.41 
Palestine 4376.83 
Morocco 3886.19 
Afghanistan 3294.42 
DR Congo 2793.96 
Ethiopia 2634.06 
Tunisia 2551.41 
Sudan 2558.13 
Egypt 2370.10 
South Africa 2157.60 
Bosnia-H. 2030.74 
Mozambique 2023.12 
Tanzania 1941.11 
Ukraine 1748.36 
Burkina Faso 1687.16 
Mali 1613.54 
Uganda 1530.04 
India 1497.78 
Niger 1414.24 
Bangladesh 1412.13 
Kenya 1373.78 
Pakistan 1254.00 
Haiti 1242.10 
Zambia 1236.12 
Georgia 1228.21 
Malawi 1226.00 
Madagascar 1196.14 
Chad 1139.98 
Jordan 1134.10 
Lebanon 1074.93 
Indonesia 1071.57 
Rwanda 1055.36 
Burundi 1038.02 
Nigeria 1020.46 
Ghana 1002.83 
Benin 983.90 
Senegal 972.00 
Moldova 966.42 
Cote d'Ivoire 963.98 
Albania  930.03 
Iraq 909.53 
China 891.66 
Sierra Leone 826.22 
Macedonia 800.02 
Algeria 791.91 
Cameroon 783.13 
Mauritania 780.51 
Croatia 772.65 
Zimbabwe 735.13 
Brazil 687.20 
Bolivia 676.32 
Syria 656.18 
Angola 651.33 
Vietnam 647.67 
Nicaragua 641.62 
Liberia 636.52 
Dominican 
Rep. 
606.65 
Jamaica 586.76 
Colombia 583.41 
Mauritius 574.52 
Honduras 524.95 
Sri Lanka 511.60 
Peru 506.83 
Guinea 466.21 
CAR 457.40 
Armenia 450.10 
Myanmar 446.67 
Yemen 417.82 
Cambodia 405.36 
Philippines 396.29 
Guatemala 395.54 
El Salvador 379.28 
Ecuador 372.33 
Nepal 358.69 
Tajikistan 352.49 
Lesotho 350.04 
Guinea-Bissau 347.70 
Argentina 346.62 
Congo 334.94 
Eritrea 312.16 
Togo 309.15 
Kyrgyzstan 291.11 
Namibia 280.75 
Timor-Leste 276.13 
Thailand 271.12 
Azerbaijan 238.64 
Chile 226.49 
PNG 221.62 
Botswana 212.29 
Paraguay 203.49 
Swaziland 194.67 
Slovenia 172.77 
Laos 170.31 
Gambia 152.96 
Kazakhstan 149.04 
Libya 148.86 
Gabon 144.64 
Belarus 126.78 
Venezuela 125.89 
Mexico 125.69 
Cuba 102.34 
Uzbekistan 98.54 
Uruguay 95.02 
Iran 70.07 
Mongolia 68.47 
Costa Rica 58.86 
Panama 41.54 
Turkmenistan 38.10 
Figure 8: EU Total MDG Era Development Aid Disbursements to Recipient 
Countries (in millions) 
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Country Total 
Cote d'Ivoire 4323.08 
Morocco 3829.41 
Nigeria 3594.22 
DR Congo 2795.67 
Congo 2730.09 
Senegal 2615.59 
Iraq 2570.73 
China 2313.77 
Cameroon 2149.97 
Tunisia 1990.15 
Vietnam 1839.62 
Madagascar 1541.62 
Algeria 1530.79 
Brazil 1445.26 
Egypt 1435.14 
Mali 1085.73 
Mexico 1085.03 
Burkina Faso 1062.52 
Lebanon 1054.77 
Niger 1030.30 
Turkey 977.20 
South Africa 908.96 
Colombia 823.75 
Kenya 721.00 
Guinea 671.89 
Mozambique 657.33 
Benin 641.93 
Palestine 625.00 
Myanmar 608.02 
Togo 594.25 
Haiti 584.96 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
557.23 
Chad 538.80 
Mauritania 484.61 
Ghana 474.64 
Afghanistan 412.05 
Mauritius 400.13 
Indonesia 397.38 
Gabon 391.80 
Cambodia 359.09 
CAR 351.16 
Dominican Rep. 312.62 
Jordan 303.50 
Syria 301.02 
Liberia 271.01 
Ethiopia 261.97 
Laos 252.47 
Tanzania 244.57 
Pakistan 227.29 
Zambia 215.99 
Bolivia 198.54 
Burundi 187.10 
Iran 172.15 
Ukraine 161.46 
Argentina 161.26 
Chile 140.26 
Sri Lanka 136.74 
Sudan 132.62 
Peru 113.53 
Philippines 111.60 
Nicaragua 108.71 
Azerbaijan 98.37 
Costa Rica 93.98 
Venezuela 83.74 
Rwanda 82.56 
Libya 82.55 
Armenia 81.87 
Uganda 81.65 
Georgia 81.14 
Honduras 80.12 
Moldova 69.40 
Namibia 67.31 
Guinea-Bissau 63.29 
Yemen 59.48 
Sierra Leone 59.02 
Zimbabwe 58.11 
Albania 57.73 
Ecuador 51.92 
Bosnia-H. 44.27 
El Salvador 42.12 
Kazakhstan 37.67 
Macedonia 37.51 
Cuba 36.42 
Guatemala 36.25 
Saudi Arabia 35.48 
Mongolia 34.51 
Uzbekistan 33.25 
Croatia 32.75 
Belarus 28.19 
Uruguay 28.11 
Botswana 27.85 
Tajikistan 24.89 
Eritrea 18.71 
Trinidad and T. 14.52 
Malawi 13.91 
Figure 9: France Total MDG Era Development Aid Disbursements to Recipient 
Countries (in millions) 
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Country Total 
Iraq 6624.87 
China 3877.97 
Afghanistan 3432.96 
Nigeria 3218.31 
Cameroon 2394.77 
India 2087.90 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
1823.50 
DR Congo 1778.38 
Egypt 1647.05 
Brazil 1520.97 
Vietnam 1173.89 
Ethiopia 1021.74 
Zambia 1017.52 
Tanzania 977.92 
Palestine 963.84 
Kenya 957.07 
Pakistan 927.54 
Mozambique 924.08 
South Africa 844.64 
Yemen 797.03 
Peru 780.42 
Ghana 774.76 
Morocco 738.53 
Bangladesh 704.23 
Ukraine 699.96 
Georgia 696.84 
Nicaragua 693.69 
Syria 655.97 
Nepal 646.31 
Bolivia 631.23 
Mexico 580.03 
Uganda 579.27 
Iran 570.68 
Liberia 550.10 
Sudan 517.16 
Mali 510.43 
Jordan 504.02 
Burkina Faso 493.86 
Botswana 472.96 
Benin 457.74 
Albania 433.22 
Cote d'Ivoire 428.22 
Colombia 422.11 
Chile 407.32 
Bosnia-H. 396.16 
Philippines 392.75 
Mongolia 390.40 
Indonesia 381.59 
Namibia 379.57 
Cambodia 379.12 
Malawi 373.68 
Tunisia 346.48 
Rwanda 340.67 
Senegal 333.62 
Zimbabwe 330.19 
Armenia 328.41 
Macedonia 309.92 
Ecuador 303.36 
Lebanon 302.56 
Uzbekistan 298.44 
Niger 287.01 
Laos 277.14 
Chad 276.97 
Kyrgyzstan 273.74 
Honduras 254.89 
Tajikistan 247.20 
Sri Lanka 241.39 
Burundi 232.29 
Guatemala 225.22 
Congo 224.41 
Argentina 215.45 
Azerbaijan 205.39 
Guinea 202.61 
El Salvador 194.26 
Sierra Leone 191.17 
Mauritania 182.96 
Madagascar 176.39 
Togo 167.20 
Haiti 160.34 
Belarus 156.85 
Kazakhstan 156.10 
Costa Rica 131.99 
Angola 130.45 
Moldova 111.69 
Malaysia 109.68 
Myanmar 100.41 
Dominican Rep. 88.86 
Croatia 81.08 
Timor-Leste 72.04 
Lesotho 71.32 
Venezuela 70.38 
Paraguay 64.60 
CAR 63.18 
Turkey 58.51 
Libya 50.97 
Algeria 40.54 
Cuba 39.51 
Eritrea 39.28 
PNG 19.35 
Turkmenistan 16.95 
Gambia 14.30 
Figure 10: Germany Total MDG Era Development Aid Disbursements to 
Recipient Countries (in millions) 
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Figure 11: UK Total MDG Era Development Aid Disbursements to Recipient 
Countries (in millions) 
Country Total 
Nigeria 7416.96 
India 5887.33 
Ethiopia 3304.44 
Afghanistan 3294.08 
Bangladesh 3163.02 
Tanzania 2924.28 
Iraq 2824.95 
Pakistan 2697.96 
DR Congo 2218.85 
Sudan 2217.79 
Ghana 1910.43 
Malawi 1631.41 
Uganda 1560.06 
Mozambique 1454.60 
Kenya 1421.66 
Zambia 1243.82 
Zimbabwe 1116.16 
Rwanda 1100.62 
Nepal 1087.57 
Sierra Leone 975.75 
China 934.42 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
885.93 
Vietnam 883.39 
Palestine 740.79 
South Africa 648.96 
Indonesia 560.69 
Myanmar 518.97 
Yemen 494.33 
Cameroon 328.51 
Syria 287.50 
Brazil 263.91 
Cambodia 260.92 
Egypt 238.85 
Liberia 213.47 
Burundi 147.11 
Jamaica 137.51 
Sri Lanka 119.61 
Angola 116.14 
Kyrgyzstan 110.38 
Cote d'Ivoire 100.30 
Bosnia-H. 98.83 
Tajikistan 89.71 
Congo 89.43 
Colombia 82.99 
Haiti 77.44 
Jordan 74.30 
Georgia 73.55 
Lesotho 73.45 
Honduras 73.08 
Tunisia 70.46 
Nicaragua 69.13 
Eritrea 67.68 
Gambia 66.01 
Madagascar 63.25 
Guatemala 62.54 
Libya 62.12 
Moldova 58.96 
Senegal 56.82 
Lebanon 48.60 
Ukraine 47.04 
Armenia 46.96 
Timor-Leste 45.18 
Malaysia 43.99 
Niger 43.73 
Mauritius 41.67 
Albania 41.57 
Mexico 41.44 
Chad 41.15 
Macedonia 36.91 
Morocco 34.31 
Philippines 33.40 
Kazakhstan 31.56 
Turkey 30.67 
Mauritania 26.47 
Togo 24.88 
Benin 24.11 
Guinea 23.29 
CAR 20.22 
Algeria 19.22 
Namibia 17.99 
Burkina Faso 17.61 
Iran 16.92 
Croatia 16.03 
Mali 15.90 
Uzbekistan 14.81 
Botswana 13.95 
Azerbaijan 13.82 
Mongolia 13.67 
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Page 91 of 127 
 
 
Section 5.1 – Geographic and Population Size Biases 
 
The actual development aid distributions displayed in the previous chapter can be 
compared with the HDI-based aid allocation model in any number of ways.  Initial 
observations of European Union (EU) development aid disbursements in the era of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) show two obvious biases that are necessary to 
acknowledge, as they clearly play an important role in determining the overall distribution 
of EU development aid funding.  These are a geographic bias and a population size bias, and 
both are overviewed in this section. 
Breaking the recipient countries into geographic groupings, and comparing the proportion 
of development aid the grouping actually received in the MDG era against the proportion 
the model predicted it should receive, clearly illustrates the role that geographic factors 
play.  As stated in Section 3.7, the EU disburses its development aid funding through four 
geography-based funding instruments, and this structure allows for geographic comparisons 
to be made.  Figure 12 displays the particular recipient countries that make up each 
geographic grouping, for the purposes of this comparison.  The first grouping is the 
Enlargement Area, and those current EU Member States that were included in the study 
have been added to this group.  The second grouping is the neighbourhood countries.  The 
third group is those countries belonging to the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States (ACP) funded mainly through the European Development Fund (EDF); this group is 
labelled Africa-CP, to account for the absence of most Caribbean and Pacific entities from 
the study due to their small size, and thus the strongly African character of the group 
overall.  The final group is titled Rest of World, and is generally made up of those Asian and 
Latin American countries funded through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).  
Figure 13 displays the information in map form; the light blue countries are the Enlargement 
Area, the purple countries are the Neighbourhood, the green countries are the Africa-CP 
group, the orange countries are the Rest of World group, and the dark blue countries are 
the remaining EU Member States. 
Figure 14 displays in graphical form the actual proportion of EU development aid received 
by each group compared with that recommended by the model.  Meanwhile, for 
comparative purposes, Figure 15 displays, in similar fashion, the model recommendations 
for each group against the actual proportions they received from the key Member States of 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK). 
As shown in Figure 14, the proportions of its development aid packet disbursed by the EU to 
the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood regions far exceed those recommended by the 
model.  While the model suggests that these regions combined should receive around 4% of 
development aid based on their level of need, in reality the EU gives them around 40%; the 
prioritisation of these groups by the EU is sufficiently significant to constitute a clear 
geographic bias.  The Africa-CP group, possibly due to the longstanding institutional 
relationship it has with the EU through the Cotonou Agreement and its predecessors, also  
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Figure 12: Recipient Geographic Groupings 
Enlargement Area 
Albania 
Bosnia-H. 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Latvia 
Macedonia 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
Turkey 
Neighbourhood 
Algeria 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Egypt 
Georgia 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Palestine 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Africa-CP 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
CAR 
Chad 
Congo 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Dominican Rep. 
DR Congo 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
PNG 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad and T. 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Rest of World 
Afghanistan 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Cambodia 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Sri Lanka 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
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Figure 13: Geographic Funding Groups Map 
 
receives a larger share of aid from the EU than the model recommends.  Meanwhile, the 
Rest of World group receives a massively smaller share of the overall packet of EU 
development aid funding than that recommended by the model.  It is interesting to note 
that the EU development aid appears to be split into fifths, with the Africa-CP group being 
given two-fifths, and the other three groups being given one fifth.  This is probably 
coincidental but nonetheless shows that factors other than need appear to play a significant 
role in determining the overall distribution of EU development aid. 
Figure 14: Percentage of EU Development Aid Disbursed to Geographic 
Groupings in MDG Era
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Figure 15: Percentage of Key Member State Development Aid Disbursed to 
Geographic Groupings in MDG Era 
 
 
The comparison with the Member States, whose data is shown in Figure 15, offers some 
points of interest.  Firstly, although the Member States did give more development aid to 
the Enlargement Agenda area than that recommended by the model, their proportions are 
much lower than that of the EU, and it is reasonable to say that they do not share the strong 
EU bias towards the grouping.  This possibly reflects a belief that they have delegated or 
assigned the Enlargement Agenda countries to the EU.  Regarding the Neighbourhood, the 
Member States diverge; France exhibits a similarly strong bias towards the neighbourhood 
as the EU, while the UK does not have a Neighbourhood bias, and Germany occupies a 
middle position.  As with the EU, all three key Member States gave a greater proportion of 
their development aid to the Africa-CP group than that recommended by the model; France 
and the UK gave a significantly higher proportion of their aid to this this grouping than 
Germany and the EU.  The Rest of World grouping appears underfunded by the Member 
States when compared with the model recommendations, however the Member States 
gave a greater proportion of their aid to this group than the EU, and thus are closer to the 
model recommendation, with Germany being the closest of the three.  Overall, the funding 
from the Member States appears less balanced between the four geographic groupings than 
the funding from the EU; this could be due to the relatively low levels of need in the 
Enlargement Agenda and Neighbourhood groups, and shows that the Member States 
appear to be less influenced by a geographic bias towards those regions than the EU.  
Finally, it is notable that the EU, France and the UK gave Africa-CP the highest share of their 
development aid of the four groupings, while Germany gave the Rest of World group the 
highest share of its aid. 
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The second clear bias in the development aid allocation of the EU is a population size bias 
against larger countries.  A bias towards smaller countries is considered something of a 
standard feature in development aid allocations and is not unique to the EU, however the 
significant role it plays must be acknowledged.  While the small country bias has 
traditionally not been particularly controversial, the issue of the high absolute numbers of 
poor people living in large countries that on average are not among the poorest, is gaining 
increasing prominence.  With regards to the development aid distributions of the EU and 
the key Member States, this bias can be illustrated by breaking the recipients into 
population size groups and comparing the overall proportion of development aid actually 
received by each grouping in the MDG era against that recommended by the model.  The 
countries in the study have been broken into three population size groups in a manner often 
practiced by the United Nations (UN).  Those recipients with a population of between 1 and 
10 million are classified as small countries, those with a population of between 10 and 50 
million are classified as medium countries, and those with a population of greater than 50 
million are classified as large countries.  Figure 16 displays the recipient countries in these 
population-based groupings. 
The actual proportion of EU development aid received by each population size group in the 
MDG era is compared with that recommended by the model in Figure 17.  Meanwhile, 
Figure 18 displays the model recommendation with the actual proportions allocated by the 
Member States to each group, for comparative purposes. 
Figure 17 clearly shows the EU’s development aid allocation to be affected by the 
population size of recipients.  Rather than a small country bias, the issue in this case is 
probably better characterised as an anti-large country bias.  Overall the large countries 
group received a massively smaller proportion of EU development aid disbursements than 
recommended by the model during the MDG era.  By contrast, the medium countries and 
small countries both received a notably higher proportion of EU development aid than that 
suggested by the model.  As shown in Figure 18, similar conclusions can be reached for the 
development aid allocations of the key Member States; each gave small and medium 
countries more development aid than recommended by the model, and large countries less.  
Based on these figures, the EU appears to more strongly prioritise small countries, and 
exhibit a stronger anti-large country bias than the Member States; the EU gives a lower 
proportion of its development aid to large countries, a lower proportion of its development 
aid to medium countries, and a notably higher proportion of its development aid to small 
countries, than the Member States.  Also, it is notable that the UK appears to be less 
influenced by the anti-large country bias than France and Germany; the UK gives the lowest 
proportion of the four donors examined to small countries, and the highest proportion of 
the four donors examined to large countries. 
 
 
 
Page 96 of 127 
 
 
Figure 16: Recipient Population Size Groupings 
Small Countries (1-10 million population) 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Bosnia-H. 
Botswana 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
CAR 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican Rep. 
El Salvador 
Eritrea 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Macedonia 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Oman 
Palestine 
Panama 
Paraguay 
PNG 
Rwanda 
Serbia (incl. 
Kosovo) 
Sierra Leone 
Slovenia 
Swaziland 
Tajikistan 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad and T. 
Turkmenistan 
Uruguay 
Medium Countries (10-50 million population) 
Afghanistan 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Chile 
Colombia 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Iraq 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Niger 
Peru 
Portugal 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tanzania 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Large Countries (Over 50 million population) 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
China 
DR Congo 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Mexico 
Myanmar 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Russia 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Vietnam 
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Figure 17: Percentage of EU Development Aid Disbursed to Population Size 
Groupings in MDG Era 
 
 
Figure 18: Percentage of Key Member State Development Aid Disbursed to 
Population Size Groupings in MDG Era 
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To summarise, the development aid allocation of the EU during the MDG era was affected 
by the two obvious biases of a geographic bias towards the Enlargement Area and 
Neighbourhood, and a population bias against large countries.  Both of these biases were 
also exhibited, though generally to a notably less extent, by the key Member States.  Of 
particular note was the fact that during the MDG era, the EU distributed over 40% of its 
development aid budget to the Enlargement area and Neighbourhood; regions that are 
geographically proximal to the EU itself, but have notably lower levels of need than other 
parts of the world.  This would appear to reflect a deliberate decision by the EU to focus its 
energies on its own region of the world.  Regarding the large countries, it is important to 
note that, regardless of their overall level of development, they are generally considered to 
be important and influential in the international system, and also as more capable of 
generating their own development progress.  As such, they are often seen as less suitable 
targets for development aid, and in some cases are donors themselves, and prefer to be cast 
as such rather than as development aid recipients; this is particularly the case with India and 
China, the two countries the model recommends receive the highest shares of development 
aid.  Overall, these biases may justifiable or defensible, and the anti-large country bias in 
particular is not uncommon, but nonetheless it is necessary to acknowledge that they 
reduce the influence of need on the EU’s overall development aid distribution.  
 
 
Section 5.2 – Pearson Correlation Coefficient Tests 
 
In addition to aiding in the production of descriptive statistics, the HDI-based aid allocation 
model can be used in statistical tests.  This section summarises the results of Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient Tests run comparing those development aid proportions suggested 
by the model, with those actually observed in the real world; the Pearson test is a simple 
statistical test commonly used in the social sciences to test for an association between 
variables.  For the purposes of this research, it is testing for a potential association between 
need as expressed by the model, and the actual development aid distributions of the EU and 
the key Member States.  The tests were performed using the SPSS statistical package from 
IBM, a piece of software widely used in the social sciences. 
The tests were run for each of the four donors being examined in the research; the EU, and 
the key Member States of France, Germany and the UK.  Again, the primary focus, as for 
research as a whole, was on the EU, and the Member States were included mainly for 
comparative purposes.  The tests were run with four different samples of recipients, to 
reflect the obvious biases overviewed in the previous section.  The first of these samples 
contained all recipient countries included in the research.  The second sample contained all 
countries in the study except those located in the Enlargement Area or Neighbourhood, to 
remove the geographic bias towards those countries already accounted for.  The third 
sample contained all except those large countries with a population of over 50 million, to 
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remove the anti-large country bias already accounted for.  The final sample included all 
countries except the large countries and the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood 
countries; that is, it included all the small and medium countries located outside the 
Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood.  Thus, this fourth and final sample removed both the 
clear biases already identified.  Due to different makeup of these samples, it was necessary 
to recalculate the model for each of them. 
The most important figure generated by the test is the correlation value, which is a number 
between -1 and 1.  This indicates the extent to which the two variables, in this case the 
proportion of development aid recommended by the model, and the actual proportion of 
development aid disbursed, are associated.  A value of -1 indicates a perfect negative 
relationship between the variables, which would mean that the distribution of development 
aid was perfectly negatively associated with need, as unlikely finding.  A value of 0 indicates 
no relationship between the variables, which would mean that levels of need have no 
impact on levels of development aid.  A value of 1 indicates a perfect positive relationship 
 
Figure 19: Summary of EU Pearson Test Results 
Sample 1: All Countries in Study 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .082 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .377 
N 118 118 
Actual Pearson Correlation .082 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .377  
N 118 118 
 
Sample 2: EA and Neighbourhood Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .247* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .018 
N 92 92 
Actual Pearson Correlation .247* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .018  
N 92 92 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 3: Large Countries Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .394** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 100 100 
Actual Pearson Correlation .394** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 4: Small Sample 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .810** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 76 76 
Actual Pearson Correlation .810** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 76 76 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
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between the variables, which means that the distribution of development aid was perfectly 
associated with need, an ideal finding.  Practically, the values generated are located 
between 0 and 1; a value closer to 0 indicates a weaker relationship between the aid 
allocation and need as expressed by the model, while a value of closer to 1 indicates a 
stronger relationship.  It is important to note that three of the 16 tests generated results 
that cannot be considered statistically significant due to the particular makeup of those 
samples, but are still included for completeness and nonetheless still give a broad indication 
of the relationship.  Also, as always in the social sciences, it is necessary to state that 
correlation tests themselves indicate only the extent to which the variables are correlated, 
and not whether a causal relationship between them exists. 
Pearson tests for all four donors were run with all four samples.  This allowed for 
comparisons of the extent to which each combination was associated with need.  Figure 19 
offers a summary of the results of the Pearson tests run with the EU data, Figure 20 offers a 
summary of the test results run with the data for France, Figure 21 summarises the test 
results for Germany, and Figure 22 summarises the test results for the UK. 
 
Figure 20: Summary of France Pearson Test Results 
Sample 1: All Countries in Study 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .133 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .150 
N 118 118 
Actual Pearson Correlation .133 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .150  
N 118 118 
 
Sample 2: EA and Neighbourhood Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .140 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .182 
N 92 92 
Actual Pearson Correlation .140 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .182  
N 92 92 
 
 
Sample 3: Large Countries Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .306** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .002 
N 100 100 
Actual Pearson Correlation .306** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002  
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 4: Small Sample 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .267* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .020 
N 76 76 
Actual Pearson Correlation .267* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .020  
N 76 76 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
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Figure 21: Summary of Germany Pearson Test Results 
Sample 1: All Countries in Study 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .403** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 118 118 
Actual Pearson Correlation .403** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 118 118 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 2: EA and Neighbourhood Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .407** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 92 92 
Actual Pearson Correlation .407** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 92 92 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 3: Large Countries Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .348** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 100 100 
Actual Pearson Correlation .348** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 4: Small Sample 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .354** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .002 
N 76 76 
Actual Pearson Correlation .354** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002  
N 76 76 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
 
The tests generated a number of interesting results regarding the extent to which the 
development aid distribution of the EU was associated with need during the MDG era.  The 
most important test was that with Sample 1, as it included all the countries in the study.  For 
the EU, this generated a correlation value of 0.082, which being very close to 0, indicates 
that there is only a very weak relationship between the variables.  This was one of the three 
results not considered statistically significant, but nonetheless was the lowest score 
recorded amongst all the tests.  The value generated for Sample 2, the sample with the 
geographically favoured countries removed, was 0.247.  While this still indicates a weak 
relationship, it shows EU development aid to be more closely associated with need if the 
Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood are taken out of consideration.  Sample 3, the 
sample without the large countries, generated a value of 0.394; again, this is still not a close 
relationship, but it does indicate that the development aid allocation of the EU was more 
closely associated with need amongst small and medium countries as a group, than amongst 
all recipients.  These scores show the existence and effect of the two biases overviewed in 
the previous section, and indicate the anti-large country bias to be playing a stronger role 
than the geographic bias.  Finally, Sample 4, the sample with both of these biases removed, 
generated a value of 0.810, which indicates a close positive relationship between the  
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Figure 22: Summary of UK Pearson Test Results 
Sample 1: All Countries in Study 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .563** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 118 118 
Actual Pearson Correlation .563** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 118 118 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 2: EA and Neighbourhood Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .557** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 92 92 
Actual Pearson Correlation .557** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 92 92 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 3: Large Countries Removed 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .696** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 100 100 
Actual Pearson Correlation .696** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Sample 4: Small Sample 
 Model Actual 
Model Pearson Correlation 1 .722** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 76 76 
Actual Pearson Correlation .722** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 76 76 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
 
variables.  This was the highest score amongst the 16 tests run, and indicates that once the 
geographic bias and population size bias were accounted for, the remaining EU 
development aid was allocated on a basis closely reflecting relative recipient needs.  That is, 
within this sample group, a greater level of need was associated with a greater proportion 
of development aid received. 
The results for the tests run for the distributions of the key Member States, for comparative 
purposes, are also summarised in tables in this section; there are three important points to 
note regarding how they compare overall with the EU.  Firstly, for Sample 1, which includes 
all countries in the study, the allocations for all three of the key Member States are more 
closely associated with need than that of the EU; this is a clear finding.  Secondly, while the 
removal of countries affected by the two biases clearly improves the association of the 
model recommendations with the actual figures for the EU, it does this to a much weaker 
extent for the Member States.  This indicates that those particular biases are uniquely 
strong for the EU, and that the distributions of the key Member States are affected by other 
issues not examined in this thesis.  Thirdly, and relatedly, the EU distribution appears in 
stages to be more equitable compared with the Member States as the obvious biases are 
removed; it has a more equitable distribution than France with the geographic bias 
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removed, a more equitable distribution than both France and Germany with the large 
countries removed, and more equitable distribution than all three with both biases 
removed.  Finally, a comparison between the Member States themselves shows a clear 
result; of those three donors, the development aid distribution of the UK is most closely 
associated with need in each of the four sample groups.  For each of the tests, the 
correlation value generated for the UK was above 0.5, which indicates a close relationship 
between need and the development aid allocation of that donor.  Furthermore, all four 
sample groups showed France to have the weakest relationship between levels of need and 
actual aid allocations amongst the three key Member States, while in all cases Germany 
occupied the middle position. 
 
 
Section 5.3 – Identification of Chronically Underfunded Countries 
 
The problem of chronically underfunded countries, overviewed in Section 2.8, is an issue 
gaining increasing attention in development studies, and is a focus for this thesis.  A 
potential use of the HDI-based aid allocation model is to identify the numbers and identities 
of countries that can be considered chronically underfunded.  In this case, it does this by 
comparing the proportion of development aid each recipient received during the MDG 
period against the proportion predicted by the model.  Using overall totals from a large 
period of 13 years is a sufficient justification to classify those countries shown to be 
underfunded as chronically underfunded.  However, it is important to note that technically 
they are better understood as potentially chronically underfunded due to the possibility 
they may be relatively well-funded by other donors not investigated in this research, or 
through other means of financing for development not investigated in this research. 
The Pearson tests overviewed in the previous section utilised four different samples of 
recipients, to account for the clear biases in the distribution of EU development aid 
identified earlier.  When looking to identify chronically underfunded countries the most 
useful sample of these was Sample 4, the small sample with the countries affected by the 
two clear biases removed.  This was for two main reasons.  Firstly, the effect of the 
geographic and population size biases is so strong that if included in a sample, the 
Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood countries are consistently identified as relatively 
overfunded, and the large countries are consistently identified as chronically underfunded, 
reflecting findings already identified and established in the research.  Secondly, the finding 
that within the small sample EU development aid is overall strongly associated with need is 
notable, and it would be particularly interesting to investigate which countries can be 
identified as relatively overfunded or chronically underfunded within this group. 
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Figure 23: Percentage of Aid Recommended by HDI-based Allocation Model 
(small sample) 
Country % Rec. 
Sudan 5.999 
Tanzania 5.902 
Kenya 4.391 
Uganda 4.160 
Mozambique 3.903 
Afghanistan 3.864 
South Africa 3.219 
Nepal 3.061 
Niger 2.802 
Yemen 2.786 
Cote d'Ivoire 2.756 
Angola 2.534 
Burkina Faso 2.490 
Cambodia 2.427 
Cameroon 2.427 
Madagascar 2.398 
Ghana 2.350 
Mali 2.307 
Malawi 2.188 
Colombia 1.949 
Chad 1.926 
Iraq 1.917 
Zimbabwe 1.851 
Guinea 1.661 
Uzbekistan 1.653 
Senegal 1.580 
Sierra Leone 1.580 
Zambia 1.537 
Burundi 1.509 
Rwanda 1.433 
Haiti 1.266 
Benin 1.208 
Guatemala 1.121 
Peru 1.043 
PNG 0.842 
Togo 0.793 
Venezuela 0.787 
CAR 0.747 
Eritrea 0.706 
Sri Lanka 0.653 
Laos 0.638 
Tajikistan 0.620 
Ecuador 0.615 
Liberia 0.594 
Bolivia 0.573 
Honduras 0.570 
Malaysia 0.537 
Dominican Rep. 0.461 
Kazakhstan 0.457 
Nicaragua 0.450 
Mauritania 0.432 
Argentina 0.394 
Kyrgyzstan 0.389 
Congo 0.381 
El Salvador 0.370 
Paraguay 0.339 
Lesotho 0.257 
Guinea-Bissau 0.238 
Gambia 0.226 
Turkmenistan 0.205 
Namibia 0.172 
Mongolia 0.159 
Saudi Arabia 0.158 
Botswana 0.131 
Swaziland 0.126 
Costa Rica 0.114 
Jamaica 0.106 
Timor-Leste 0.101 
Panama 0.084 
Gabon 0.083 
Chile 0.075 
Oman 0.058 
Uruguay 0.048 
Cuba 0.047 
Mauritius 0.035 
Trinidad and T. 0.030 
 
To clarify, the small sample used in the below calculations is made up of all those recipients 
in the study not located in the Enlargement Area or Neighbourhood with populations of less 
than 50 million.  While labelled the small sample for the purposes of this research, it 
contains a still-significant number of 76 countries that are roughly comparable to each 
other, and on the whole receive an equitable distribution of development aid from the EU.  
The use of the small sample necessitated a recalculation of the HDI-based aid allocation 
model, and the proportions recommended for each country in the sample are shown in 
Figure 23; they are shown to three decimal places and listed from the largest 
recommendation to the smallest. 
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Figure 24: Comparison of HDI-based Allocation Model with Actual Percentage 
Disbursed by EU (small sample) 
Country Model Actual Diff. 
Afghanistan 3.86 6.47 2.60 
Haiti 1.27 2.44 1.17 
Mauritania 0.43 1.53 1.10 
Mauritius 0.03 1.13 1.09 
Jamaica 0.11 1.15 1.05 
South Africa 3.22 4.24 1.02 
Zambia 1.54 2.43 0.89 
Mali 2.31 3.17 0.86 
Burkina Faso 2.49 3.31 0.82 
Nicaragua 0.45 1.26 0.81 
Bolivia 0.57 1.33 0.75 
Dominican Rep. 0.46 1.19 0.73 
Benin 1.21 1.93 0.72 
Liberia 0.59 1.25 0.66 
Rwanda 1.43 2.07 0.64 
Burundi 1.51 2.04 0.53 
Honduras 0.57 1.03 0.46 
Guinea-Bissau 0.24 0.68 0.44 
Timor-Leste 0.10 0.54 0.44 
Lesotho 0.26 0.69 0.43 
Namibia 0.17 0.55 0.38 
El Salvador 0.37 0.74 0.37 
Chile 0.07 0.44 0.37 
Sri Lanka 0.65 1.00 0.35 
Senegal 1.58 1.91 0.33 
Chad 1.93 2.24 0.31 
Argentina 0.39 0.68 0.29 
Botswana 0.13 0.42 0.29 
Congo 0.38 0.66 0.28 
Swaziland 0.13 0.38 0.26 
Malawi 2.19 2.41 0.22 
Gabon 0.08 0.28 0.20 
Kyrgyzstan 0.39 0.57 0.18 
Cuba 0.05 0.20 0.15 
CAR 0.75 0.90 0.15 
Uruguay 0.05 0.19 0.14 
Ecuador 0.62 0.73 0.12 
Gambia 0.23 0.30 0.07 
Tajikistan 0.62 0.69 0.07 
Mozambique 3.90 3.97 0.07 
Paraguay 0.34 0.40 0.06 
Sierra Leone 1.58 1.62 0.04 
Costa Rica 0.11 0.12 0.00 
Panama 0.08 0.08 0.00 
Mongolia 0.16 0.13 -0.03 
Niger 2.80 2.78 -0.03 
Trinidad and T. 0.03 0.00 -0.03 
Peru 1.04 0.99 -0.05 
Madagascar 2.40 2.35 -0.05 
Oman 0.06 0.00 -0.06 
Eritrea 0.71 0.61 -0.09 
Turkmenistan 0.21 0.07 -0.13 
Iraq 1.92 1.79 -0.13 
Saudi Arabia 0.16 0.00 -0.16 
Kazakhstan 0.46 0.29 -0.16 
Togo 0.79 0.61 -0.19 
Laos 0.64 0.33 -0.30 
Guatemala 1.12 0.78 -0.34 
Ghana 2.35 1.97 -0.38 
PNG 0.84 0.44 -0.41 
Zimbabwe 1.85 1.44 -0.41 
Malaysia 0.54 0.00 -0.54 
Venezuela 0.79 0.25 -0.54 
Guinea 1.66 0.92 -0.75 
Colombia 1.95 1.15 -0.80 
Cote d'Ivoire 2.76 1.89 -0.86 
Cameroon 2.43 1.54 -0.89 
Sudan 6.00 5.02 -0.98 
Uganda 4.16 3.00 -1.16 
Angola 2.53 1.28 -1.26 
Uzbekistan 1.65 0.19 -1.46 
Cambodia 2.43 0.80 -1.63 
Kenya 4.39 2.70 -1.69 
Yemen 2.79 0.82 -1.97 
Tanzania 5.90 3.81 -2.09 
Nepal 3.06 0.70 -2.36 
Page 106 of 127 
 
 
Country Model Actual Diff. 
Iraq 1.92 8.85 6.93 
Afghanistan 3.86 7.14 3.28 
Congo 0.38 2.31 1.93 
Cameroon 2.43 3.87 1.44 
Cote d'Ivoire 2.76 3.98 1.22 
Senegal 1.58 2.72 1.14 
Zambia 1.54 2.54 1.00 
Mauritius 0.03 0.70 0.66 
Nicaragua 0.45 1.04 0.59 
Mauritania 0.43 1.01 0.58 
Liberia 0.59 1.14 0.55 
Ghana 2.35 2.85 0.50 
Bolivia 0.57 1.03 0.46 
Chile 0.07 0.53 0.45 
Jamaica 0.11 0.50 0.39 
Botswana 0.13 0.50 0.37 
Namibia 0.17 0.51 0.34 
Rwanda 1.43 1.77 0.33 
Gabon 0.08 0.37 0.28 
Benin 1.21 1.44 0.23 
Dominican Rep. 0.46 0.69 0.23 
Mongolia 0.16 0.35 0.19 
Timor-Leste 0.10 0.27 0.17 
Haiti 1.27 1.41 0.15 
Argentina 0.39 0.50 0.11 
Lesotho 0.26 0.34 0.08 
Costa Rica 0.11 0.19 0.08 
Cuba 0.05 0.12 0.07 
Kyrgyzstan 0.39 0.46 0.07 
Honduras 0.57 0.64 0.07 
Uruguay 0.05 0.12 0.07 
El Salvador 0.37 0.42 0.05 
Guinea-Bissau 0.24 0.28 0.04 
Sri Lanka 0.65 0.69 0.04 
Malawi 2.19 2.22 0.03 
Swaziland 0.13 0.13 0.01 
Trinidad and T. 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
Togo 0.79 0.75 -0.04 
Panama 0.08 0.03 -0.06 
Oman 0.06 0.00 -0.06 
Gambia 0.23 0.16 -0.07 
Peru 1.04 0.96 -0.08 
South Africa 3.22 3.12 -0.10 
Mali 2.31 2.21 -0.10 
Ecuador 0.62 0.50 -0.12 
Tajikistan 0.62 0.49 -0.13 
Saudi Arabia 0.16 0.02 -0.13 
CAR 0.75 0.61 -0.14 
Paraguay 0.34 0.18 -0.16 
Laos 0.64 0.48 -0.16 
Turkmenistan 0.21 0.04 -0.17 
Sierra Leone 1.58 1.40 -0.18 
Kazakhstan 0.46 0.26 -0.20 
Burkina Faso 2.49 2.23 -0.26 
Zimbabwe 1.85 1.53 -0.32 
Madagascar 2.40 2.04 -0.36 
Eritrea 0.71 0.30 -0.41 
Burundi 1.51 1.10 -0.41 
Malaysia 0.54 0.11 -0.43 
Mozambique 3.90 3.46 -0.44 
Chad 1.93 1.37 -0.56 
Venezuela 0.79 0.19 -0.60 
Guatemala 1.12 0.49 -0.63 
Colombia 1.95 1.31 -0.64 
PNG 0.84 0.16 -0.68 
Guinea 1.66 0.93 -0.73 
Niger 2.80 1.90 -0.90 
Kenya 4.39 3.06 -1.33 
Uzbekistan 1.65 0.30 -1.35 
Cambodia 2.43 0.96 -1.47 
Yemen 2.79 1.21 -1.58 
Uganda 4.16 2.57 -1.59 
Nepal 3.06 1.43 -1.63 
Tanzania 5.90 4.17 -1.74 
Angola 2.53 0.61 -1.92 
Sudan 6.00 3.71 -2.29 
Figure 25: Comparison of HDI-based Allocation Model with Actual Percentage 
Disbursed by EU, France, Germany and the UK Combined (small sample) 
 
Figure 24 shows a comparison of the proportions recommended by the model for each 
recipient country against the proportion of development aid funding it actually received from 
the EU during the MDG era.  In this display the recipients are ordered by the difference 
between the two figures, with those most relatively overfunded at top and those most 
underfunded at the bottom.  Regarding the key Member States, it is not reasonable to compare 
them with the EU using the small sample, as their distributions are affected by different issues 
not accounted for in this research, and the sample has been constructed to account for the two 
clear biases of the EU; Member State distributions would show as unbalanced within this 
particular sample, despite the fact that they each have a more equitable development aid 
distribution overall than the EU.  Nonetheless, there is value in displaying a composite of the 
smaller sample figures for the EU and the Member States; it can illuminate the issue of 
chronically underfunded countries further, as it represents a greater bulk of overall funding 
without overly unbalancing the proportions.  Each of the three key Member States gave a total 
amount of development aid to this group of countries over the MDG period that was 
comparable to that of the EU.  So, using the small sample, Figure 25 shows a comparison of the 
proportions for each recipient recommended by the model, against the proportion of the total 
development aid funding pool of the EU and the three key Member States combined that it 
received during the MDG era; again, the recipients are ordered by difference, with those most 
relatively overfunded at the top, and those most underfunded at the bottom. 
While these tables show the distance between the model prediction and the actual proportion 
received for each recipient, and the listing of them in order shows how they compare with each 
other, discretion is required to interpret the level of distance necessary to deem a particular 
recipient relatively overfunded or underfunded.  The general benchmark adopted in this 
research is that a difference of 1 between the percentage of the overall total recommended by 
the model and that actually received is sufficient to constitute being relatively overfunded or 
underfunded.  It is interesting to note that within this sample few countries receive a share of 
the total sufficiently different from that recommended by the model to cross this benchmark.  
This shows that, within this sample of countries, the EU appears to take into account relative 
levels of need when determining its development aid distribution.  Nonetheless, using the 1% 
of total benchmark, the six countries listed at the top of Figure 24 can be considered as 
relatively overfunded, and the eight countries at the bottom can be considered as relatively 
underfunded.  The composite table, Figure 25, which includes the Member States, reveals two 
points of interest.  Firstly, the set of seven countries identified as relatively overfunded includes 
six different recipients from the previous table, indicating that amongst this sample group the 
EU and the key Member States tend to favour different recipients.  Secondly, the set of nine 
countries identified as relatively underfunded is almost identical to that in the previous table, 
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with only one new entry; this indicates that amongst this sample group the EU and the key 
Member States tend to allow the same group of countries to go underfunded. 
Figure 26 summarises the information contained in these tables in map form.  For simplicity, it 
groups those countries identified as relatively overfunded or underfunded in at least one of the 
two tables together.  The red countries can be classified as potentially chronically underfunded 
and the yellow countries can be classified as relatively overfunded.  The green countries are 
those that were not indicated to be relatively overfunded or underfunded.  The grey countries 
are those that were not included in this sample, and the blue countries are the Member States 
of the EU. 
 
 
Figure 26: Map of Potentially Chronically Underfunded Countries 
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Section 6.1 – Summary of Findings 
 
The previous chapter analysed the performance of the European Union (EU) as a development 
aid donor by examining its development aid distribution.  It did so using the HDI-based aid 
allocation model introduced in this research, and thus provided examples of how the model can 
be applied. 
A comparison of the proportions of EU development aid funding received during the era of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by different geographic groups of recipients, based on 
the different development aid funding instruments used by the EU, indicates a clear bias 
towards the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood.  While the model recommends around 4% 
of development aid be disbursed to these groups, the EU disburses just over 40% of its 
development aid budget to them.  During the MDG era, the EU bias towards the Enlargement 
Area and Neighbourhood was much stronger than the historic bias it has had towards the 
Africa-CP group, although the latter bias is still in effect to a lesser extent.  The geographic bias 
towards the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood appears somewhat unique to the EU, as the 
Member States used for comparative purposes exhibit this bias much more weakly. 
A comparison of the proportions of EU development aid funding received during the MDG era 
by different groups of recipients based on their population size also indicates a clear bias, in this 
case against large countries.  The EU disburses around 26% of its development aid to large 
countries, while the model recommends that group should receive 75% of development aid 
funding.  The high recommendation is a reflection of the fact that large numbers of poor people 
are living in developing countries that overall are not among the poorest.  This bias, usually 
characterised as a small country bias but better understood here as an anti-large country bias, 
is not uncommon in development, but the EU appears to exhibit it particularly strongly, as 
when compared with the key Member States for instance. 
Statistical testing using the Pearson method was performed comparing the development aid 
proportions actually received by recipients during the MDG era with those recommended by 
the HDI-based aid allocation model.  This showed that overall the development aid distribution 
of the EU was not associated with need.  Furthermore, the distribution of the EU was less 
closely associated with need than those distributions of each of the key Member States.  
However, once those recipient countries affected by the biases outlined above were removed, 
the development aid distribution of the EU was shown to be strongly associated with need as 
expressed by the model.  As previous studies examining EU development aid allocations have 
generally been critical, this is perhaps a surprising and encouraging finding.  Amongst the three 
key Member States examined, the development aid distribution of the United Kingdom (UK) 
was consistently shown to be the most closely associated with need, that of France to be the 
least closely associated with need, and that of Germany to be situated between them. 
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Finally, the model was used to investigate the potential presence of chronically underfunded 
countries in the development aid distribution of the EU; to do this it used the smaller sample of 
countries that as a sample group had been shown to have a distribution closely associated with 
need overall.  The analysis identified twelve countries that could potentially be considered as 
relatively overfunded countries; this included eight countries in Africa (Cameroon, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia), two countries in the 
Caribbean (Haiti and Jamaica), and two countries in Asia (Afghanistan and Iraq).  More 
pertinently, it identified nine countries that could potentially be considered as chronically 
underfunded countries; five in Africa and four in Asia.  The African countries identified were 
Angola, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, and the Asian countries identified were Cambodia, 
Nepal, Uzbekistan and Yemen.  With the exception of Nepal, these countries do not match 
those identified as potentially chronically underfunded by the two previous studies examining 
the matter; though those studies used different and shorter time periods, different models not 
generally based on need, and did not have an exclusive focus on the EU.  It is important to note 
that while the countries identified are potentially chronically underfunded, further investigation 
would be required to confirm them as such. 
 
 
Section 6.2 – Revisiting the Research Topic 
 
This thesis began by outlining a number of research questions designed to guide its overall 
approach and as it concludes it is necessary to revisit these questions. 
The main guiding research question for this thesis called for an investigation of the extent to 
which the development aid distribution of the EU reflected the relative human development 
needs of recipients.  This research question informed the overall structure of the thesis, which 
was organised in such a way as to best examine its components.  The development studies 
perspective adopted in Chapter 2 situated the specific issue of development aid allocations 
within the wider context of ideas about development aid, and in the yet wider context of ideas 
and theories about development itself; Section 2.2 in particular outlines the human 
development approach and how it understands need.  The European studies perspective 
adopted in Chapter 3 situated the issue of the EU’s development aid distribution within the 
wider context of the EU’s overall approach to development, which is set within the yet wider 
context of the unique international actor that is the EU itself.  The sections contained in those 
chapters have each illuminated a relevant aspect that in some way influences the extent to 
which the development aid distribution of the EU reflects relative human development needs. 
The research model based on the main guiding research question identified need as the 
independent variable and the development aid distribution as the dependent variable.  Section 
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2.7 examined the main influences that guide development aid allocations, and identified these 
as need, institutional performance and political factors; the latter two influences thus 
constitute intervening variables.  While it was hypothesised that need played an important role 
in determining the development aid distribution of the EU, the analysis performed in this 
research indicates that overall it does not.  However, once two clear biases are accounted for, a 
geographic bias towards the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood, and a population size bias 
against large countries, need is shown to be closely associated with the development aid 
distribution of the EU. 
An additional focus of this research was on the related research questions querying the extent 
to which the EU’s approach to development aid was influenced respectively by development 
theory and the nature of the EU itself.  The first half of Chapter 2 introduced the most 
prominent theories and ideas about development, as well as the human development approach 
adopted in this thesis, and the contemporary evolution of development theory.  Meanwhile, 
the first half of Chapter 3 outlined the unique and complex structure of the EU and approaches 
to understanding how it operates.  Both aspects undoubtedly have some effect on the EU’s 
behaviour as a development aid donor.  The EU’s approach to development is generally seen as 
reflecting a neoliberal development outlook, and the nature of the Cotonou Agreement reflects 
this; however overall the EU does not appear to have a strong ideological stance regarding 
development theory, but rather is influenced more by its own nature.  This is reflected in the 
likes of the relatively high proportion of aid it gives to regional organisations in the developing 
world, the inclusion of the regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) aspect in the 
Cotonou Agreement, and the influence of regional biases on its development aid distribution.  
The historic Africa-CP bias reflects the institutional relationship it formed with a group made up 
largely of former colonies of two of its prominent Member States.  The stronger Enlargement 
Area and Neighbourhood bias is unique to the EU in development and can be traced to the 
successive enlargements that constitute an important part of its history.  These and other 
facets of the EU’s approach to development can be traced to aspects of its own nature more so 
than to general theories and ideas about development. 
A secondary focus of this research was on the chronically underfunded countries problem and 
the extent to which the EU allowed certain recipient countries to go underfunded in the 
distribution of its development aid.  Section 2.8 examined the chronically underfunded 
countries problem in particular.  The analysis performed in this research suggests a two-tiered 
answer to this question.  Firstly, the distribution of the EU’s development aid is affected more 
strongly by the geographic and population size biases than by any specific imbalances between 
comparable recipients.  Secondly, amongst small and medium countries outside the geographic 
bias area, the EU’s development aid distribution is surprisingly equitable, though it does allow 
potentially up to nine countries to go chronically underfunded.  This appears to be a low 
number, but as this is a new and emerging research area it is difficult to reach a strong 
conclusion in this regard.  
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An additional secondary focus for this research was on how the development aid distribution of 
the EU compared with the three key Member States of France, Germany and the UK.  As the 
Member States were only analysed within the context of the EU and the complex governance 
structure of Europe, and not in their own right, conclusions on this matter are necessarily 
tentative.  It was hypothesised that the development aid distribution of the EU would better 
reflect relative needs than that of the key Member States, due to the traditionally strong effect 
of political factors on the behaviour of bilateral donors.  The conclusion based on the analysis 
performed by this research is the opposite; the development aid distribution of the key 
Member States more closely reflects relative needs than that of the EU.  The two strong biases 
that affect the EU’s development aid distribution affect the Member States much more weakly.  
The general absence of an Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood bias amongst the Member 
States is interesting and somewhat confirms the idea that they believe they have outsourced 
this region to the EU.  Of the three Member States themselves, the analysis shows the aid 
distribution of the UK to most closely reflect human development needs, followed by Germany 
and then France. 
The last remaining issue raised by the research questions referred to investigating the extent to 
which the EU’s approach to development indicated it constitutes a normative power in 
international relations.  Section 3.3 examined the concept of normative power, and Section 3.4 
examined linkages between the concept and development policy in particular.  Regarding this 
issue the research is somewhat inconclusive.  While the rhetorical approach of the EU to 
development in many ways indicates a normative ambition, its ability to shape development 
theory and the development agenda appears limited, especially considering its status as the 
world’s leading donor in monetary terms.  Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude the EU 
constitutes a normative power in development considering the strong biases that affect its 
development aid distribution and the fact that overall, according to the analysis performed 
here, need does not play a leading role in determining said distribution. 
 
 
Section 6.3 – Practical Implications 
 
The EU and its Member States together constitute the world’s leading donor in monetary 
terms.  Thus they have the greatest capacity to positively influence developmental changes in 
the world.  However, the EU often overstates its role as in actuality the Member States 
themselves have chosen to retain primary control of their development aid budgets.  The 
development aid budget of the EU, while not insignificant, is comparable overall to that of the 
large Member States.  Within the complex governance structure of Europe, traditionally the EU 
is able to gain greater powers from the Member States if it can show it is a more effective actor 
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in a given field.  Therefore, to increase that part of the development aid budget it directly 
controls, the EU must prove to the Member States that it can function more effectively than 
they as a development actor.  The analysis in this research suggests that during the MDG era, 
the key Member States had more equitable development aid distributions than the EU.  Thus, it 
is difficult to argue, from a human development perspective, that the EU should be given a 
greater share of the overall European development aid packet to distribute.  Rather, it suggests 
that reform is needed in the way the EU distributes its development aid, to better take account 
of the relative needs of recipients. 
The development aid distribution of the EU is surprisingly equitable once the two clear biases 
that affect it have been taken into account, therefore creating a more equitable overall 
development aid distribution for the EU necessarily involves confronting these biases.  The 
geographic bias towards the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood appears unique in 
development and is difficult to justify in terms of human development needs, as these 
countries are relatively developed compared to other parts of the world.  Furthermore, it 
suggests that in the field of development, the EU’s ambition is to be a regional actor rather than 
a global actor, which contradicts the general rhetoric of the EU on the matter.  A more global 
distribution of development aid would better reflect the EU’s stated global ambitions, and does 
not preclude assisting the Enlargement Area and Neighbourhood countries through means 
other than development aid.  Finally, while some degree of small country bias is commonplace 
in development, the anti-large country bias of the EU is particularly strong; while donors are 
often reticent to give development aid to countries already perceived as strong in the 
international system, it seems counterintuitive that a large political unit like the EU would be 
more influenced by this issue than smaller political units like the Member States.  The equitable 
distribution that characterises the remainder of the EU’s development aid packet suggests that 
it has the potential to stand out as an aid equity-based donor in the global development 
landscape, if it can reduce the influence of its two strong biases. 
More generally, the EU needs to consider the overall approach that it adopts to development if 
it seeks to become more influential in the field.  As an institution, the UN has been associated 
with and well-known for adopting the human development approach, and now the sustainable 
development approach.  Meanwhile, the United States and the institutions of the Washington 
Consensus, such as the World Bank, are well-known for adopting and leading the neoliberal 
approach to development.  By contrast, there is not a globally prominent distinct approach to 
development, supported and underpinned by a wide body of development theory, associated 
with the EU as an institution.  Rather, the EU appears to follow and adopt trends and ideas 
generated elsewhere.  Furthermore, it seems somewhat unclear in its overall approach, 
influenced to some extent by the humanistic ideals of normative power Europe and the MDGs, 
but also by neoliberal development ideas, as shown by the trade focus it has largely adopted 
through the Cotonou Agreement.  The region-building aspect that signifies a point of EU 
differentiation, while contestably considered to have influenced international relations more 
generally, cannot be considered as highly influential in development.  While the leading donor 
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in monetary terms, the EU does not appear to be a leading actor in development overall, and 
needs to develop a distinct approach and role for itself that it can be instantly identified with; 
the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 offers a medium-term possibility for this to be 
enacted and should provide impetus for it.  Greater engagement between the European studies 
and development studies disciplines, and greater engagement from the EU with contemporary 
thought in development studies, can help in generating a distinct and influential EU approach to 
development. 
Adopting an aid equity approach to development aid disbursements, and deliberately targeting 
chronically underfunded countries, could help form part of a new and distinct EU approach to 
development.  While need is widely cited as the main justifier for development aid, the reality is 
that political factors influence its distribution, which creates funding imbalances between 
recipients when compared with their relative levels of need.  The EU, as both the leading donor 
in monetary terms, and an international actor influenced to some extent by the idea of 
normative power, is uniquely placed to adopt such an approach.  It seems unnecessary that a 
donor with multilateral characteristics should appear more influenced by traditional political 
factors than the bilateral donors that are the Member States; thus, this feature of the EU’s 
development aid distribution could be relatively rectifiable.  By adopting an aid equity approach 
to its development aid allocations, and targeting chronically underfunded countries, the EU 
could not only help improve the developmental circumstances of those countries most in need, 
but could also give greater clarity of direction to its development policy, and enhance its 
normative power and overall international standing. 
Finally, channelling the normative ambition of the development studies discipline itself, it is 
necessary to part by stating that in an ideal world, development aid would be directed to the 
recipient countries most in need of it.  The advancement and development of human society 
over time should be something that all of humanity can share in, and thus levels of absolute 
deprivation and global inequality should be reduced.  An equitable distribution of development 
aid can help play an admittedly small but nonetheless meaningful role in this process. 
 
 
Section 6.4 – Future Directions for Research 
 
As is always the case, this research was limited by issues of feasibility and scope, however it has 
generated six broad areas for potential future research that could allow for further 
investigation of the issues raised within it. 
The most promising area for future research lies in further development and explication of the 
aid equity concept.  While the concept of aid effectiveness is ubiquitous in development, and 
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clearly has merit, it has led to the undesirable outcome of donors being dis-incentivised from 
giving development aid to those countries most in need.  There is a degree of general concern 
in development that aid should be distributed in a fair manner, however there is not a strong 
and influential concept to crystallise these general concerns around, and the concept of aid 
equity could potentially provide that.  While the main intention would be to generate debate 
and investigation around how aid equity could best be expressed, rather than imposing a 
clearly defined conception of it, further development of an aid equity model or models could 
help advance the concept.  The HDI-based aid allocation model used in this research could 
serve as something of a prototype aiding in further investigation of how best to operationalise 
the aid equity concept. 
A related area for further investigation concerns how best to measure and quantify need.  This 
research used the reputable Human Development Index (HDI) as a basis for its investigation, as 
it was not feasible to create a unique needs index.  However, as how best to measure need is a 
contested concept, it could be of interest to investigate the issue in greater depth, and propose 
a new and unique, yet appropriate means of quantifying need and levels of development. 
A third area for future research could be to investigate other development aid donors, either 
independently, or in comparison with those donors investigated here.  In this research, the 
main focus was on the EU, and the key Member States of France, Germany and the UK were 
used for comparative purposes.  Comparisons with other EU Member States, such as Sweden 
and Denmark, both of whom meet the 0.7% target, could be of interest; those two donors in 
particular offer the possibility to test whether a higher proportion of development aid given is 
equated with a more equitable distribution.  Also, donors from outside the EU, such as the 
United States, Japan, New Zealand, or multilateral donors such as the World Bank, could be 
investigated. 
An additional area for potential future research could be to investigate changes or trends that 
may have occurred in development aid distributions during the MDG period.  While this 
research looked at total development aid disbursements for the whole period, breaking the 
period into smaller blocks would allow for an investigation into changes over time. 
An examination of why particular donors may have more equitable development aid 
distributions than others could also be of interest.  This could take qualitative approach and 
involve interviews with those involved in formulating and administering the development aid 
policies of the EU and other donors.  This approach could also help generate an improved 
understanding of the approaches taken by the EU and other donors to development more 
generally. 
Finally, the particular recipient countries identified as potentially chronically underfunded, or a 
select number of them, could be investigated in greater depth.  The first part of this would 
involve further analysis to determine if those potentially chronically underfunded countries 
were indeed genuinely underfunded.  If established as such, a case-study approach would 
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follow and investigate those particular countries, their political and developmental situations, 
and why they may be going underfunded.  A project of this sort would be an appropriate way to 
build on the type of research undertaken in this thesis. 
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